I have another grab bag of topics for you this week.
2013 Say-on-Pay Results Just in time for the 2014 proxy season, Steven Hall & Partners has published a quick summary of the Say-on-Pay vote results for last year’s proxy season. Here are a few facts of interest.
73 companies failed (out of a total of 3,363 companies that held votes. This seems to be up from 2012. Oddly, even with a Google search, I could not find an apples-to-apples comparison, but it seems like just over 60 companies had failing votes in 2012. It’s possible the increase is partly due to more companies having held Say-on-Pay votes.
In the category of “Not Getting the Message,” 15 of the companies with failing votes had failures in prior years.
At one company, Looksmart, 100% of the votes on their Say-on-Pay proposal were against it (which makes them look not so smart). That’s right, even the board voted against their own Say-on-Pay proposal. Apparently there was a complete board turnover, all the executives were fired, and the new execs didn’t own any stock.
New HSR Act Filing Thresholds New HSR Act filing thresholds have been announced for 2014. Under the new thresholds, executives can own up to $75.9 million of stock before potentially having to make the HSR filings. See this memo from Morrison & Foerster for more information. If you have no idea what the HSR Act is, see the NASPP’s excellent HSR Act Portal.
NASDAQ Amends Rules on Compensation Committee Independence NASDAQ has amended its rules on compensation committee independence to provide that compensatory fees (consulting, advisory, et. al.) paid by the company to board members should be considered when evaluating eligibility to serve on this committee, rather than prohibiting these fees outright. The NYSE has always imposed the more lenient standard and apparently NASDAQ received feedback that their more stringent standard might make them less popular. This alert from Cooley has more information.
On January 16, the SEC approved the new NYSE and NASDAQ listing standards relating to compensation committee independence. As noted in the NASPP’s alert on the original proposals (“Exchanges Issue New Standards for Compensation Committee Independence“), the new standards include three primary requirements:
The compensation committee must be comprised of independent directors, based on a number of “bright line” tests (many of which were already applicable to independent directors under each exchange’s prior listing standards) as well as additional factors that the SEC suggested should be considered in determining a director’s independence. Also, NASDAQ will now require a separate compensation committee (the NYSE already required this).
The compensation committee must have authority and funding to retain compensation advisors and must be directly responsible for appointment, compensation, and oversight of any advisors to the committee.
The committee must evaluate the independence of any advisors (compensation consultants, legal advisors, etc.).
The final rules make only a few minor changes to the original proposals, including clarifying that the compensation committee will not be required to conduct the required independence assessment as to a compensation adviser that acts in a role limited to:
consulting on a broad-based plan that does not discriminate in favor of executive officers or directors of the company, and that is available generally to all salaried employees; or
providing information (such as survey data) that is not customized for a particular company or that is customized based on parameters that are not developed by the adviser, and about which the adviser does not provide advice.
Public companies now need to assess whether the compensation consultants and other advisors engaged by their compensation committee raise any conflicts of interest and disclose any identified conflicts in their proxy statement (for annual meetings after January 1, 2013 at which directors will be elected). Although not required, where no conflict of interest is found, we expect that many companies will include a disclosure to indicate this.
In his Proxy Disclosure Blog on CompensationStandards.com, Mark Borges of Compensia highlights a recent disclosure on this topic in Viacom’s proxy statement, which might be useful to review as you draft your own disclosure (if this isn’t your gig, perhaps you can score some points by forwarding it on to the person that will be drafting this disclosure).
As required by Exchange Act Rule 10C-1, which was recently adopted by the SEC pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act (see my June 26 entry, “Comp Committees and Their Advisors“), the NYSE and NASDAQ have proposed changes to their listing standards with respect to compensation committee independence.
The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same
I almost titled this blog that way, because, frankly, I thought we already had rules in place on compensation committee independence. And, it turns out, I was at least partly correct. We definitely already have them under Section 16 and Secton 162(m), but the exchanges already had their own standards in this area as well. The proposed rules continue to require companies to have compensation committees comprised of independent directors and largely just reaffirm the requirements that already exist in each exchange’s current listing standards with respect to director independence.
So What’s New?
The SEC’s rule calls for a couple additional factors that should be taken into consideration in assessing director independence: (1) the source of the director’s compensation, including consulting, et. al. fees, and (2) any affiliations the director has with the company. Both exchanges propose to incorporate these additional assessments into their standards.
Under both proposals, #2 is not a dealbreaker, however; the proposals concede that there could be some situations where affiliation does not impair a director’s independence (e.g., in the case of a director that is an affiliate by virtue of stock ownership). The NYSE and NASDAQ proposals depart with respect to #1 however. Under NASDAQ’s proposal, any fees paid to the director (other than for service as a director) preclude independence; the NYSE proposal just includes this as a factor to consider–the fees aren’t necessarily a dealbreaker.
NASDAQ also proposes to require that companies have a formal compensation committee (the NYSE already requires this).
What Else is New?
Probably the most significant new requirement is that the compensation committee must evaluate the independence of any advisors (compensation consultants, legal advisors, etc.) that it relies on. Given that I think this is significant, you’d think I’d have more say about it, but that’s all I’ve got. I’m sure you don’t need me to blather on about why this is significant.
In addition, the compensation committee must have authority and funding to retain compensation advisors and must be directly responsible for appointment, compensation, and oversight of any advisors that it uses.
This week, we feature another installment in our series of guest blog entries by NASPP Conference speakers. Today’s entry is written by Ellie Kehmeier of Steele Consulting, who will lead a session on Section 162(m) at the NASPP Conference.
If any code section warrants the old adage “the devil is in the details,” it’s got to be Section 162(m), which disallows corporate tax deductions for compensation paid to top executives in excess of $1 million. Complying with the requirements of this section can be devilishly tricky, especially when it comes to trying to preserve tax deductions for equity awards by meeting the exception for performance-based compensation.
My fellow panelists, Danielle Benderly of Perkins Coie and Art Meyers of Choate Hall & Stewart, and I have presented on 162(m) before. We realize that, while it’s an incredibly important topic, it can also be an incredibly dry topic. For our session in New Orleans, we plan to bring 162(m) to life with lively back-and-forth discussion of issues raised in a detailed case study we’re putting together for this session that hits on many of the stumbling blocks that we’ve seen trip up HR, legal, and tax professionals alike.
For example, while most people understand that stock options and SARs generally qualify as performance-based compensation as long as the awards aren’t granted with a discounted exercise price, it’s easy to overlook the additional requirement that the compensation committee that grants equity awards to 162(m) covered employees must be comprised solely of two or more “outside directors”. Easy enough, you might think: if we’re already following the NASDAQ and NYSE listing requirements for independent directors, we should be okay, right? Not so fast! The tax rules are different, and in some respects more stringent, than the exchange listing requirements. For example, if your company pays any amount, no matter how immaterial, to an entity that is more than 50% owned by a director (directly or beneficially)–such as a caterer or florist that happens to be owned by a family member of that director–then you have a problem! If your compensation committee fails to meet these requirements, then all the equity awards granted by the committee similarly fail. That’s a harsh result, and can cause a pretty big hit to your company’s bottom line!
We will also use our case study to explore other outside director challenges, as well as tricks and traps related to when performance goals need to be established, if and how they can be changed, and when and how to get shareholder approval. For example, do your plans explicitly address how your compensation committee can adjust performance goals to reflect the effect on an acquisition? Can your company pay bonuses outside of your performance plan if the established goals are not met? Can you structure compensation for executives hired mid-year to comply with 162(m)? Our case study will also address the transition rules for newly public companies. Finally, we’ll discuss planning opportunities and best practices, and cover recent developments, including proposed 162(m) regulations that may be finalized by the time we meet in New Orleans. We’ll see you there!
Last week, the SEC issued final rules requiring US exchanges to adopt listing standards on the independence of compensation committee members and the use of compensation advisors by said committees.
I don’t have a lot to say about these rules because they don’t directly relate to stock compensation. Sure, the compensation committee typically has authority over the company’s stock plans and changing who sits on the committee and which advisors the committee relies on could have implications for the company’s stock plan, but there’s nothing specific to stock compensation in the rules. And, let’s face it, for purposes of this blog, there are only two categories of stuff: 1) Stock compensation and things that explicity impact it and 2) Things I don’t care about. But, despite that fact that the new rules seem to fall into category #2, it is a current development that, at least peripherally impacts our world, so I figured a blog entry might be in order.
Rules to Create Rules
The final rules issued by the SEC are 124 pages (and no, I haven’t read them all–see #2 above–but I did read a nifty summary by Morrison & Foerster). What strikes me is that here we have 124 pages of rules, but these aren’t actually the real rules yet. These rules just direct the exchanges (Nasdaq, NYSE) to adopt the rules. They don’t even tell Nasdaq and the NYSE what the rules should be, they just suggest things that should be considered in creating the rules. The exchanges now have around 90 days to propose the actual rules, which presumably will be subject to comment (although the SEC rules were already subject to comment) and then eventually the actual, final rules will be adopted. Just an observation, not a criticism of the SEC–they are just doing what they were instructed to do under Dodd-Frank.
Three Independence Standards
The rules require the exchanges to adopt rules requiring compensation committee members to be independent, taking into consideration sources of compensation paid to directors and any relationships directors have with the company or its officers. If you’re thinking that this sounds familiar, you’re right. For purposes of Section 16, most companies maintain a committee of two or more “nonemployee” directors and for purposes of Section 162(m), companies also ensure that the members of that committee are “outside” directors. Now the committee members will also have to be “independent” under the listing standards the exchanges adopt. My guess is that they aren’t going to just adopt the Section 16 or 162(m) definition (which are similar to each other but just different enough to be confusing) and that we’ll have a third standard to comply with.
Compensation Advisors
The rules also stipulate that the exchange listing standards require that compensation committees have sole authority to engage advisors (compensation consultants and/or attorneys) and that company provide funding to the committee to pay the advisors. The rules specify a number of independence factors that the exchanges are to direct compensation committees to consider when engaging advisors. The rules don’t preclude the committee from receiving advise from non-independent counsel or consultants (e.g., the company’s in-house or outside legal counsel).
Compensation committee reliance on independent advisors has been a best practice for many years now; I suspect that many companies already have practices that partially or fully comply with this requirement. Even so, given that the advisors your compensation committee hires are likely to be making recommendations on stock compensation issued to executives, it’s something to be aware of. See topics #1 and #2 in our recent webcast “Ten Equity Compensation Issues That Affect All Stock Plan Professionals (That No One Told You About).”
Disclosures
The final rules also update the disclosures companies are required to make with respect to compensation consultants, expanding the factors that must be considered in evaluating the independence of the consultants.
NASPP “To Do” List We have so much going on here at the NASPP that it can be hard to keep track of it all, so we keep an ongoing “to do” list for you here in our blog.
Last Tuesday, I blogged about the Say-on-Pay provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, but the Act includes a number of other corporate governance provisions that are of interest to stock plan professionals. Luckily, the presentation I attended by Mike Andresino of Posternak Blankstein & Lund and David Wise and Sara Wells of Hay Group at the Silicon Valley NASPP chapter meeting covered these aspects of the Act as well.
The Dodd-Frank Act: More Than Say-on-Pay The Dodd-Frank Act is very broad in scope, with banking legislation and consumer protections as well as regulating private placements and private investment funds–that’s nice to know, but we don’t really care about any of it for purposes of this blog. I want to focus on the areas of the Act that are likely to intersect with my readers’ job responsibilities.
Internal Pay Equity
As I noted in my June 29 blog, the Act requires companies to disclose the ratio of CEO pay to the median pay of all other employees. I understand that the jury is still out on how this ratio will actually be computed–preparing a Summary Compensation Table for all employees just to calculate their median pay may not be feasible–but, regardless, this disclosure is likely to cause a lot of consternation (David Wise pointed out that it was a top focus of the business lobby). The definition of all employees could include employees in overseas operations, including, say, manufacturing plants in countries where wages are considerably lower than in the United States. We are only beginning to contemplate the implications of this disclosure.
Relationship of Pay to Performance
Companies will be required to disclose the relationship of executive compensation to corporate financial performance. Like Say-on-Pay, this is another provision that I naively thought we already had–i.e., the performance graph in the executive compensation disclosures. Silly me. As Mike Andresino pointed out, the Act doesn’t limit the disclosure to just the top five NEOs, so this “pay for performance” disclosure could be quite a bit more work to put together than the performance graph.
According to a Pearl Meyer & Partners memo on the Act that we’ve posted in the NASPP’s Say-on-Pay Portal, there are lots of issues to resolve for this requirement, including which “executives,” what “compensation,” what “financial performance,” the time period the disclosure covers, and whether the disclosure is on an aggregate or individual basis (or by component of compensation–imagine what fun that would be to put together).
Clawbacks
The Act expands the requirements for companies to adopt clawback policies for compensation paid to executives beyond what was required under Sarbanes-Oxley. According to the NASPP’s 2010 Domestic Stock Plan Design Survey (co-sponsored by Deloitte), only 32% of respondents have clawback policies for stock compensation and of those that don’t, only 20% are considering adding one. That’s going to have to change.
Broker Non-Votes
The Act requires the SEC to direct the stock exchanges to prohibit brokers from voting uninstructed shares for director elections, executive compensation matters (e.g., Say-on-Pay), and any other significant matter (brokers are already prohibited from voting uninstructed shares on matters relating to stock plans).
This doesn’t leave a whole lot that brokers can vote uninstructed shares on. Mike Andresino pointed out that if there’s nothing in the proxy that brokers can vote on without instruction, companies may have problems achieving a quorum at shareholder meetings.
Compensation Committees
The Act requires the stock exchanges to establish new independence standards for compensation committee members. In addition, the committee must have the ability to retain its own independent (per standards to be determined by the SEC) comp consultants, legal counsel, and other advisors.
18th Annual NASPP Conference Scheduled for Sept 20-23, the 18th Annual NASPP Conference is timed perfectly to help our members prepare for mandatory Say-on-Pay and all of the other executive pay reforms required under the Dodd-Frank Act. Just announced–we’ve added a special Say-on-Pay track, featuring key advice and real-world strategies from in-the-know practitioners. Register for the Conference today.
NASPP “To Do” List We have so much going on here at the NASPP that it can be hard to keep track of it all, so I keep an ongoing “to do” list for you here in my blog.
Tune in next Tuesday, August 10, for the NASPP webcast highlighting the results of the 2010 Domestic Stock Plan Design Survey (co-sponsored by Deloitte, survey support provided by the CEP Institute). There’s sure to be some surprises!
Refer new members to the NASPP so you qualify for the August raffle and Conference discount available through our New Member Referral Program.
Don’t miss your local upcoming NASPP chapter meetings in Boston, Chicago and Michigan. In addition, the San Francisco chapter is hosting its annual all-day program at the bucolic Wente Vineyards on August 11–I’m looking forward to it and hope to see you there.
The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, passed by U.S. Senate on May 20th, contains provisions that apply to all public companies. Fortunately, you won’t need to read the daunting almost 1500 pages of the bill to weed out the pieces that could impact stock plan managers because we’ve posted the corporate governance and executive compensation portions, courtesy of Davis Polk. Here are the main sections that I think you should be aware of.
Say on Pay and Majority Voting
This bill, like the corresponding House bill, does include a required non-binding shareholder vote to approve executive compensation. Unlike the House bill, this legislation does not require a shareholder advisory vote on golden parachute payments. This provision would take effect six months after enactment of the bill. This does mean that say on pay for all public companies is eminent. Additionally, there is a provision that requires majority voting by shareholders in uncontested board elections that would require any board member who does not receive a majority vote to submit his or her resignation.
These two provisions mean that companies will need to prepare for the voting process, but also get a game plan together on how to address the possibility that shareholders will reject either uncontested board members or executive compensation. In both scenarios, the company can still choose to do what it wants–the executive compensation vote is non-binding and the board can reject a resignation letter. On that note, the CorporateCounsel.net blog this week covers three companies that are already grappling with how to respond to a shareholder rejection of executive pay packages; Motorola, Occidental Petroleum, and KeyCorp. I’ll definitely be tracking this blog to see how say on pay pans out! If you’re looking for more help with executive compensation, don’t forget that the 7th Annual Executive Compensation Conference is included with your 18th Annual NASPP Conference Registration.
Proxy Disclosures
Although this version of the bill does not require the chairman of the board and the CEO to be separate individuals, it does require companies to disclose the reasons they have chosen to keep these positions separate or combine them. In addition, there are a host of required disclosures regarding the company’s compensation committee and executive compensation. This includes a discussion of the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance as well as how the amount of executive compensation compares to the company’s financial performance or investor-return.
Clawbacks
The bill requires the SEC to direct exchanges to prohibit the listing of any company that does not adopt certain clawback policies. This provision is not included in the House bill. Stock plan managers should pay particular attention to this part of the bill. If it is enacted, you will need to work with your legal team to determine if your grant agreements need to be updated and nail down a policy on how to respond to financial restatements that trigger compensation recovery.
Get Smart
As you know, we’ve rolled out our NASPP Question of the Week. I’m really excited about this new challenge for NASPP members! What you may not know is that if you missed out on our first announcement, you still have the unique and never-to-come-again opportunity to catch up. The first four quiz questions will remain available at the full point value until the second month of our contest. So, don’t feel like you’re starting at a disadvantage–you can still work toward that number one position. Create your screen name and get started now!
The Obama Administration’s regulatory reform agenda has been moving forward. Recently, the SEC proposed changes to proxy disclosure and solicitation requirements and the Treasury issued its Interim Final Rule consolidating restrictions for TARP fund recipients. Last week I mentioned that all companies should be keeping an eye on the TARP fund recipient requirements, as the government is likely to push at least part of these requirements to all companies.
Well, last Thursday, the Treasury issued proposed legislation, the Investor Protection Act of 2009, which requires a non-binding shareholder vote on executive compensation as well as provides for truly independent compensation committees.
For proxies or shareholder meetings on or after December 15, 2009, the proposed legislation requires that a separate, non-binding shareholder vote be cast to approve the executive compensation as it is disclosed in the proxy statement.
Shareholder Approval of Golden Parachute Payments
The Treasury’s proposal also includes a requirement that any proxy or solicitation material on corporate transactions (acquisitions, mergers, etc.) include in tabular format any executive compensation relating to the corporate transaction, including the aggregate total of that compensation. Additionally, it calls for a separate, non-binding shareholder vote on executive compensation relating to the corporate transaction.
Under the proposal, compensation committee members must remain truly independent, other than their involvement in the company as non-employee directors (with potential exemptions for smaller reporting issuers). To be considered independent, members of the compensation committee may not accept any fees from the company for any activity other than their involvement in the board of directors, compensation committee, or other board committee. The SEC will direct national securities exchanges to include these enhanced independence criteria in listing requirements and may direct exchanges to prohibit the listing of the securities of companies found to not be in compliance.
Compensation Consultants and Independent Legal Counsel
The Treasury feels that the involvement of compensation consultants puts compensation committees at a disadvantage, encouraging them to approve excessive compensation for CEOs and other executives. To help level the playing field, the proposed legislation requires that compensation committees be permitted (and provided funding) by the companies to retain their own compensation consultants. These independent consultants would report only to the compensation committee rather than to the company.
Additionally, compensation committees must be permitted (and provided funding) by companies to retain independent legal counsel or other advisors at the discretion of the compensation committees.
Disclosure
In the spirit of greater transparency, the proposed regulations will require companies to disclose whether or not their compensation committees retained a compensation consultant. If a compensation committee chooses not to retain the services of a compensation consultant, the justification for that decision must be disclosed.
This proposal will almost certainly mean that stock plan administrators will find themselves working more closely with compensation consultants. Don’t miss our Conference session “Wagging the Dog: Stock Plan Administrator Meets Compensation Consultant” for ideas on how to be proactive on your involvement in compensation decisions!