The question of the role of compensation in encouraging risk-taking and cheating on the part of executives is an ongoing debate (for example, see “CEOs with Stock Options Are More Likely to Break Laws,” by Dylan Minor, Harvard Business Review, May 26, 2106). But a couple of recent studies that I heard about on a podcast make me wonder if it isn’t the amount or type of compensation that is the problem but more so the disclosure of it.
The Studies
I make dinner every night and doing so invariably involves endless chopping of vegetables. This gives me a LOT of time to listen to podcasts. One podcast I listen to regularly is NPR’s Hidden Brain, which discusses patterns in human behavior. A recent episode (“The Cheater’s High and Other Reasons We Cheat“) discussed social science research on cheating, specifically the social contexts in which people cheat.
The podcast discussed one study (“Cheating More for Less: Upward Social Comparisons Motivate the Poorly Compensated to Cheat” by Leslie John of Harvard Business School, George Loewenstein of Carnegie Mellon University, and Scott Rick of the University of Michigan) that found that people are more likely to cheat when they are aware that others are doing better than them. The subjects of the study were compensated at varying rates for performing a self-reported trivia task. The subjects were more likely to cheat when they knew that others in the experiment were earning more than them. The more easily they had access to the information about how others were compensated, the more likely they were to cheat. According to the authors of the study:
Our results suggest that low pay-rates are, in and of themselves, unlikely to promote dishonesty. Instead, it is the salience of upward social comparisons that encourages the poorly compensated to cheat.
A second study (“Winning a Competition Predicts Dishonest Behavior” by Amos Schurr of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev and Ilana Ritov of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem) found that people who won a competition were more likely to cheat on subsequent unrelated tasks. The propensity to cheat was tied directly to winning (i.e., performing better than their peers), not succeeding at personal goals or in games of chance.
Executive Compensation Disclosures and Cheating
When I listened to the podcast, I immediately thought of the executive compensation disclosures in the proxy statement. The disclosures provide an easy way for executives to compare their pay to their peers’. Not only is the information readily available on the SEC website, but it is fodder for any number of published studies on executive compensation. For proof, just look at the NASPP’s Surveys & Studies Portal. I count at least four or five such studies that are published annually, one of which is published in the Wall Street Journal. And that’s just among the studies that I have permission to post on the website. I’m sure there are more that I’m not aware of. If you are among the top five highest executives, I’m pretty sure you have an idea of how your compensation compares to your peers’.
On top of that, in recent years executive pay has shifted more and more towards performance-based compensation, which enables executives to increase the amount they are paid by improving company performance. We’ve also seen a significant shift toward measuring performance based on relative TSR—that is, how well a company performs as compared to its peers. Companies that rank higher against their peers “win” and those executives are paid more. Given the results of the two studies described above, this seems like a recipe for executives to cheat.
Our Executive Director, Barbara Baksa, has dedicated a couple of blogs (“CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rules” and “More on the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rules“) to helping all of us understand the new CEO Pay Ratio disclosure rules that were adopted by the SEC last month. Although the new disclosures aren’t imminent, companies still need to prepare. The mechanics of that has already been covered here in the NASPP Blog, so today I’m going to cover some of the more philosophical aspects of the new CEO pay ratio disclosure rules.
Another in a Long Line of Changes?
We’ve seen a lot of changes to executive compensation requirements and related disclosures over the past several years. Dodd-Frank’s Say-on-Pay gave shareholders a stronger voice when it comes to executive compensation matters. Last month the SEC adopted final CEO Pay Ratio disclosure rules that essentially require public companies to disclose the ratio of CEO pay relative to the pay of a median employee. Some are wondering – is this yet another attempt to reign in executive compensation?
The Real Impact?
One question that arises from all these changes – what has the true impact been on executive compensation? Have oversized, outsized, CEO packages become a distant memory? Many experts don’t seem to think so as of yet. The question then becomes, will the new CEO pay ratio disclosure rules really do anything to right-size executive pay? One of my favorite assessments of the situation came from a New York Times article (“Why Putting a Number to C.E.O. Pay Might Bring Change“) on the subject, which quoted Charles Elson, professor of finance and director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware as saying,“The pay ratio was designed to inflame the employees. When they read that number, employees are going to say, ‘Why is this person getting paid so much more than me?’ I think the serious discontent will force boards to reconsider their organizations’ pay schemes.”
Shareholders have had more of a say for a while now. The latest approach seems to be to give shareholders (but really employees) a very simple number to explain how the CEO’s pay relates to that of the “median” employee – which in the employee’s case would undoubtedly cause them to compare their own pay to not only the CEO, but that of their median peer. I can see where this may lead – it’s quite possible many organizations will have incensed employees, especially those who realize their pay is below that of the median employee. In addition to preparing for the mechanics of the disclosures, companies should be thinking about how to handle the optics of the disclosure with their employees. It may be time to consider some changes to compensation programs now, in advance of the disclosure. If companies do anticipate some delicate situations as a result of the disclosure, they should craft a communication strategy well in advance. The earlier you get ahead of the curve on this one, the better. The last thing needed is a hit to employee morale.
There are no pay ratio disclosures yet, so it’s hard to tell just how large the pay ratios will be. According to the same New York Times article cited above, a 2014 study by Alyssa Davis and Lawrence Mishel at the Economic Policy Institute, a left-leaning advocacy group in Washington, showed that chief executive pay as a multiple of the typical worker’s earnings zoomed from an average of 20 times in 1965 to almost 300 in 2013.
For Some CEOs, Pay is Not the Most Important Thing
Not all CEOs need the optics of a pay ratio disclosure to evaluate the appropriateness of their compensation. Earlier this week, the CompensationStandards.com blog shared the story of a CEO who actually returned his RSU to the company, saying that “he does not believe that he should receive such an award unless Plum Creek’s stockholders see an increase in their investment return.” The estimated value of the RSU shares that were handed back to the company was about $1.85 million. From the appearance of it, the company’s board awarded the CEO a retention RSU grant. Several months later, facing tough economic times and lower than hoped company performance, the CEO approached the board and basically said he’s giving back the award because he didn’t deserve it. So clearly there are great examples of CEOs who are really focused on making sure their pay truly aligns with performance. I’d be interested to see the CEO pay ratio disclosure for that company, but we’ve still got quite a while for that – until the 2018 proxy season.
It’s not too early to start planning for the disclosure and evaluate current compensation practices and communication opportunities.
There’s a lot being said about the new CEO pay ratio disclosure rules, most of it far better than anything I could write myself, so today, as a fill in for Jenn Namazi who is on vacation, I continue my new tradition of “borrowing” other blog entries on this topic.
Today’s entry is a nifty “to do” list for preparing for the CEO pay ratio disclosure that Mike Melbinger of Winston & Strawn posted in his August 6 blog on CompensationStandards.com. Given that the disclosure isn’t required until 2018 proxy statements, you might have been lulled into thinking that this isn’t something you have to worry about yet. While it’s true that there’s no need to panic, there is a lot to do between now and 2018 and it is a good idea to start putting together a project plan now to get it all done. Don’t let this turn into another fire that you to put out. Here are Mike’s thoughts on how to get started:
1. Brief the Board and/or the Compensation Committee as to the final rules and the action steps. Press coverage of the rules has been extensive. They are likely to ask.
2. Each company may select a methodology to identify its median employee based on the company’s facts and circumstances, including total employee population, a statistical sampling of that population, or other reasonable methods. We expect that the executive compensation professionals in the accounting and consulting firms very soon will be rolling out available methodologies (they began this process when the rules were proposed, two years ago). The company will be required to describe the methodology it used to identify the median employee, and any material assumptions, adjustments (including cost-of-living adjustments), or estimates used to identify the median employee or to determine annual total compensation.
3. As I noted yesterday, the rules confirm that companies may use reasonable estimates when calculating any elements of the annual total compensation for employees other than the CEO (with disclosure). Assess your ability to calculate precisely all items of compensation or whether reasonable estimates may be appropriate for some elements. The company will be required to identify clearly any estimates it uses.
4. Begin to evaluate possible testing dates. The final rules allow a company to select a date within the last three months of its last completed fiscal year on which to determine the employee population for purposes of identifying the median employee. The company would not need to count individuals not employed on that date.
5. Consider tweaking the structure of your work-force (in connection with the selection of a testing date). The rules allow a company to omit from its calculation any employees (i) individuals employed by unaffiliated third parties, (ii) independent contractors, (iii) employees obtained in a business combination or acquisition for the fiscal year in which the transaction becomes effective. Finally, the rule allows companies to annualize the total compensation for a permanent employee who did not work for the entire year, such as a new hire. The rules prohibit companies from full-time equivalent adjustments for part-time workers or annualizing adjustments for temporary and seasonal workers when calculating the required pay ratio.
As I noted yesterday, the rules permit the company to identify its median employee once every three years, unless there has been a change in its employee population or employee compensation arrangements that would result in a significant change in the pay ratio disclosure.
6. Determine whether any of your non-U.S. employees are employed in a jurisdiction with data privacy laws that make the company unable to comply with the rule without violating those laws. The rules only allow a company to exclude employees in these countries. (The rules require a company to obtain a legal opinion on this issue.)
7. The rules only allow a company to exclude up to 5% of the company’s non-U.S. employees (including any non-U.S. employees excluded using the data privacy exemption). Consider which non-U.S. employees to exclude.
8. The rules allow companies to supplement the required disclosure with a narrative discussion or additional ratios. Any additional discussion and/or ratios would need to be clearly identified, not misleading, and not presented with greater prominence than the required pay ratio.
The rules explicitly allow companies to apply a cost-of-living adjustment to the compensation measure used to identify the median employee. The SEC acknowledged that differences in the underlying economic conditions of the countries in which companies operate will have an effect on the compensation paid to employees in those jurisdictions, and requiring companies to determine their median employee and calculate the pay ratio without permitting them to adjust for these different underlying economic conditions could result in a statistic that does not appropriately reflect the value of the compensation paid to individuals in those countries. The rules, therefore, allow companies the option to make cost-of-living adjustments to the compensation of their employees in jurisdictions other than the jurisdiction in which the CEO resides when identifying the median employee (whether using annual total compensation or any other consistently applied compensation measure), provided that the adjustment is applied to all such employees included in the calculation.
If the company chooses this option, it must describe the cost-of-living adjustments as part of its description of the methodology the company used to identify the median employee, and any material assumptions, adjustments, or estimates used to identify the median employee or to determine annual total compensation.
Companies with a substantial number of non-US employees should seriously consider the ability of apply a cost-of-living adjustment to the compensation measure used to identify the median employee.
Last week, the SEC adopted the final CEO pay ratio disclosure rules. I’ve been on vacation, so I don’t have a lot to say about them, but Broc Romanek’s blog on ten things to know about the rules is better than anything I could have written anyway, so I’m just going to repeat that here:
1. Effective Date is Not Imminent (But You Still Need to Gear Up Now): We can look forward to new “Top 10″ Lists in a couple years. Highest and lowest pay ratios. Although the rules aren’t effective until the 2018 proxy statements for calendar end companies, you still need to start gearing up, considering the optics of your ultimate disclosures. The rules do not require companies to report pay ratio disclosures until fiscal years beginning after January 1, 2017.
2. You Don’t Need to Identify a New Median Employee Every Year! This is the BIG Kahuna in the rules! A big cost-saver as the rules permit companies to identify its median employee only once every three years (unless there’s a change in employee population or employee compensation arrangements). Your still need to disclose a pay ratio every year—but you don’t have to go through the hassle of conducting a median employee cost analysis every year. During those two years when you rely on a prior-calculated median employee, your CEO pay is the variable.
3. Pick Your Employee Base Within Three Months of FYE: The rules allow companies to select a date within the last three months of its last completed fiscal year to determine their employee population for purposes of identifying the median employee (so you don’t count folks not yet employed by that date—but you can annualize the total compensation for a permanent employee who did not work for the entire year, such as a new hire).
4. Independent Contractors Aren’t Employees: Duh.
5. Part-Time Employees Can’t Be Equivalized: The rules prohibit companies from full-time equivalent adjustments for part-time workers—or annualizing adjustments for temporary and seasonal workers—when calculating pay ratios.
6. Non-US Employees & the Whole 5% Thing: For some reason, the mass media is in love with this part of the rules. The rules allow companies to exclude non-U.S. employees from the determination of its median employee in two circumstances:
– Non-U.S. employees that are employed in a jurisdiction with data privacy laws that make the company unable to comply with the rule without violating those laws. The rules require a company to obtain a legal opinion on this issue—can you say “cottage industry”!
– Up to 5% of the company’s non-U.S. employees, including any non-U.S. employees excluded using the data privacy exemption, provided that, if a company excludes any non-U.S. employee in a particular jurisdiction, it must exclude all non-U.S. employees in that jurisdiction.
7. Don’t Count New Employees From Deals (This Year): The rules allow companies to omit employees obtained in a business combination or acquisition for the fiscal year in which the transaction took place (so long as the deal is disclosed with approximate number of employees omitted.)
8. Total Comp Calculation for Employees Same as Summary Comp Table for CEO Pay: The rules state that companies must calculate the annual total compensation for its median employee using the same rules that apply to CEO compensation in the Summary Compensation Table (you may use reasonable estimates when calculating any elements of the annual total compensation for employees other than the CEO (with disclosure)).
9. Alternative Ratios & Supplemental Disclosure Permitted: Companies are permitted to supplement required disclosure with a narrative discussion or additional ratios (so long as they’re clearly identified, not misleading nor presented with greater prominence than the required ratio).
10. Register NOW for the Proxy Disclosure Preconference and August 25 Pay Ratio Workshop:Register now before the discount ends next Friday, August 21. The Proxy Disclosure Preconference will be held on October 27, in advance of the NASPP Conference in San Diego. Registration for the Proxy Disclosure Preconference also includes access to a special online Pay Ratio Workshop that will be offered on August 25. The Course Materials will include model disclosures and more. Act by Friday, August 21 to save!
Last Wednesday, the SEC proposed the last set of compensation-related rules required under Dodd-Frank: clawback policies. This is one of those things where the SEC can’t directly require companies to implement clawback provisions, so instead, they are proposing rules that would require the NYSE and NASDAQ to add the requirement to their listing standards for exchange-traded companies.
Clawback Policies
The requirements for clawback policies under Dodd-Frank are much broader than under SOX (which required misconduct and applied only to the CEO and CFO). Here’s the gist of the SEC’s Dodd-Frank proposal:
Applies to all officers (generally the same group subject to Section 16) and former officers
Clawback is triggered by any material noncompliance with financial reporting standards, regardless of whether intent, fraud, or misconduct is involved
Applies only to incentive compensation contingent on the financial results that are subject to the restatement (interestingly, this includes awards in which vesting is contingent on TSR or stock price targets)
Recoverable Amount
The amount of compensation that would be recovered is the excess of the amount paid over what the officer is entitled to based on the restated financials.
In the case of awards in which vesting is contingent on TSR or stock price targets, the company would have to estimate the impact of the error on the stock price. Which seems a little crazy to me. But I didn’t take a single math, science, economic, or business course in college so my understanding of what drives stock price performance is most charitably described as “rudimentary.” Perhaps this is more straightforward than I think.
In the case of equity awards, if the shares haven’t been sold, the company would simply recover the shares. If the shares have been sold, the company would have to recover the sale proceeds (good luck with that). If you weren’t in favor of ownership guidelines and post-vesting holding periods for executives before, this might change your mind, possession being nine-tenths of the law and all. Check out our recent webcasts on these topics (“Stock Ownership Guidelines” and “Post-Vest Holding Periods“)
Disclosures
In addition to requiring a clawback policy, the SEC has also proposed a number of disclosures related to that policy:
The policy itself would be filed with the SEC as an exhibit to Form 10-K.
Companies would be required to disclose whether a restatement that triggered recovery of compensation has occurred in the past year.
If a restatement has occurred, the company must disclose the amount of compensation recoverable as a result of the restatement and the amount of this compensation that remains unrecovered as of the end of the year. For officers for whom recoverable compensation remains outstanding for more the 180 days, the company must disclose their names and the amounts recoverable from them.
For each person for whom the company decides not to pursue recovery of compensation, the company must disclose the name of the person, the amount recoverable, and a brief description of the reason the company decided not to pursue recovery.
More Info
For more information, check out the NASPP alert on this topic. The memos from Ropes & Gray, Jenner & Block, and Covington, as well as Mike Melbinger’s blogs on CompensationStandards.com, were particularly helpful to me in writing this blog (in case you don’t want to read all 198 pages of the SEC’s proposal).
How many grant dates can one option have? The answer, as it turns out, is more than you might think. I was recently contacted by a reporter who was looking at the proxy disclosures for a public company and was convinced that the company was doing something dodgy with respect to a performance option granted to the CEO. The option was not reported in the SCT for the year in which it was granted, even though the company discussed the award in some detail in the CD&A, had reported the grant on a Form 4, and the option price was equal to the FMV on the date the board approved the grant. The reporter was convinced this was some clever new backdating scheme, or some way of getting around some sort of limit on the number of shares that could be granted (either the per-person limit in the plan for 162(m) purposes or the aggregate shares allocated to the plan).
Bifurcated Grant Dates
When I read through the proxy disclosures, I could see why the reporter was confused. The problem was that the option had several future performance periods and the compensation committee wasn’t planning to set the performance goals until the start of each period. The first performance period didn’t start until the following year.
Under ASC 718 the key terms of an award have to be mutually understood by both parties (company and award recipient) for the grant date to occur. I’m not sure why the standard requires this. I reviewed the “Basis for Conclusions” in FAS 123(R) and the FASB essentially said “because that’s the way we’ve always done it.” I’m paraphrasing—they didn’t actually say that, but that was the gist of it. Read it for yourself: paragraph B49 (in the original standard, the “Basis for Conclusions” wasn’t ported over to the Codification system).
The performance goals are most certainly a key metric. So even though the option was granted for purposes of Section 409A and any other tax purposes (the general standard to establish a grant date under the tax code is merely that the corporate action necessary to effect the grant, i.e., board approval, be completed), the option did not yet have a grant date for accounting purposes.
And the SCT looks to ASC 718 for purposes of determining the value of the option that should be reported therein. Without a grant date yet for ASC 718 purposes, the option also isn’t considered granted for purposes of the SCT. Thus, the company was right to discuss the grant in the CD&A but not report it in the SCT. (The company did explain why the grant wasn’t reported in the SCT and the explanation made perfect sense to me, but I spend an excessive amount of time thinking about accounting for stock compensation. To a layperson, who presumably has other things to do with his/her time, I could see how it was confusing and suspicious).
Trifurcated Grant Dates?
The option vested based on goals other than stock price targets, so it is interesting that the company chose to report the option on a Form 4 at the time the grant was approved by the compensation committee. Where a performance award (option or RSU) is subject to performance conditions other than a stock price target, the grant date for Section 16 purposes doesn’t occur until the performance goals are met. So the company could have waited until the options vested to file the Form 4.
If you are keeping score, that’s three different grant dates for one option:
Purpose
Grant Date
1. Tax
Approval date
2. Accounting / SCT
Date goals are determined
3. Form 4
Date goals are met
If the FASB is looking for other areas to simplify ASC 718, the determination of grant date is just about at the top of my list. While they are at it, it might nice if the SEC would take another look at the Form 4 reporting requirements, because I’m pretty sure just about everyone (other than Peter Romeo and Alan Dye, of course) is confused about them (I had to look them up).
As expected (and as I blogged last week), the SEC has issued a proposal for the pay-for-performance disclosure required under Dodd-Frank. Proxy disclosures aren’t really my gig, so I don’t have a lot more to say about this topic. Luckily, Mike Melbinger of Winston & Strawn provided a great bullet-point summary of the proposed disclosure in his blog on CompensationStandards.com. I’m sure he won’t mind if I “borrow” it.
The proposed rules rely on Total Shareholder Return (TSR) as the basis for reporting the relationship between executive compensation and the company’s financial performance.
Based on the explicit reference to “actually paid” in Section 14(i), the proposed rules exclude unvested stock grants and options, thus continuing the trend to reporting realized pay. Executive compensation professionals will need to sharpen their pencils to explain the relationship between these figures and those shown in the Summary Compensation Table.
For equity-based compensation, companies would use the fair market value on date of vesting, rather than estimated grant date fair market value, as used in the SCT.
The proposed rules also would require the reporting and comparison of cumulative TSR for last 5 fiscal years (with a description of the calculations).
The proposed rules would require a comparison of the company’s TSR against that of a selected peer group.
The proposed rules would require separate reporting for the CEO and the others NEOs—allowing use of an average figure for the other NEOs.
The proposed rules would require disclosure in an interactive data format—XBRL.
Compensation actually paid would not include the actuarial value of pension benefits not earned during the applicable year.
The proposed rules would phase in of the disclosure requirements. For example, in the first year for which the requirements are applicable [2018?], disclosure would be required for the last 3 years only.
The proposed rules exclude foreign private issuers and emerging growth companies, but not smaller reporting companies. However, the proposed rules would phase in the reporting requirements for smaller companies, require only three years of cumulative reporting, and not require reporting amounts attributable to pensions or a comparison to peer group TSR.
A Few More Thoughts
In the NASPP’s last Domestic Stock Plan Design Survey (co-sponsored by Deloitte Consulting), usage of TSR targets for performance awards increased to 43% of respondents. With this new disclosure requirement, will even more companies jump on the TSR-bandwagon?
At least there’s one bit of good news: the disclosure covers only the NEOs, not a broader group of officers as was originally feared.
More Information
To learn more about the proposed regs, check out our NASPP alert, which includes a number of practitioner memos. The memo from Pay Governance includes a nifty table comparing the SEC’s definition of “actual” pay to the SCT definition of pay, traditional definitions of realized and realizable pay, and the ISS definition of pay.
It’s beginning to look this is going to be the year of Dodd-Frank rulemaking at the SEC. We may have the CEO pay-ratio disclosure rules by the end of the year, the SEC recently proposed rules for hedging policy disclosures, and now the SEC appears poised to propose the pay-for-performance disclosure rules this week.
Readers will recall that Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to promulgate rules requiring public companies to disclose how executive compensation related to company financial performance (see my blog entry, “Beyond Say-on-Pay,” August 5, 2010). In his April 24 blog on TheCorporateCounsel.net, Broc Romanek noted that the SEC has calendared an open Commission meeting for this Wednesday, April 29, to propose the new rules.
Broc’s Eight Cents
Broc offered eight points of analysis on this disclosure:
1. Companies can get the data and crunch the numbers. I don’t think that the actual implementation itself will be difficult.
2. But I think what could be particularly worrisome is having yet another metric to figure out what the CEO got paid and trying to explain all of it.
3. You know how companies have different schemes for granting equity, including type and timing. If the rules tend to try to fit everyone into a narrow bucket in order to try to line everyone up for comparability, and a company’s program doesn’t quite fit neatly into it, then the disclosure can get even more complicated.
4. There are two elements: compensation and financial performance. What is meant by “financial performance” for example? Maybe the SEC will just ask for stock price, maybe they’ll go broader.
5. A tricky part likely will be the explanation of what it all means—and how it works with the Summary Compensation Table.
6. I don’t think it will be difficult to produce the “math” showing the relationship of realized/realizable pay relative to TSR and other financial metrics, so long as:
– There’s a tight definition of realized pay
– We know what period to measure TSR (and if multiple periods can be used)
– We know what other performance measures can be included (if any) and if they can be as prominent in the disclosure as TSR
7. Another area of potential difficulty is explaining why there is not a tight or tighter correlation with TSR (“we use metrics other than TSR to drive our compensation; thus, the correlation is not very strong; on the other hand, our compensation is based on Revenue Growth and EBITDA Margin, and as Exhibit II demonstrates, the correlation is very significant”).
In addition, Dodd-Frank has no requirement for a relative ranking, and companies will need to decide if TSR and Pay should be put in some type of relative context (“relative to our peers, our realizable pay was well below the peers; so even though compensation is not tightly aligned with stock price performance the last 3 years, we did not pay our bums very much).
8. I think what may be the most difficult to address is a requirement to discuss what the Compensation Committee plans to change—and why is it now that it has performed the analysis?
Let’s Make It a Dime; Here’s My Two Cents
I’m not sure that the problem with executive compensation is that companies aren’t disclosing enough information about it. Isn’t this what the CD&A is for? Isn’t this why the stock performance graph is included with the executive compensation disclosures?
Moreover, does anyone think that any company will just come out and say that their executive compensation is not based on or tied to company performance in any way? I’m just not sure that public companies need one more disclosure to try to convince their shareholders that the amount of compensation they are paying to their executives is justified by the company’s performance.
I’ve been listening to the recordings of the sessions at the 22nd Annual NASPP Conference. And frankly, I’ve been surprised—pleasantly surprised by how much I’ve learned. All of the sessions I’ve listened to have been very enlightening, even the ones where I thought I already knew everything on the topic.
Take the session on pay-ratio disclosure. I wasn’t really sure how interesting this session would be, since the rules haven’t been finalized yet. I mean, really, how much could there possibly be to talk about? But it turns out that the panel had a lot to say and all of it was very interesting. So for today’s blog entry, I feature five things I learned from listening to the panel, “Pay Ratio (& Other Issues): Pointers from In-House.”
1. Run a Test Calculation.
If you haven’t already, you really should perform a test of how you will calculate your CEO pay ratio. It might prove to be harder than you expect. Patty Hoffman-Friedes of Seagate Technology noted that they actually didn’t get very far in their test, but they are now much more prepared for the final calculation. Things you haven’t thought about come to light. Patty noted that Seagate provides shoes to employees in China and they had to think about whether those should be included in compensation.
2. How Will the Ratio Be Used?
The panel spent some time discussing how the ratio will be used by ISS and investors. Although it isn’t clear how ISS will use the disclosure, everyone felt that they will eventually use it. But, as Patty noted, perhaps the bigger question is how the NY Times will use the disclosure.
Stacey Geer of Primerica brought up a concern that hadn’t occurred to me: how employees will react when they realize they are below the median. Valerie Ho from ICF explained that she is planning to educate her HR business partners on the ratio, so that they can be prepared to address employee inquiries. She will also be looking to them for feedback on what employees are saying about the ratio.
3. Your Peers Are the Wildcard.
As moderator Barry Sullivan of Semler Brossy noted, the first year the rules are in effect will be a little bit like the Wild West. Everyone will have to decide on an approach and draft their disclosure without really knowing what their peers will be doing and how their ratio will compare to that of their peers.
Panelists recommend using your outside advisors—attorneys and compensation consultants—for a sanity check, since they will at least have some insight into trends and practices among their clients. Ask for feedback on your methodology and help with drafting the disclosure.
4. Year-Over-Year Comparisons Are Likely to be a Challenge.
Several panelists noted concerns about how much variation will exist in the results from one year to the next. If the median employee shifts from the United States to another country, if the company acquires another company, if there is a significant reduction in force, if a new CEO steps in—all of these events, and lots more, could cause significant year-to-year variability in the ratio, which could be confusing for investors and the media. Before you decide on a methodology, make sure you run comparisons of the results for the past several years, so you can get a feel for how much the number changes from one year to the next. And keep this potential for variability in mind when drafting the disclosure.
5. Thorough, Accurate, Ease of Calculation, Reliable, and Reproducible (and Defensible)
The panel touched on the various approaches companies can take to find the median employee. Primerica has 1800 employees located in the US and Canada; Stacy Geer can download W-2 income to a spreadsheet and calculate the median in about ten minutes. But fellow panelist Charles Grace of EMC—with 60,000 employees in 75 countries and upwards of 30 payroll systems—has a much more involved decision-making process. Include all employees in the calculation or use statistical sampling? What compensation to include? Patty Hoffman-Friedes noted that the range of approaches Seagate is considering could involve using salary, using actual wages earned, including benefits, or including all elements of compensation (even shoes for those employees in China).
Patty explained that Seagate has five touchstones that they are using to evaluate the methodologies: thoroughness, accuracy, ease of calculation, reliability, and reproducibility. Barry Sullivan noted that a sixth is defensibility. I think these are great touchstones for any company to consider as it decides on a methodology.
Here are a few items that recently showed up in my Google Alert/email that I found interesting.
Return on Executives Exequity is promoting a new way to measure alignment of pay with performance: return on executives (ROX). This measure compares the change in compensation paid to executives with the aggregate change in shareholder wealth. According to Exequity’s alert, ROX results in greater correlation between pay and performance and fewer disconnects in pay for performance alignment than other models (e.g., relative degree of alignment) typically used by ISS, Glass Lewis, and institutional investors.
The alert doesn’t go into a lot of detail on the calculation, but if you are having trouble with your Say-on-Pay story, maybe you should give Exequity a call.
Canada’s Loophole Activists in Canada are jumping on the stock options loophole bandwagon. Their objection isn’t related to corporate tax deductions, however (companies already don’t typically get a deduction for stock compensation in Canada). Stock options that meet certain requirements are taxed as capital gains in Canada, which generally results in a 50% income deduction. The requirements seem to be somewhat straightforward (you can read about them on pg 28 the NASPP’s Canada Guide) and there isn’t a limit on the number of shares that can qualify for this benefit, like there is with ISOs in the US. Canadian tax activists think option gains should be taxed as compensation. But I wonder, if the options are taxed as compensation, shouldn’t companies then be entitled to a corporate tax deduction for them?
Less Disclosure It’s not often that you hear about the SEC reducing the disclosures companies are required to make. Recently, however, the Corporation Finance staff updated the SEC’s Financial Reporting Manual to reduce the amount of disclosure companies have to make about their pre-IPO stock price valuations. The SEC doesn’t note what is new in the Manual, but a blog by Polk Davis describes what has changed with respect to the disclosures. This seems to be an outcome of the SEC’s Reg S-K study that I blogged about last week.