As we reported in the Nov-Dec 2015 NASPP Advisor, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey announced in October that he is giving 6.8 million shares of common stock that he owns back to Twitter, to be used in Twitter’s stock plan. I started looking into this a little further and found some interesting details.
Not So Fast
Dorsey donated shares he already owned to the plan, unlike other CEOs who have given back outstanding options or awards. Because of this, the shares can’t simply be added to the stock plan. For most companies, the only way to add shares reacquired from investors into a stock plan is to submit the allocation to a shareholder vote.
Why Not Contribute Awards?
It would have been less complicated for Dorsey to have agreed to the cancellation of outstanding options or awards, as other CEOs have done (e.g., see our coverage of LinkedIn CEO Jeff Weiner’s decision to forgo his stock grant in the Mar-Apr 2016 Advisor). These shares can be added back to the plan without shareholder approval. But Dorsey doesn’t have a lot of outstanding awards to give up; he has voluntarily worked without compensation since becoming CEO and, thus, wasn’t granted any awards in 2015. He only has 2,000,000 outstanding stock options.
Enter the Proxy Advisors and Institutional Investors
Of course, submitting the plan to a shareholder vote leads to an analysis of the plan by proxy advisors and investors. It can even lead to a new Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation by ISS. A bit of news that caught my eye was that Twitter had to agree to prohibit repricing without shareholder approval under the plan to secure a favorable vote. Repricing without shareholder approval is a deal-breaker under the EPSC.
It’s Complicated
My first thought on reading this was “no good deed goes unpunished.” But, on second thought, I’m not sure that’s the case here. I’m not even sure this is a good deed. Rather than submit the proposal as a allocation of shares to their existing plan, Twitter adopted an entirely new plan for just the 6.8 million shares. The amendment to prohibit repricing only applies to this new plan; as far as I can tell, repricing is still permitted without shareholder approval under Twitter’s existing plans (under which any currently underwater options would likely have been granted).
Where’s the Urgency?
I was surprised to note that Twitter had over 110 million shares available in its 2013 plan as of December 31 and that the plan includes an evergreen provision, under which close to 35 million shares were added to the plan this year. It looks like Twitter granted less than 25 million shares last year, so it seems hard to believe that they are going to need those 6.8 million shares anytime soon.
Which makes me wonder why Dorsey donated the shares. Was it just a publicity stunt? A way to increase employee morale? (And, if so, did it work? Better than donating the 2,000,000 outstanding options would have worked?)
In late March, ISS issued an updated Equity Compensation Plans FAQ. This development was largely eclipsed by the FASB’s issuance of ASU 2016-09, so I haven’t had a chance to get around to it until now. Here is a quick summary of the most significant updates:
Plan Amendments
FAQ 2 has been updated and a new FAQ 28 has been added to clarify that plan amendments may be evaluated under the Equity Plan Scorecard (EPSC), if the amendment could increase the potential cost of the plan. (By “cost,” ISS means dilution or shareholder value transfer; ISS is less concerned with the actual P&L expense.)
In other cases, i.e., amendments that don’t increase cost to shareholders, ISS evaluates the amendment based on whether it is favorable to shareholder interests, but without going through the whole EPSC.
Plans submitted for shareholder approval solely for Section 162(m) purposes fall into a separate category and ISS hasn’t changed or clarified anything with respect to these proposals.
Share Withholding
ISS suggests requesting new shares or extending the term of a plan as examples of the types of amendments that would trigger a new EPSC evaluation, but my guess is that this would also include amendments to allow share withholding for taxes up to the maximum tax rate when the shares withheld will be returned to the plan (my blog from last week explains why these amendments are necessary).
It’s possible that the timing of the release of these updated FAQs is not coincidental. It’s also possible I’m paranoid; hard to say. But then again, just because I’m paranoid, doesn’t mean ISS won’t apply the EPSC to your share withholding amendment. This issue is definitely a hot button for ISS. If your plan allows shares withheld for taxes to be returned to your plan, it’s a good idea to discuss this with whoever advises you on ISS concerns before you amend your plan.
Performance Awards
Previously, the FAQ provided that ISS would consider performance awards as being subject to accelerated vesting upon a CIC, unless the amount paid was tied to the performance achieved as of the CIC and was pro rated based on the amount of the performance period that was completed.
The new FAQ states that:
If a plan would permit accelerated vesting of performance awards upon a change in control (either automatically, at the board’s discretion, or only if they are not assumed), ISS will consider whether the amount of the performance award that would be payable/vested is (a) at target level, (b) above target level, (c) based on actual performance as of the CIC date and/or pro rated based on the time elapsed in the performance period as of the CIC date, or (d) based on board discretion.
I’m not sure this changes much, but it does seem to be a more nuanced position.
If you’re feeling curious about how equity plan proposals are performing with shareholder votes, today’s blog has answers. Semler Brossy recently released their 2016 report on Trends in Equity Plan Proposals. Keep reading for some of the highlights.
Upward Trend in Failed Say-on-Pay Votes?
The number of companies each proxy cycle that have failed to obtain say-on-pay (“SOP”) approval from shareholders has remained fairly constant since SOP became mandatory 2011. This time last year, only two of the Russell 3,000 companies had failed their SOP vote. This year, that number has increased to five companies so far. Does this signify an uptick in SOP failures? It appears so, because the number of companies with failed votes so far in 2016 amounts to 3.5%, marking the first time more than 3% of Russell 3000 companies have failed at this time in the cycle to obtain an affirmative vote. Whether this is an anomaly year, or an indicator of a trend, time will tell.
Correlation Between Affirmative Say-on-Pay and Stock Plan Proposal Approvals
One correlation that appears to be rising is that companies who receive a pass Say-on-Pay vote also receive strong support for their equity plan proposals. Since SOP was adopted, the percentage of equity plan proposals that receive affirmative support relative to passing SOP votes has steadily increased (from 83% in 2011 to 90% in 2015). According to the Semler Brossy report,
Similarly, average vote support for equity plans at companies that receive an ISS ‘For’ recommendation has increased over time; this may suggest that ISS voting policies have become well-aligned with shareholder preferences
Companies that fail Say on Pay tend to have significantly lower support for their equity plan proposals, indicating that shareholders are assessing both proposals under similar lenses
A couple of final data points that seem to bring this all full circle are that ISS has recommended that shareholders vote “Against” Say-on-Pay at 10% of the companies it’s assessed so far in 2016, and, on top of that, shareholder support was 32% lower at companies with an ISS “Against” vote. This seems to suggest that companies looking for shareholder support in other areas, such as equity plan proposals, are more likely to gain shareholder support when ISS has recommended an affirmative Say-on-Pay vote. At minimum, there is an intertwining of all these factors and how they drive shareholder support.
For more interesting Say-on-Pay and equity plan proposal trends, view the full Semler Brossy report.
One area of ISS’s voting policy that you can count on changing every year are the burn rate benchmarks. ISS updates these benchmarks based on historical data. In theory, if granting practices haven’t changed, the burn rate benchmarks won’t change either. But, inevitably, practices change (in response to changes in the economic environment, the marketplace, and compensation practices, not too mention pressure to adhere to ISS’s burn rate benchmarks) and the burn rate benchmarks change as well.
Surprise, Surprise (Not!)—Burn Rate Benchmarks Lower in 2016
It seems like a self-fulfilling prophecy to me that if ISS sets a cap that burn rates can’t exceed and companies are forced to manage their grants to come in under that cap, burn rates are going to keep decreasing. This year, by my calculations, burn rate benchmarks dropped for 40% of industries in the S&P 500, 59% of industries in the Russell 3000, and 68% of industries in the Non-Russell 3000. ISS indicates that the median change across all industries/indices is a decline of .07%.
It’s a “Benchmark” Not a “Cap”
ISS calls the standard a “benchmark” not “cap.” When they made this change last year, I thought maybe this was because they thought the word “benchmark” sounded friendlier. This isn’t the case at all, however. It’s a “benchmark” because the cap is actually lower than the benchmark. To get full credit for the burn rate test in ISS’s Equity Plan Scorecard (EPSC), a company’s burn rate has to be less than 50% of the benchmark. In other words, the cap is 50% of the benchmark.
Burn Rate Scores Can Go Negative
Laura Wanlass of Aon Hewitt tells me that, just like the score for the SVT test (see “Update on the ISS Scorecard,” July 21, 2015), the burn rate score can also be negative.
Burn Rate Is Important
Burn rate is not quite as important as a plan’s SVT score, but it’s still significant—a negative score could be impossible to come back from in the EPSC. Laura tells me that it is the largest percentage of points in the Grant Practices pillar, which is worth less than Plan Cost (i.e., the SVT test) but more than the Plan Features pillar.
Before the EPSC, burn rates didn’t matter as much. If a company didn’t pass the burn rate test, they simply made a three-year commitment to stay under ISS’s cap in the future—no harm, no foul. But those three-year commitments are just a distant fond memory under the EPSC.
The Burn Rate Test Is Getting Harder
While the standard to earn full points for burn rate remains 50% of the benchmark, overall, the benchmarks have been lowered for most industries/indices. In addition, Laura tells me that ISS is recalibrating the test so that burn rates above 50% of the benchmark will earn fewer points and will go negative sooner than last year.
Last Friday, ISS issued an updated FAQ for its Equity Plan Scorecard. For most companies, the overall scorecard structure remains unchanged: a max of 100 points and 53 points is a passing grade. For companies disclosing three years of equity data, the points available under each pillar also remain the same, but the scores for each test within the pillars may have been adjusted (ISS doesn’t disclose the number of points each test is worth).
Here’s what ISS is changing for 2016 (effective for shareholder meetings on or after February 1, 2016):
New Company Category
The IPO/Bankruptcy category has been renamed “Special Cases” and includes any companies that have less than three years of disclosed equity grant data. This is still largely newly public companies and companies emerging from bankruptcy, but it could include other companies. For example, if a public company implemented a new stock compensation program in 2016 and had not previously granted any equity awards, they would presumably be in this category (because they wouldn’t have any equity grant data to disclose for prior years).
In addition, the Special Cases category is now divided into S&P 500/Russell 3000 companies and non-Russell 3000 companies. The S&P 500/Russell 3000 companies can earn 15 points for the Grant Practices pillar; to provide these points, their max score for the Plan Cost pillar is reduced by ten points to 50 and their max score for the Plan Features pillar is reduced by five points to 35. Scoring for the non-Russell 3000 companies in this category is the same it was for IPO/Bankruptcy companies last year: 60 points for plan cost, 40 points for plan features, and no points for grant practices.
CIC Provisions
The “CIC Single Trigger” category under Plan Features is renamed “CIC Equity Vesting” and is a little more complicated (last year it was pass/fail).
For time-based awards:
Full points for 1) no acceleration, or 2) acceleration only if awards aren’t assumed/substituted
No points for automatic acceleration of vesting
Half points for anything else (does this mean half points for a double trigger?)
For performance-based awards:
Full points for 1) forfeiture/termination, or 2) payout based on target as of CIC, or 3) pro-rata payout
No points for payout above target (ISS doesn’t say if this applies if performance as of the CIC is above target)
Half points for anything else
Post-Vest Holding Periods
The period of time required to earn full points for post-vest holding periods increased from 12 months to 36 months (or termination of employment). 12 months (or until ownership guidelines are met) is still worth half credit.
First off, I must say that I was thrilled to see so many of you last week in sunny San Diego (and boy, was it sunny in a perfect kind of way) at our 23rd Annual Conference. The Conference was a wild success and our members helped make it so. Shortly before the Conference, several news outlets carried the story of Twitter’s CEO returning a significant number of his own shares of stock to the Company for use in employee equity programs. There wasn’t time to cover it then, but I wanted to take a moment to share the story now.
In the latter part of October, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey tweeted (of course!) that he was giving one-third (wow!) of his own shares of Twitter stock, 1% of the Company, to the organization for use in the Company’s equity pool. The value of those shares is estimated to be $200 million. While the return of stock to a company from a CEO or founder is not unprecedented, the size of Dorsey’s stock contribution marks new territory. I am hard pressed to find a CEO that has surpassed that figure.
A Way to Avoid Dilution?
Mr. Dorsey’s gift seems to be a win on multiple fronts. It’s bound to boost employee morale, since the shares are going straight to the Company’s equity pool and will be used to incentivize employees. Shareholders are likely to be happy, since the shares will reward employees without affecting the Company’s dilution figures. And, CEO Dorsey seems excited about it, tweeting “I’d rather have a smaller part of something big than a bigger part of something small.” It can’t hurt that his other company, Square, recently filed for their IPO. Forbes highlights that in an earlier, similar move, Dorsey also returned 20% of his stake in Square to employees as well.
A New Trend?
The question now becomes, will other CEOs follow suit? According to the Washington Post, Dorsey isn’t the first CEO to give shares back to employees. In their coverage of this story, they shared that “The chief executive of a Turkish food delivery company paid out $27 million to 114 employees this summer after selling the firm. In July, Bobby Frist, the nephew of former U.S. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, gave $1.5 million of his own shares to 600 employees of the Nashville-based health care company he runs. Dan Price, the founder of Seattle-based Gravity Payments, made headlines for using his $1 million salary (as well as company profits) to fund raises for every employee in his company to at least $70,000. In 2013, Lenovo CEO Yang Yuanqing gave $3.25 million of his $4.23 million bonus to hourly employees.” The noticeable difference in Twitter’s case is the size of the gift – shares valued at $200 million – a huge step above the other recorded cases. I’m guessing that a gift of Dorsey’s magnitude is probably not going to start a wave of similar actions (though it certainly would be nice if it did). For one thing, not all CEOs have such a wealth of stock from which to pull such a sizable donation. Founder CEOs (or simply founders) may have the advantage here, as they are often likely to have a larger stake in the company than subsequent CEOs – which makes them more able to give away a large number of shares without making much of a dent in their own personal fortune. CEO Dorsey is a billionaire, so this is a smaller drop in the bucket for him. However, the gift is not likely to be small potatoes to the employees who will benefit from receiving stock awards.
Time will tell if Mr. Dorsey’s generosity and smart thinking (giving employees more equity without increasing dilution) inspires other founders or CEOs to take similar action.
Now that the proxy season is winding down and I’ve had the chance to attend a couple of presentations on the new ISS Equity Plan Scorecard, I thought it would be a good time to provide an update on how the scorecard has worked out so far.
Most Plans Passed
Very few plans failed to obtain a favorable rating under the new EPSC. But I’m not sure this should come as a surprise. Of course, most plans passed; that’s why companies pay for the ISS Compass model and hire consultants certified in the use of this model—to ensure that they don’t undertake the expense of submitting a plan to a shareholder vote and not get the votes they need to pass. If a favorable ISS recommendation is key to ensuring the plan is approved, companies are going to do what it takes to get a favorable recommendation. But, how much did companies have to reduce their share requests (and how many of the scorecard factors did companies have to incorporate into their plans) to get favorable recommendations?
It’s Only Going to Get Harder
One thing that’s been clear from the beginning is that ISS is likely to tweak both the pass threshold and the points allotted to each test in the EPSC from year-to-year (this is how they operate scorecards they have created for other purposes). Ken Lockett of AST, Laura Wanlass of AON Hewitt, Scott McCloskey of Lincoln Financial, and Melinda Hanzel of D.F. King presented on the EPSC at the Philadephia/DC/VA/MD joint half-day meeting in June. Given that so few companies failed this year, they noted that they expect the EPSC to be harder to pass next year.
Negative Points Are Possible
Laura noted that on some of the tests, including the SVT, a company can score so poorly that the plan is awarded negative points. The Corporate Executive noted, in its January-February 2015 issue, that with the SVT worth 45% of the score for most companies, it is virtually impossible to achieve a favorable recommendation without earning at least some points for this test. Now it turns out that the plan could score so poorly on the SVT that it is actually impossible to make up enough points the elsewhere in the scorecard to pass.
Where companies need to make up points under the scorecard, there are several provisions they can remove from (e.g., liberal share recycling, discretion to accelerate vesting) or add to (e.g., post-vesting holding periods, minimum vesting requirement) their plan to earn additional points.
I’ve heard from several practitioners that post-vest holding periods are worth more than expected under the scorecard. This is a nice break, since post-vest holding requirements aren’t necessarily a takeaway for execs when the company already has stock ownership guidelines in place (and what public company doesn’t have these already). To learn more about post-vesting holding periods, check out our podcast with Terry Adamson or our March webcast.
Peter Kimball of ISS Corporate Services presented on the scorecard at the Phoenix NASPP chapter meeting in May and noted that many companies were reluctant to remove discretion to accelerate vesting or to stipulate a minimum vesting period under the plan. I can understand this—there are perfectly legitimate reasons to accelerate vesting. And minimum vesting periods are a disaster waiting to happen. I’ve already encountered one company that had a minimum vesting requirement, and then granted RSUs that vested in under that time frame and did not discover the error until after the RSUs had vested and been paid out. I’m not sure how you fix that mistake; the lawyers I asked about it did not want to touch that question with a ten-foot pole (or without an attorney-client relationship to protect everyone involved).
Learn More at the NASPP Conference
The session “Demystifying the ISS Equity Plan Scorecard” at the 23rd Annual NASPP Conference will provide a full analysis of how companies fared under the scorecard this year and includes a case study from one company that has already navigated it. The Conference will be held in San Diego from October 27 to 30; register by August 7 to save!
ISS has released 104 additional FAQs on their corporate governance policy. That’s 44 pages of FAQs but they still haven’t answered the question we all want to know, which is how many points each of the tests in the Equity plan Scorecard are worth. In fact, a lot of the FAQs provide information that I thought was already general knowledge or is so a granular as to be applicable to only a small number of companies (I think ISS must be using the term “frequently” very loosely).
For what it’s worth, here are a few highlights from the FAQs on equity plans.
Excluding Certain Grants from Burn Calculations
ISS will exclude assumed or substitute grants issued as a result of an acquisition as well as grants issued pursuant to a shareholder-approved repricing from the burn rate calculation if these grants are disclosed separately in the plan activity table in the company’s Form 10-K. This explains why I see companies do this.
Disclosing Performance Based Awards
ISS generally counts performance based awards in the burn rate calculation in the year they are earned, provided that the company has included disclosures sufficient for this purpose. Separately report the number of performance awards granted and the number of performance awards earned when disclosing plan activity. Be careful about this: if ISS can’t figure out your disclosures, they could end up counting performance awards twice.
Updating Disclosures After Year-End
If circumstances for your company have changed so significantly since the end of the year that you want ISS to base the SVT and (presumably) other tests on new numbers, ISS will do this if you update “ALL” of the disclosures required for their analysis in your proxy statement (or in another public filing that the proxy statement references). See the FAQs for list of disclosures that must be updated; it sounds like ISS is going to be a stickler about this (the use of all caps for the word “ALL” was their idea).
Fungible Share Reserves and SVT
ISS calculates the cost of plans with fungible share reserves by running the SVT test twice; once assuming all shares are issued as stock options/SARS and a second time assuming all shares are issued as full value awards. The plan has to pass both tests. It isn’t clear from the FAQ what happens if the plan passes both tests but scores better on one than the other (the SVT score is scaled; plans can earn partial credit for scores within a certain range). Maybe the plan is assigned the lowest score.
Fungible Share Reserves and Plan Duration
The plan duration is calculated by adding the shares requested to the share available in the plan and dividing by the company’s burn rate multiplied by the company’s weighted shares outstanding. For purposes of calculating the burn rate in this formula, for plans with a fungible share reserve, the FAQs state that ISS will apply the share multiplier in the plan to full value awards. Normally, ISS has its own multiplier that it uses for burn rate calculations that is based on the volatility of the company’s stock, so this is a little surprising to me. I can only assume that it hurts companies in some way (not that I’m cynical); perhaps plan multipliers are typically lower than ISS’s multiplier, resulting in a lower burn rate, which would result in a longer plan duration.
Burn Rate Commitments
If you have made a burn rate commitment in the past three years, you aren’t off the hook. Even though these commitments are defunct under the scorecard, ISS expects companies to adhere to any commitments they’ve already made. If you don’t, they may take it out on your compensation committee members.
Fixing a Liberal Change-in-Control Definition
A liberal change-in-control definition is a deal-breaker; ISS will recommend against the plan regardless of how perfect the plan’s scorecard is. A liberal change-in-control definition is one that provides for single-trigger acceleration of vesting upon a trigger that could occur even if the deal doesn’t close (e.g., shareholder approval of the deal) or other triggers that are suspect (e.g., acquisition of a low percentage of the company’s common stock).
But there’s good news—this is fixable. You can modify the CIC provision in your plan (the FAQs provide suggested language). ISS is good with this, even if the modification only applies to new awards.
Other Matters
Most of the FAQs (75 of the 104 questions) relate to Say-on-Pay votes and other corporate governance considerations, rather than directly addressing equity plan matters. These are beyond the scope of things I care about, so I didn’t read them. It’s possible they are more scintillating than the FAQs on equity plan matters.
Last week, I discussed ISS’s new Equity Plan Scorecard. If you were hoping that the scorecard gave you a free pass on your burn rate, I have some disappointing news. The scorecard doesn’t eliminate the burn rate caps—the caps are a component of a plan’s overall scorecard rating.
The Word “Cap” Is So Limiting
One interesting change I noticed is that ISS is no longer calling them “caps”; now they are “benchmarks.” I’m not sure if this is to make them seem less restrictive or to make companies feel worse about exceeding them because the caps aren’t an arbitrary limit but a benchmark established by their peers.
According to ISS’s FAQ on the Scorecard, a plan gets max points when the company’s burn rate is 50% or less of the benchmark for its industry. The FAQs say that the burn rate score is “scaled,” so I assume this means that partial credit is available if the company’s burn rate is more than 50% of the benchmark but still below it. (If burn rates follow the pattern established in other areas, companies will get half credit if they are in this range. But don’t quote me on that; I didn’t find anything in the FAQs about this–I’m totally guessing). I’m also guessing that if you are over the benchmark, no points for you.
Good News for (Most) Russell 3000 Companies; Not So Good News for S&P 500 Companies
The most significant change is that ISS has broken out S&P 500 companies from other Russell 3000 companies for purposes of determining the burn rate benchmarks. For S&P 500 companies, this results in significantly lower burn rate benchmarks. In a number of industries (energy, commercial & professional services, health care equipment & services, pharmaceuticals & biotechnology, diversified financials, software & services, and telecommunication services), the benchmark dropped more than two points below the cap that S&P 500 companies in these industries were subject to last year.
For most of the Russell 3000 companies that aren’t in the S&P 500, ISS increased the burn rate benchmark slightly. For non-Russell 3000 companies, burn rate benchmarks dropped for the most part (only seven out of 22 industries didn’t see a drop), so I’m guessing that the benchmarks for the Russell 3000 would be lower if the S&P 500 companies hadn’t been removed.
How Does This Play Into the Scorecard?
Burn rate is just one part of one pillar in the scorecard, the grant practices pillar, which is worth 35 points for S&P 500/Russell 3000 companies (25 points for non-Russell 3000 companies). All three types of companies can also earn points in this pillar for the duration of their plan (shorter duration=more points). S&P 500/Russell 3000 companies also earn points in this pillar for specified grant practices. Thus, even if a company completely blows their burn rate benchmark, the plan can still earn partial credit in the grant practices pillar.
In a worst-case scenario, where a plan receives no points at all for grant practices, there’s still hope in the form of the plan cost and plan features pillars. For S&P 500/Russell 3000 companies, plan cost is worth 45 points and the plan features pillar is worth 20 points. That’s a potential 65 points, well over the 53 required to receive a favorable recommendation.
As I noted on October 21 (“ISS Changes Stock Plan Methodology“), ISS is changing how they evaluate stock plan proposals. Just before Christmas, ISS released additional information about their new Equity Plan Scorecard, including an FAQ. For today’s blog entry, I take a look at how the scorecard works.
What the Heck?
Historically, ISS has used a series of tests (Shareholder Value Transfer, burn rates, various plan features) to evaluate stock plan proposals. Many of these tests were deal-breakers. For example, fail the SVT test and ISS would recommend against the plan, regardless of how low your burn rate had been in the past or that fact that all the awards granted to your CEO vest based on performance.
Under the new Equity Plan Scorecard (known as “EPSC,” because what you need in your life right now is another acronym to remember), stock plans earn points in three areas (which ISS refers to as “pillars”): plan cost, grant practices, and plan features. Each pillar is worth a different amount of points, which vary based on how ISS categorizes your company. For example, S&P 500 and Russell 3000 companies can earn 45 points for the plan cost, 35 points for grant practices and 20 points for plan features. Plans need to score 53 points to receive a favorable recommendation. [I’m not sure how ISS came up with 53. Why not 42—the answer to life, the universe, and everything?] So an S&P 500 company could completely fail in the plan cost area and still squeak by with a passing score if the plan got close to 100% in both the grant practices and plan features area.
Plan Cost
Plan cost is our old friend, the SVT analysis but with a new twist. The SVT analysis is performed once with the shares requested, shares currently available under all plans, and awards outstanding, then performed a second time excluding the awards outstanding. Previously, ISS would carve out options that had been outstanding for longer than six years in certain circumstances. With the new SVT calculation that excludes outstanding options, this carve out is no longer necessary (at least, in ISS’s opinion–you might feel differently). The points awarded for the SVT analysis are scaled based on how the company scores against ISS’s benchmarks. Points are awarded for both analyses (with and without options outstanding), but the FAQ doesn’t say how many points you can get for each.
Grant Practices
The grant practices pillar includes our old friend, the burn rate analysis. But gone are the halcyon days when burn rates didn’t really matter because companies that failed the test could just make a burn rate commitment for the future. Now if companies fail the burn rate test, they have to hope they make the points up somewhere else. Burn rate scores are scaled, so partial credit is possible depending on how companies compare to the ISS’s benchmarks. This pillar also gives points for plan duration, which is how long the new share reserve is expected to last (full points for five years or less, no points for more than six years). S&P 500 and Russell 3000 companies can earn further points in this pillar for certain practices, such as clawback provisions, requiring shares to be held after exercise/vest, and making at least one-third of grants to the CEO subject to performance-based vesting).
Plan Features
This seems like the easiest pillar to accrue points in. Either a company/plan has the features specified, in which case the plan receives the full points, or it doesn’t, in which case, no points for you. There are also only four tests:
Not having single-trigger vesting upon a CIC
Not having liberal share counting
Not granting the administrator broad discretionary authority to accelerate vesting
Specifying a minimum vesting period of at least one year
That’s pretty simple. If willing to do all four of those things, S&P 500/Russell 3000 companies have an easy 20 points, non-Russell 3000 companies have an easy 30 points (more than halfway to the requisite 53 points), and IPO/bankruptcy companies have an easy 40 points (75% of the 53 points needed).
Alas, this does mean that companies no longer get a free pass on returning shares withheld for taxes on awards back to the plan. Previously, this practice simply caused the arrangement to be treated as a full value award in the SVT analysis. Since awards were already treated as full value awards in the SVT analysis, it didn’t matter what you did with the shares withheld for taxes. Now you need to be willing to forego full points in the plan features pillar if you want to return those shares to the plan.
Dealbreakers
Lastly, there are a few practices that result in a negative recommendation regardless of how many points the plan accrues under the various pillars. These include a liberal CIC definition, allowing repricing without shareholder approval, and a couple of catch-alls that boil down to essentially anything else that ISS doesn’t like.