A court (Sutardja v. United States) recently confirmed that discounted stock options are subject to Section 409A. You probably didn’t even know that there was any question about this. But I guess when someone is slapped with the penalty tax under 409A, they are willing to try just about any argument. It certainly would have been big news if the plaintiff had prevailed.
As it stands, you probably think it’s hardly news worth blogging about. That’s because you don’t write a blog. If you had to come up with something pithy and timely to say every week, you’d know that anything is on the table. Which brings us to today’s blog entry…
Don’t Do That!
First, there are a couple of important lessons here:
Lesson 1) If you are thinking of taking the IRS on with regards to whether stock options are subject to 409A, the fact that a court has now backed the IRS on this matter makes it a lot less likely that you’ll succeed. It might be better to just cut your losses and deal with those discounted stock options that you granted accidentally.
Lesson 2) This issue arose out of a backdating investigation. The option in question was approved by the company’s compensation committee at one meeting and then later, at a subsequent meeting, the compensation committee ratified their earlier decision. When the company later conducted an investigation of its grant procedures, it decided that the grant date was when the decision was ratified at the second meeting. The FMV of the stock was higher on this date than at the earlier meeting, but the option price had been set based on the earlier FMV. As a result, the investigation deemed the option to have been discounted.
I’m not sure why the comp committee would approve the grant at one meeting and then ratify the decision at a second meeting (perhaps there was something wrong with the initial approval). Don’t do that! Approve options just once.
What About the Corrections Program?
Another interesting point in this case is that when the company’s internal investigation concluded that the options were discounted, they required the executive to pay the amount of the discount back to the company. If you’re keeping score, that means this guy has been dinged twice. He’s paid the higher (non-discounted) exercise price for the stock yet has also paid the 409A 20% penalty tax plus interest.
But wait–isn’t there some sort of corrections program for discounted stock options? If the exec has made up the difference in the exercise price, why wouldn’t the option be exempt under the corrections program? Why yes, Virginia, there is a 409A corrections program for discounted stock options–I even blogged about it back in 2009 (“Recent 409A Developments,” Jan. 13, 2009). I think there are several reasons why this option doesn’t qualify for the corrections program, however:
The events in this drama unfolded from 2003 to 2006, long before the corrections program–announced in late 2008–existed.
To be eligible for correction, the option can’t have been exercised yet. The executive in this case didn’t pay the additional cost to make up for the discounted option price until after he had already exercised the option.
Options granted to Section 16 insiders have to be corrected by the end of the calendar year in which they are granted. The options in this case were granted in 2003 but not corrected until 2006.
The grant documentation has to indicate that the option was intended to have price equal to FMV. I have no idea if this is an issue in this case, but it’s a good thing to make sure is specified in your own grant documentation. If you are ever in a situation where you need to rely on the 409A corrections program, you’ll be glad you did.
At this point, the case is not yet resolved. While the judge did agree that discounted stock options are subject to 409A, this decision was a partial summary judgment (meaning the judge thought that the IRS’s case was so obviously right that it wasn’t necessary to go to trial over this issue–something else to keep in mind if you were thinking of taking the IRS on). But the remaining question, which is whether or not the option was actually discounted, remains to be decided.
Is This Up to a Jury?
Coincidentally, I just got a jury duty summons, which got me thinking: are these sorts of tax law questions decided by a jury of my peers? Nothing against my peers, but most of ’em (except, of course, for my colleagues in stock compensation) don’t know beans about stock compensation or tax law. So if that’s the case, that’s a little scary. Also, how come when I’m called for jury duty, it’s never for cases that involve stock compensation? I think I’d have a lot to add as a juror for a case like this. Heck, I could probably even count it as “work.” You know, research for the blog…
Risky Behavior and Stock Options The study, which is summarized in the article “The Making of a Daredevil CEO: Why Stock Options Lead to More Risk Taking,” published by Knowledge@Wharton, looked at companies that had recently experienced an increased risk and evaluated which companies took steps to mitigate that risk based on the percentage of their managers’ compensation that is in stock options and the in-the-moneyness of the options.
The researchers found that firms where managers held more stock options took fewer mitigating actions. They felt that this is because once stock options are underwater, the value of the options can’t get any lower. When you think about it, with full value awards, there’s always upside potential but there’s also always downside potential–until the company is just about out of business, the value of the stock can always drop further. But once an option is underwater, it doesn’t matter how low the stock price drops, the option can’t be worth any less. As a result, managers in the study that held more options were less incented to take actions to keep the stock price steady.
Risk and In-the-Moneyness
Interestingly, and in line with this theory, the study also found that when managers’ had in-the-money options they took more mitigating action than when their options were underwater. If there was some spread in the options, the managers were motivated to preserve that spread and thus took action to keep the stock price from dropping. But where there was no spread, the managers were more incented to take risks (presumably in the hopes that the risks would pay off and the stock price would increase).
This is all very interesting; I’ve often wondered (probably here in this blog even) why the media and investors have a bias for full value awards over stock options–I think this is the first plausible explanation I’ve heard for that bias. But here in the NASPP Blog, we view studies like this with a healthy level of skepticism–it’s odd but I’ve never seen a study that didn’t prove the researchers’ initial hypothesis–so I wouldn’t scrap your option plan in favor of full value awards just yet (if you haven’t already done so).
A Nail in the Coffin for Premium-Price Options
I’ve never been a fan of premium-priced options because the reduction in expense is less than the premium, which, to my mind, makes them an inefficient form of compensation. I prefer discounted options, which provide a benefit that exceeds the additional expense to the company.
If this study can be believed, premium options would also discourage executives from taking steps to mitigate risk (whereas discounted options would presumably have the opposite impact). Maybe regulators and investors need to reconsider their bias against discounted options (although, in the case of the IRS, this bias may have less to do with concerns about risk taking and more to do with tax revenue–see my March 16, 2010 blog, “Discounted Stock Options: Inherently Evil or Smart Strategy“).
NASPP “To Do” List We have so much going on here at the NASPP that it can be hard to keep track of it all, so I keep an ongoing “to do” list for you here in my blog.
Now that the scandal, media frenzy, investigations (internal and external), prosecutions, and shareholder litigation seems to be winding down, a recently published academic study suggests that backdated options may not have done much harm to shareholders after all.
The real cost of stock options to shareholders is dilution, which is disclosed via diluted EPS. This calculation takes into account the strike price of the option, whether backdated or not, therefore, shareholders were aware of the potential dilution caused by backdating.
The reduced exercise price is more valuable to employees than the company’s cost for the discount. Thus, companies that granted backdated options may have been able to grant smaller options that were less dilutive than the options they would have granted if the options had been at-the-money at grant.
A Case for Discounted Stock Options
I was excited to see the paper, not because I think backdating is okay, but because I am a fan of discounted options. Under ASC 718, discounting an option doesn’t necessarily result in a dollar-for-dollar increase in the fair value of the grant. This makes discounted options a bargain from a compensation standpoint: the expense for the discount is less than the value delivered to employees (for this same reason, I’m not a fan of premium-priced options). The paper does conclude that there are situations where discounted stock options can be beneficial to both the company and employees.
Unfortunately, the very real obstacle of Section 409A still stands in the way of actually granting discounted options and, from a tax-revenue perspective, there are some valid reasons to discourage discounting (see my blog entry “Discounted Stock Options: Inherently Evil or Smart Strategy?,” March 16, 2010), so I don’t see this changing any time soon, study or not.
Flaws in the Study
There are also a number of flaws in the study. First, the study assumes that the company never realizes a tax deduction for ISOs and that ISOs have to be subject to vesting requirements–any Level I CEP candidate knows that both of these premises are false. In addition, the study assumes that stock options never qualify as performance-based compensation under Section 162(m). The authors in general seem to be very confused as to the operation of this area of the tax code.
Word of the Day
I did learn a new word when reading this study: “Pareto-improving,” which refers to something which harms no one and benefits at least one person. The authors conclude that, at least in some situations, backdated options can be Pareto-improving. I still haven’t figured out what sunspot equilibria are, though.
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NASPP “To Do” List We have so much going on here at the NASPP that it can be hard to keep track of it all, so I keep an ongoing “to do” list for you here in my blog.
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