It is common for boards and compensation committees to have discretion over clawback provisions, either over determining whether the clawback provision has been triggered or, once triggered, whether it should be enforced. While this discretionary authority is useful from a design and implementation standpoint, it can sometimes be problematic from an accounting perspective.
Background
Under ASC 718, expense associated with an equity award is determined on the grant date, which cannot occur before an employee and employer reach a mutual understanding of the key terms and conditions of the award. Where a key term is subject to discretion, a mutual understanding of the key terms and conditions of the award may not exist until the point at which this discretion can no longer be exercised.
In the case of clawback provisions, if the circumstances under which the board/compensation committee might exercise their discretion are not clear, this could lead to the conclusion that the service or performance necessary to earn the award is not fully defined. This, in turn, prohibits a mutual understanding of the terms and conditions of the award and delays the grant date. This delay would most likely result in liability treatment of the award.
Recent Comments from SEC Accounting Fellow
Sean May, a professional accounting fellow in the SEC’s Office of the Chief Accountant, discussed this concern in a speech at the 2016 AICPA Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments, held in Washington, DC. May distinguished objectively applied clawback policies from policies that “may allow those with the authority over compensation arrangements to apply discretion.” In addition, he made the following comments:
If an award includes a key term or condition that is subject to discretion, which may include some types of clawback provisions, then a registrant should carefully consider whether a mutual understanding has been reached and a grant date has been established. When making that determination, a registrant should also assess the past practices exercised by those with authority over compensation arrangements and how those practices may have evolved over time. To that end, registrants should consider whether they have the appropriate internal control over financial reporting to monitor those practices in order to support the judgment needed to determine whether a grant date has been established.
Clawbacks and Discretion are Common
68% of respondents to the NASPP’s 2016 Domestic Stock Plan Design Survey (co-sponsored by Deloitte Consulting) indicate that their equity awards are subject to clawback provisions. 83% of those respondents, indicate that the board or compensation committee has some level of discretion over enforcement of the provisions.
If you are among those 83%, it might be a good idea to review the comments May made at the AICPA conference with your accounting advisers to make sure your equity awards receive the accounting treatment you expect.
The full results from the 2016 Domestic Stock Plan Design Survey, which the NASPP co-sponsors with Deloitte Consulting LLP, are now available. Companies that participated in the survey (and service providers who weren’t eligible to participate) have access to the full results. And all NASPP members can hear highlights from the survey results by listening to the archive of the webcast “Top Trends in Equity Plan Design,” which we presented in early November.
For today’s blog entry, I highlight ten data points from the survey results that I think are worth noting:
Full Value Awards Still Rising. This survey saw yet another increase in the usage of full value awards at all employee levels. Overall, companies granting time-based restricted stock or units increased to 89% of respondents in 2016 (up from 81% in 2013). Most full value awards are now in the form of units; use of restricted stock has been declining over the past several survey cycles.
Performance Awards Are for Execs. We are continuing to see a lot of growth in the usage of performance awards for high-ranking employees. Companies granting performance awards to CEOs and NEOs increased to 80% in 2016 (up from 70% in 2013) and companies granting to other senior management increased to 69% (from 58% in 2013). But for middle management and below, use of performance award largely stagnated.
Stock Options Are Still in Decline. Usage of stock options dropped slightly at all employee levels and overall to 51% of respondents (down from 54% in 2013).
TSR Is Hot. As a performance metric, TSR has been on an upwards trajectory for the last several survey cycles. In 2016, 52% of respondents report using this metric (up from 43% in 2013). This is first time in the history of the NASPP’s survey that a single performance metric has been used by more than half of the respondents.
The Typical TSR Award. Most companies that grant TSR awards, use relative performance (92% of respondents that grant TSR awards), pay out the awards even when TSR is negative if the company outperformed its peers (81%), and cap the payout (69%).
Clawbacks on the Rise. Not surprisingly, implementation of clawback provisions is also increasing, with 68% of respondents indicating that their grants are subject to one (up from 60% in 2013). Enforcement of clawbacks remains spotty, however: 5% of respondents haven’t enforced their clawback for any violations, 8% have enforced it for only some violations, and only 3% of respondents have enforced their clawback for all violations (84% of respondents haven’t had a violation occur).
Dividend Trends. Payment of dividend equivalents in RSUs is increasing: 78% of respondents in 2016, up from 71% in 2013, 64% in 2010, and 61% in 2007. Payment of dividends on restricted stock increased slightly (75% of respondents, up from 73% in 2013) but the overall trend over the past four surveys (going back to 2007) appears to be a slight decline. For both restricted stock and RSUs, companies are moving away from paying dividends/equivalents on a current basis and are instead paying them out with the underlying award.
Payouts to Retirees Are Common. Around two-thirds of companies provide some type of automated accelerated or continued vesting upon retirement (60% of respondents for stock grants/awards; 68% for performance awards, and 60% for stock options). This is up slightly in all cases from 2013.
Post-Vesting Holding Periods are Still Catching On. This was the first year that we asked about post-vesting holding periods: usage is relatively low, with only 18% of companies implementing them for stock grants/awards and only 13% for performance awards.
ISOs, Your Days May be Numbered. Of the respondents that grant stock options, only 18% grant ISOs. This works out to about 10% of the total survey respondents, down from 62% back in 2000. In fact, to further demonstrate the amount by which option usage has declined, let me point out that the percentage of respondents granting stock options in 2016 (51%) is less than the percentage of respondents granting ISOs in 2000 (and 100% of respondents granted options in 2000—an achievement no other award has accomplished).
Next year, we will conduct the Domestic Stock Plan Administration Survey, which covers administration and communication of stock plans, ESPPs, insider trading compliance, stock ownership guidelines, and outside director plans. Look for the survey announcement in March and make sure you participate to have access to the full results!
This week the SEC announced a settled enforcement action against the former CFO of Marrone Bio Innovations, Inc. At issue were bonuses the former CFO received within 12 months of various financial filings containing results that the company was later required to restate. Using Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxlely Act of 2002 (SOX 304), the SEC pursued the clawback of $11,789 in bonuses from the former CFO.
As we await final clawback rules from the SEC (which originate from Dodd-Frank and would apply to national securities exchanges), it’s important to remember that the SEC already has the present ability to enforce clawbacks in certain situations under SOX 304. The SOX provisions apply only to CEOs and CFOs and the courts have determined that only the SEC has the power to enforce clawbacks under SOX. One common misunderstanding about SOX 304 centers on “misconduct.” A Latham & Watkins memo once described SOX 304 as follows: “The statute states that, in the event an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement caused by “misconduct,” the CEO and the CFO “shall” reimburse the company for any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation, and any profits from the sale of the issuer’s securities, received during the year following the issuance of the misstated financial statements.” The memo later explained that the misconduct does not necessarily need to be on the part of the CEO or CFO who is subject to the clawback, a fact sometimes overlooked in our view of the type of misconduct that would trigger a clawback.
The recent SEC enforcement in the case of the former MBI CFO is a prime example that the SEC appears to have determined the misconduct by someone or something other than the person subject to the clawback (the CFO) as a legitimate grounds to demand the repayment of the CFO’s compensation. In this case, the former CFO had to return $11,789 in bonuses, but the SEC did not allege misconduct on his part. They did, however, allege that by not voluntarily returning his incentive compensation once the restatements occurred, he had violated SOX 304. It’s important to understand that in order for the circumstances for a clawback to be ripe, misconduct specifically by the CEO or CFO does not need to be present. Misconduct by someone or something else leading to a restatement can be enough to require the clawback of incentive compensation under SOX 304.
It’s important for companies to evaluate the circumstances regarding any restatement to ensure that appropriate measures have been taken to clawback the appropriate compensation from the CEO and CFO under SOX 304.
The SEC’s proposed clawback rulemaking resulting from Dodd-Frank will require national securities exchanges to adopt standards that, among other things, expand the scope of clawbacks – making them applicable to more individuals and for a longer period of time. The types of compensation subject to the clawback will be more limited under the proposed rules. These rules will not replace SOX 304; the SEC can still continue to rely on SOX 304 as means to enforce clawbacks. For full details on the proposed rules, visit the NASPP Alert on this topic.
Last Wednesday, the SEC proposed the last set of compensation-related rules required under Dodd-Frank: clawback policies. This is one of those things where the SEC can’t directly require companies to implement clawback provisions, so instead, they are proposing rules that would require the NYSE and NASDAQ to add the requirement to their listing standards for exchange-traded companies.
Clawback Policies
The requirements for clawback policies under Dodd-Frank are much broader than under SOX (which required misconduct and applied only to the CEO and CFO). Here’s the gist of the SEC’s Dodd-Frank proposal:
Applies to all officers (generally the same group subject to Section 16) and former officers
Clawback is triggered by any material noncompliance with financial reporting standards, regardless of whether intent, fraud, or misconduct is involved
Applies only to incentive compensation contingent on the financial results that are subject to the restatement (interestingly, this includes awards in which vesting is contingent on TSR or stock price targets)
Recoverable Amount
The amount of compensation that would be recovered is the excess of the amount paid over what the officer is entitled to based on the restated financials.
In the case of awards in which vesting is contingent on TSR or stock price targets, the company would have to estimate the impact of the error on the stock price. Which seems a little crazy to me. But I didn’t take a single math, science, economic, or business course in college so my understanding of what drives stock price performance is most charitably described as “rudimentary.” Perhaps this is more straightforward than I think.
In the case of equity awards, if the shares haven’t been sold, the company would simply recover the shares. If the shares have been sold, the company would have to recover the sale proceeds (good luck with that). If you weren’t in favor of ownership guidelines and post-vesting holding periods for executives before, this might change your mind, possession being nine-tenths of the law and all. Check out our recent webcasts on these topics (“Stock Ownership Guidelines” and “Post-Vest Holding Periods“)
Disclosures
In addition to requiring a clawback policy, the SEC has also proposed a number of disclosures related to that policy:
The policy itself would be filed with the SEC as an exhibit to Form 10-K.
Companies would be required to disclose whether a restatement that triggered recovery of compensation has occurred in the past year.
If a restatement has occurred, the company must disclose the amount of compensation recoverable as a result of the restatement and the amount of this compensation that remains unrecovered as of the end of the year. For officers for whom recoverable compensation remains outstanding for more the 180 days, the company must disclose their names and the amounts recoverable from them.
For each person for whom the company decides not to pursue recovery of compensation, the company must disclose the name of the person, the amount recoverable, and a brief description of the reason the company decided not to pursue recovery.
More Info
For more information, check out the NASPP alert on this topic. The memos from Ropes & Gray, Jenner & Block, and Covington, as well as Mike Melbinger’s blogs on CompensationStandards.com, were particularly helpful to me in writing this blog (in case you don’t want to read all 198 pages of the SEC’s proposal).
In a prior installment of this blog, I explored the renewed interest in mandatory holding periods for equity compensation post vest. In today’s blog, we’ll look at some of the scenarios where this makes the most sense.
We’ve looked at some general reasons why companies may find it attractive to implement a requirement for a participant to hold shares after they are vested. Among the top considerations are ease of facilitating clawbacks, good corporate governance, points on the ISS Equity Plan Scorecard, and the possibility of a reduced fair value accounting expense. I now want to dive into the nuances of where these holding periods seem to make the most sense.
Does One Size Fit All?
While there are many compelling reasons to implement a post vest holding period, a closer look suggests that this may not be a one size fits all approach. This means that not all employees and not all forms of equity compensation are considered “equal” in determining if and how to apply mandatory holding periods. Let’s cover the “who” first, and then the “what.”
Who Should be Subject to Post-Vest Holding Periods?
In contemplating the intent behind the post-vest holding periods (ease of clawbacks, good governance, ISS scorecard points, etc.) it becomes clear that the ideal target for mandatory holding is the executive population. Not only are they the subject of most of the logic behind the holding periods, but this is also a population that tends to have significant amounts of equity compensation. Beyond that level within the organization, there are likely to be varied opinions about who else should be subject to mandated holding periods. There may be a case to include other levels of management, such as middle or senior managers who receive equity compensation. Should post-vest holding periods be broad based? Probably not. Employees who have no equity have nothing to “hold” and those with limited equity (such as only via participation in the ESPP and/or a limited amount of stock options) don’t appear to fit the profile that supports the “why” behind implementing holding periods. Additionally, employees within the non managerial ranks of the organization have tend to have no influence over governance practices, are not subject to clawbacks, and don’t typically represent a significant piece of the accounting expense pie.
What Types of Equity Compensation Make the Most Sense?
We’ll explore three major categories of equity compensation: restricted and performance awards, employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs) and stock options. According to the sources I’ve heard from on this topic, stock options are the least likely candidate for a post-vest holding period. Any mandatory holding period would be tied to the shares post exercise and since the vast majority of stock options are exercised in a same-day-sale transaction, there are most often no shares to tie to a holding period.
With stock options generally off the table, we are left with ESPP shares and restricted stock and performance awards. In my opinion, ESPPs fall into the “maybe” category. Certainly a company could implement a post purchase holding period. However, a key question is whether the population most engaged in ESPP is the same population that would be targeted by post-vest holding periods. We’ll explore the “who” should be affected shortly, but that is a key question in determining whether ESPP shares should be subject to such a mandated holding. Even if executives participate in the ESPP, they are most often likely to have other forms of equity compensation that would be more significant targets for holding periods. Additionally, employees contribute their own funds to the ESPP, and this may be an additional concern in evaluating whether a holding period makes sense (not so much at the executive level where it’s usually deemed good to have skin in the game, but at the mid or lower levels of the company).
The last category is restricted stock and performance awards/units. This appears to be the most likely area of focus for post-vest holding periods. In considering subjecting these types of award to mandatory holding post-vest, companies will need to consider the timing of taxation for awards and units. Restricted stock awards (absent an 83(b) election) are taxed upon vest, and the existence of a mandatory holding period can complicate matters if the participant is not permitted to sell shares to cover the taxes. Restricted stock units are subject to income tax when the award is distributed, making it more attractive to attach these types of awards to post-vest holding. Since income tax isn’t due until the shares are released to the employee, companies could delay settlement until after the post-vest holding period, eliminating the question of how to pay taxes if shares can’t be sold. FICA/FUTA taxes will still be due at vest for both awards and units, but there are ways to collect those taxes over time (such as using the IRS’s Rule of Administrative Convenience) or via payroll deduction from other cash compensation.
Scratching the Surface
This blog can only be so long, and I’ve only scratched the surface on the considerations for post-vest holding periods. One significant evaluation that I left out is the potential for a discount on the fair value for equity compensation subject to mandated hold after vest. This week I was fortunate enough to catch the DC/MD/VA Chapter meeting which (by pure coincidence) was on this exact topic. Terry Adamson of Aon Hewitt and Gustavo Dalanhese of E*TRADE did a great job of bringing companies up to speed on all of these considerations, including a deeper dive into the fair value savings. One thing I learned is that (several factors considered, including stock volatility) the discount can be significant. This is not a minor perk, but could be a strong driver in a company’s evaluation of whether or not to implement a post-vest holding period. We’re out of time today, but the good news is that next week’s NASPP webcast (March 11th) will explore this in much more detail. Be sure to tune in. And, for a quick run down, check out our Hold After Vest podcast episode (it’s much shorter than the webcast, so not as much detail, but definitely a great primer on this topic).
Free lunches (not too mention breakfasts, dinners, and snacks), open offices, games and nap rooms, shuttle services for commuting employees—we all know Silicon Valley operates a little differently than the rest of corporate America. But just how different is the Valley when it comes to stock compensation?
Last week, I attended a presentation hosted by the Silicon Valley NASPP chapter on how Silicon Valley differs from the rest of the United States when it comes to stock compensation. Tara Tays of Deloitte Consulting ran special northern California cuts of the results of the NASPP’s 2013 and 2014 Domestic Stock Plan Design and Administration Surveys and compared them to the national results. She was joined by Sue Berry of Infoblox and Patti Hoffman-Friedes of Seagate Technology, who provided color commentary.
As it turns out, not as different as you might think. In many areas, the northern CA data aligned fairly closely with the national data. These areas included the use of full value and performance awards, overhang levels, timing of grants, termination and forfeiture provisions, and performance metrics. But here are five areas where Silicon Valley does its own thing:
Burn Rates
This probably isn’t a big surprise to anyone, but burn rates are higher in Silicon Valley. Nationally, 77% of respondents report a burn rate of less than 2.5%. In northern California, only 56% of respondents report burn rates below this level. Interestingly, however, the higher burn rates did not translate to higher overhang; in this area the northern California numbers align closely with the national data.
Clawbacks
In the national data, 60% of respondents report that equity awards are subject to a clawback provisions, representing an almost 90% increase in the use of these provisions since our 2010 survey. But this trend doesn’t appear to have taken hold yet in Silicon Valley; only 34% of companies in northern California report that their awards are subject to clawbacks.
RSUs
While usage of full value awards (vs. stock options) in northern California aligns with the national data, practices vary with respect to the type of award granted. Just over 90% of northern California respondents grant RSUs but, nationally, RSUs are granted by only 77% of respondents. Restricted stock is granted by only 26% of northern California respondents but 44% of national respondents.
Vesting Schedules
For full value awards, graded vesting is more common in northern California (88% of respondents) than it is nationally (65% of respondents). But vesting schedules for full value awards appear to be slightly longer in Silicon Valley. 57% of northern California respondents report a four-year schedule and 37% report a three-year schedule, whereas this trend is flipped at the national level. There, 60% of respondent report a three-year schedule and 30% report a four-year schedule.
For stock options, monthly vesting is far more common in Silicon Valley than nationally. 53% of northern California companies report that options vesting with a one-year cliff and monthly thereafter; only 11% of respondents report this in the national data (27% for high-tech companies).
ESPP Participation
When it comes to ESPP participation, Silicon Valley comes out on top. Close to 60% of northern California companies report that their participation rate is between 61% to 90% of employees; nationally only 20% of companies were able to achieve this. ESPPs are also more generous in northern California, with more companies reporting that their plans offer a look-back and 24-month offering than nationally. This may account for some of the increase in participation but I’m not sure it accounts for all of it (note to self: must do quick survey on this).
It’s been a while since I posted a stock compensation grab bag. Here are a few recent developments that don’t warrant their own entry but are still worth knowing about.
HSR Filing Thresholds
Good news: now executives can acquire even more stock! Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, executives that acquire company stock in excess of specified thresholds are required to file reports with the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. The thresholds at which these reports are required have increased for 2015. See the memo we posted from Morrison & Foerster for the new thresholds, which are effective as of February 20, 2015.
If you have no idea what I’m talking about, check out our handy HSR Act Portal.
Final FATCA Regs
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) requires employees to report any overseas accounts that hold specified foreign financial assets, which could be interpreted to include stock awards issued by non-US corporations. The assets (stock awards, for our purposes) are reported on IRS Form 8938 (“Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets”), which is filed with the annual tax return. Final FATCA regulations, released in December 2014, clarify that unvested awards, do not need to be reported on Form 8938 until they have “substantially vested” (except in the case of a Section 83(b) election).
Dodd-Frank Rulemaking Update
The SEC has pushed back its agenda of rulemaking projects under the Dodd-Frank Act. The proposed rules for clawback requirements, disclosure of hedging policies, and pay-for-performance disclosures and the final rules for the CEO pay ratio disclosure have been pushed back to October 2015 (just in the time for the 23rd Annual NASPP Conference). This is despite comments from SEC Chair Mary Joe White last fall that the SEC was pushing to issue the final CEO pay ratio rules by the end of year. That’s a big delay—from the end of 2014 to October 2015—especially given the pressure on the SEC to issue these rules.
Section 83(b) Election Update
When making a Section 83(b) election, employees are required to include a copy of the election with their tax return for the year in which the election is made. In PLR 201438006, the IRS ruled that a Section 83(b) election was valid even though the taxpayer failed to attach a copy of the election to his Form 1040. If the failure had invalidated the election, employees could effectively revoke the election by “forgetting” to include it with their tax return—and, as we all know, Section 83(b) elections are irrevocable once the deadline to file them has elapsed.
Today I look at recent litigation relating to the use of non-compete provisions in award agreements. The case (Newell Rubbermaid v. Storm) involves an employee, Sandy Storm (yes, that’s her real name), of Newell Rubbermaid. Storm was responsible for the sale of infant and juvenile products (sold under the Graco brand) by Newell Rubbermaid to Target. In 2013, Storm signed an RSU agreement that included a number of post-employment restrictive covenants (e.g., relating to confidentiality, use of trade secrets, and non-solicitation) that effectively prohibited her from competing with Newell Rubbermaid. In 2014–you guessed it–she resigned from Newell Rubbermaid to work for one of their competitors (Artsana) selling infant and juvenile products (including to Target).
What is interesting here is that the Delaware Chancery Court agreed that the restrictive covenants are enforceable and issued a temporary restraining order against Storm. In today’s entry, I discuss some other aspects of the case that I think are interesting.
An Online Agreement and Acceptance
The agreement was distributed online and Storm consented to it with an electronic signature. The court did not seem to view this any differently than if the agreements had been in paper format and she had manually signed them, saying “Agreements may, of course, be made online.”
You Really Should Read All Those Online Agreements
Storm had not read the agreement, so she didn’t know about the restrictions. She knew that other employees had been asked to sign separate non-compete agreements, so, before resigning, she checked several other sources for prohibitions against working for a competitor (including her personnel file and the company intranet) and didn’t find anything. But she didn’t think to check her RSU agreement. And who can blame her–she thought that agreement related solely to her RSU award, which she was going to forfeit anyway because it wasn’t vested, and she’d signed RSU agreements in 2011 and 2012 that didn’t contain these provisions.
The court didn’t care, saying “Storm is understandably unhappy that she did not read the 2013 Agreements…She altered her post-employment rights in a manner she appears to regret now, but it was her choice to modify her rights without fully investigating the terms to which she agreed.” Harsh! Something to keep in mind the next time you accept an online service agreement without reading it.
Enforcement Went Beyond Forfeiture of the Award
What we typically see with non-compete provisions in awards is that the award is forfeited (or, if vested, clawed back) if the employee violates the provision. The employee essentially has a choice of (A) keeping the award or (B) competing. That wasn’t the case here. The restrictive covenants apply regardless of whether the award is forfeited. In fact, the award had not yet vested by the time Storm terminated, so she forfeited it regardless of where she went to work after leaving Newell Rubbermaid. The question is not whether she gets to keep the award but whether she can work for Newell Rubbermaid’s competitor at all. It’s a lose-lose situation for her; she already forfeited the award and now she’s out of work.
New Possibilities and Challenges
This certainly opens up some new possibilities for award agreements. Mike Melbinger of Winston & Strawn and blogger at CompensationStandards.com thinks, given Storm’s level in the organization and access to sensitive information, this particular scenario might even withstand a challenge in California.
But a provision like this would be a darn good reason for an employee to refuse to accept an award. Storm’s future employment opportunities were limited as soon as she accepted the award agreement (without even reading it!). Enforcing acceptance of award agreements is already a challenge (see the NASPP webcast “Is Silence the Answer? Acceptance of Grant Agreements“), giving employees a legitimate reason to decline them makes this process even harder.
Moreover, a key consideration for the court was that Storm checked a box labeled “I have read and agree to the terms of the Grant Agreement,” and clicked a button labeled “Accept.” The court reviewed screen shots of the page that Storm used to accept the agreement and emphasized this in its decision. I’m not sure that the court would have sided with Newell Rubbermaid if Storm hadn’t had to voluntarily take action to accept the award. And many companies don’t get serious about enforcing acceptance until awards are about to vest. Storm’s award hadn’t vested yet; if Newell Rubbermaid had taken that approach, Storm would probably be happily working at their competitor today.
Lululemon, an athletic apparel company, recently received some attention from the media because one of their shareholders (a pension fund) is suing them over an increase to their bonus program that their compensation committee approved just before the company announced a $60 million recall. Emily Cervino of Fidelity forwarded an article (“C-Suite Addiction to Stock Options No Bonus for Shareholders“) on the development to me because she knows of my penchant for both stylish workout gear and stock compensation. It’s rare that I get to combine the two interests.
Arrrggh!
The author of the article uses the Lululemon story as a jumping off point to lambast stock options, eventually making the statement that “While stock options are a no-lose proposition for those who get them, they are a no-win situation for existing shareholders.” Which is ridiculous.
For one thing, as far as I can tell, the suit against Lululemon has nothing to do with stock options. The investors are suing over an increase to the executives’ bonus program, not stock options (the reporter’s tenuous connection is that sometimes incentive compensation takes the form of stock options). Moreover, stock options most certainly aren’t a “no lose” deal for employees, any more than they are a “no-win” proposition for shareholders.
In fact, grants of stock options, rather than cash bonuses, might have been a more palatable solution for shareholders in this case. Unlike bonus plans, stock option payouts are non-discretionary. Either the stock price appreciates or it doesn’t. The compensation committee can’t decide to just pay out more under the options (setting aside the possibility of repricing). And if the company announces a major recall just after options are granted, presumably the company’s stock price will decline and the options will be worthless. If the options aren’t worthless, the stock price didn’t decline and investors haven’t lost money as a result of the recall.
Even if we allow the possibility of repricing, most public companies can’t do that without shareholder approval. Bonus plans, however, can typically be changed with just compensation committee approval (unless the plan is intended to qualify as performance based compensation under Section 162(m)).
What Do Responsible Stock Options Look Like?
The conclusion of the article asks readers to comment on how stock options can be structured to reward workers and protect investors, which got me thinking about what responsible options look like for executives. Here are some of the components that I think make for an option program that aligns with shareholder interests:
No mega grants. Small options granted frequently; never more than a single year’s worth of shares in one grant.
Appropriately sized options for everyone, execs included. When granting to execs, the size of grants should be determined based on option fair value, consideration of several possible payout scenarios, and consideration of the amount of wealth the executive has already accumulated through the company’s compensation programs. I know this thought makes me a communist, but really, how much money does one person need?
No flipping for executives. Require executives to fund exercises through netting, sell-to-cover, cash, or other payment methods that don’t require a sale and implement a holding period on the shares issued to the executive. I’m fine with allowing the rank-and-file to flip, however.
Reasonable caps on the option gain for everyone, execs and rank-and-file. You should really be doing this for full value awards as well. It’s a smart way to reduce plan expense with minimal to no impact on perceived value.
Appropriate clawback policies on shares/gain for execs.
No single-trigger vesting acceleration on a change-in-control (for everyone, both execs and the rank-and-file).
No repricing of options held by executives. Only shareholder approved, value-for-value repricing for the rank-and-file, preferably in lieu of that year’s annual grants, with renewed/extended vesting, and cancelled shares that aren’t regranted are retired (rather than returned to the plan).
The 2013 Domestic Stock Plan Design Survey is now open for participation. This is the industry’s most comprehensive survey on stock plan design, easily worth the cost of NASPP membership. Seriously–consulting firms charge upwards of $1,000 to participate in surveys that offer less data with fewer respondents. We let you participate for free–but issuers have to participate to receive the full survey results. Don’t put it off; you’re going to want this data and you only have until April 5 to complete the survey.
For today’s blog, I highlight just a few of the many data points in the survey that I am eagerly anticipating an update on. These are hot topics today and I’m looking forward to finding out where current practices stand with respect to them:
Performance Award Usage: In the 2010 survey, usage of full value awards largely caught up to usage of stock options. Usage of performance awards had increased significantly, but still lagged a bit. I am very curious to see if performance award usage has plateaued or if usage of these awards will rival that of traditional service-based awards. The 2010 survey also revealed that companies were granting performance awards down further into the organization. I’m not sure that performance awards work well below management; I’m very interested to see if this trend continues or if companies have pulled back on their performance award programs.
Clawbacks: Only 32% of respondents indicated that awards are subject to a clawback provision. This seemed surprisingly low, given the shareholder optics on this issue, as well as pressure from regulators (a la SOX and Dodd-Frank). When we conducted the survey in 2010, Say-on-Pay had not yet gone into effect. Now that we’ve completed two rounds of Say-on-Pay votes and are in the middle of a third, I’m curious to see where clawbacks come out.
Double-Triggers: Almost 60% of respondents indicated that vesting is automatically accelerated on a change-in-control and only 38% of respondents reported that awards were subject to a double-trigger. I was very surprised to see such low usage of double-triggers and I’m very interested to see if this data reverses itself in the new survey.
Flexible Share Reserves: Only 17% of respondents in 2010 reported that their stock plan had a flexible share reserve. I’ve heard a lot of consultants promoting flexible share reserves and I agree that they make a lot of sense, so I was surprised that usage was low and even more surprised that it really hadn’t changed since we last conducted the survey in 2007. I’m intrigued to see if usage remains flat again in 2013 or if this plan feature has started to take hold.
Deferrals: Only 22% of respondents in 2010 reported that they allowed (or required) deferral of payout of RSUs. I think deferral programs offer some key advantages, including tax planning opportunities for award holders and easier enforcement of clawbacks and stock ownership guidelines for companies. I’m curious to see if usage of deferral programs has increased in 2013.
– Barbara
P.S. (can I do a PS in a blog?) – If you missed my cat, Kaylee’s appearance in the blog last week, you should check it out for your daily quota of cute.