This week, we feature another installment in our series of guest blog entries by NASPP Conference speakers. Today’s entry is written by Ellie Kehmeier of Steele Consulting, who will lead a session on Section 162(m) at the NASPP Conference.
If any code section warrants the old adage “the devil is in the details,” it’s got to be Section 162(m), which disallows corporate tax deductions for compensation paid to top executives in excess of $1 million. Complying with the requirements of this section can be devilishly tricky, especially when it comes to trying to preserve tax deductions for equity awards by meeting the exception for performance-based compensation.
My fellow panelists, Danielle Benderly of Perkins Coie and Art Meyers of Choate Hall & Stewart, and I have presented on 162(m) before. We realize that, while it’s an incredibly important topic, it can also be an incredibly dry topic. For our session in New Orleans, we plan to bring 162(m) to life with lively back-and-forth discussion of issues raised in a detailed case study we’re putting together for this session that hits on many of the stumbling blocks that we’ve seen trip up HR, legal, and tax professionals alike.
For example, while most people understand that stock options and SARs generally qualify as performance-based compensation as long as the awards aren’t granted with a discounted exercise price, it’s easy to overlook the additional requirement that the compensation committee that grants equity awards to 162(m) covered employees must be comprised solely of two or more “outside directors”. Easy enough, you might think: if we’re already following the NASDAQ and NYSE listing requirements for independent directors, we should be okay, right? Not so fast! The tax rules are different, and in some respects more stringent, than the exchange listing requirements. For example, if your company pays any amount, no matter how immaterial, to an entity that is more than 50% owned by a director (directly or beneficially)–such as a caterer or florist that happens to be owned by a family member of that director–then you have a problem! If your compensation committee fails to meet these requirements, then all the equity awards granted by the committee similarly fail. That’s a harsh result, and can cause a pretty big hit to your company’s bottom line!
We will also use our case study to explore other outside director challenges, as well as tricks and traps related to when performance goals need to be established, if and how they can be changed, and when and how to get shareholder approval. For example, do your plans explicitly address how your compensation committee can adjust performance goals to reflect the effect on an acquisition? Can your company pay bonuses outside of your performance plan if the established goals are not met? Can you structure compensation for executives hired mid-year to comply with 162(m)? Our case study will also address the transition rules for newly public companies. Finally, we’ll discuss planning opportunities and best practices, and cover recent developments, including proposed 162(m) regulations that may be finalized by the time we meet in New Orleans. We’ll see you there!
This week, we feature another installment in our series of guest blog entries by NASPP Conference speakers. Today’s entry is written by Brian Frost of Towers Watson, who will lead the session “The Better Part of Valor: Discretion in Performance Share Plans”
Discretion and Long-Term Performance Plans By Brian Frost of Towers Watson
Long-term performance plans are becoming more prevalent every year as companies strive to align executive pay with shareholder returns. However, some compensation committees have become uncomfortable with establishing fixed goals for a three-year period due to the uncertain economic environment or changes happening at the company. To address these challenges, one approach might be for the committee to establish some initial performance goals while reserving the discretion to adjust the payout after taking into account likely outside perceptions and company-specific issues. Maintaining this flexibility comes with some downsides, however, and a particular concern is the potential for significant changes in the timing and amount of compensation reported in the company’s Summary Compensation Table (SCT). This, in turn, can influence the views of shareholders, proxy advisors and the press, which makes the decision to retain and exercise discretion one that requires a full understanding of the implications.
These are among the issues we’ll address in our October 10 session (6.3) at the 20th Annual NASPP Conference entitled “The Better Part of Valor: The Complicated World of Discretion in Performance Plans.” While the accounting rules are fairly straightforward when dealing with mainstream plan designs, more complicated plans, including those involving discretion, often reside in a gray area where accounting guidance is vague and the company and its accountants must use judgment to determine the appropriate accounting treatment. While the accounting interpretation may not have a material impact on the company’s financial statement, it can have a profound impact on the amount and timing of reported pay for NEOs. Participants in our session will gain insights about the plan design considerations that lead companies to use more discretion in determining performance plan payouts, the technical accounting rules that drive proxy reporting and other implications of discretion. Since how equity awards are reported in the SCT is determined under Accounting Standards Codification Topic 718 (ASC 718), we’ll explore the basics of those rules as well as the nuances of when and how discretion can influence the mysterious complexities of “grant date” and “service inception date.”
We also will explore the recent SEC decision in the Verizon case, which received significant publicity and involved his complicated mix of rules. Finally, we’ll review a list of items compensation professionals should know to better understand the decisions that influence the accounting and disclosure of discretionary plan awards so they can anticipate areas of potential concern before they arise.
NASPP “To Do” List We have so much going on here at the NASPP that it can be hard to keep track of it all, so we keep an ongoing “to do” list for you here in our blog.
Don’t miss your local NASPP chapter meetings in NY/NJ and San Diego. Robyn Shutak, the NASPP’s Education Director, and I will be presenting at the San Diego chapter meeting–we hope to see you there!
For the past few years, in the months leading up to the NASPP Conference, we have featured guest blog entries from some of our Conference speakers. This week we feature our first guest blog entry for the 20th Annual NASPP Conference, by Michael Melbinger of Winston and Strawn, who will lead the session “Issues and Answers on Clawback Provisions.”
A couple of weeks ago the subject of compensation clawbacks burst onto the front pages and into lead stories at newspapers and TV stations all over the country, as a result of JP Morgan Chase’s difficulties. Our scheduled presentation on “Issues and Answers on Clawback Provisions” at the 20th Annual NASPP Conference in New Orleans suddenly got a whole lot more interesting and we are glad to be starting this blog to track thoughts and developments in the meantime.
Compensation clawback provisions have a long history and were developing nicely as a best practice for compensation committees before Dodd-Frank Act Section 954 made them the law of the land (pending the issuance of final rules by the SEC and revised listing standards by the stock exchanges). Reasonable minds, regulators, and courts are differing about how best to handle the design, taxation, and enforcement of clawback provisions.
Mark Poerio, Amylynn Flood, and I will focus our NASPP presentation on the many difficult legal and practical issues raised by a compensation clawback policy, including:
Documentation and drafting requirements,
Legal enforceability issues under state and foreign law,
Establishing procedures for applying the clawback policy,
The accounting consequences of a clawback to the company,
Problematic real-life scenarios for the board and the employees,
The continued applicability of Sarbanes Oxley Act to clawback provisions,
What forms of incentive compensation should be affected by the clawback,
The availability of D&O insurance and indemnification for clawback targets,
Deciding which employees the compensation clawback policy should cover,
The impact of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower bounties on future restatements and clawbacks,
The tax consequences of a clawback to the employee and the company (Code Sections 1341 and 409A),
Possible unintended consequences from the Dodd-Frank clawback provisions and their implementation,
The use of “holdbacks” and deferrals to implement and enforce a clawback policy (see also, Dodd-Frank Act Section 956),
The types of shareholder and employee litigation that are certain to result from a compensation clawback–or the lack of one, and
Balancing the interests of the employees and the company in designing a clawback policy, including protecting employees against an unjust clawback (complete with examples of unjust potential clawback scenarios).
If, as expected, the SEC has proposed rules under Dodd-Frank Section 954 by the time of the NASPP Conference, we will examine those rules in detail–as well as the open issues that are sure to remain under the rules.
Last Change for Early-Bird Rate on M&A Course The early-bird rate for our online program “Tackling Equity Compensation Issues Related to Mergers & Acquisitions” ends this Friday, June 8. We’ve already extended this rate once; we won’t extend it again. Don’t miss out–the next time your company is involved in a deal, you’ll be glad you took this course.
NASPP “To Do” List We have so much going on here at the NASPP that it can be hard to keep track of it all, so we keep an ongoing “to do” list for you here in our blog.
Don’t miss your local NASPP chapter meetings in the Carolinas, DC/VA/MD, Ohio, Seattle, and Silicon Valley. Barbara Baksa will be at the Silicon Valley chapter meeting–be sure to say hello.
Did It Pass? Understanding Shareholder Voting Issues By Keith Bishop of Allen Matkins
Because we live in a democracy, we are likely to feel that we have a good understanding of voting. The basic principle is that whoever or whatever gets the most votes wins. Voting, however, is a far more complicated subject than many governance professionals may realize.
When determining whether a proposal has passed, the first step is to determine the applicable voting rule. This will be a function of state corporate law and the corporation’s charter documents. For Delaware corporations, Section 216 provides a general (there are some exceptions) default rule for matters other than the election of directors – the affirmative vote of the majority of the shares present and entitled to vote present in person or by proxy at the meeting. However, this default rule is not immutable. It can be changed by the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws. Some Delaware corporations, for example, have adopted a majority of the votes cast rule for shareholder action. Thus, it is important to review a company’s charter documents when determining whether a matter has been approved.
What’s the difference between these two rules? Under Delaware’s default rule, broker non-votes are not counted as votes against because they are not considered present and entitled to vote. Under a “votes cast” standard, abstentions and broker non-votes aren’t counted as votes against because neither is a vote against.
But wait, there’s more. In determining whether a proposal has passed, it is critical that companies ask the question “why are we seeking shareholder approval?” If shareholder approval is being sought to meet listing, tax or other requirements, additional, and even conflicting, voting requirements may come in to play.
For example, the New York Stock Exchange (Rule 303A.08) generally requires listed companies to obtain shareholder approval of equity compensation plans. The requisite standard for approval appears to be similar to a majority of the votes cast standard – “the minimum vote which will constitute shareholder approval for listing purposes is defined as approval by a majority of votes cast on a proposal in a proxy bearing on the particular matter, provided that the total vote cast on the proposal represents over 50% in interest of all securities entitled to vote on the proposal.” Rule 312.07. However, the NYSE treats abstentions as votes cast regardless of their treatment under state law. Consequently, a measure may pass as a matter of state law and yet fail to meet the NYSE’s requirement.
Determination of whether a proposal has passed is not as easy as it may seem. It requires an understanding of applicable state law as well as other applicable listing and legal requirements.
Don’t Miss the 19th Annual NASPP Conference The 19th Annual NASPP Conference will be held from November 1-4 in San Francisco. With Dodd-Frank and Say-on-Pay dramatically impacting pay practices, you cannot afford to fall behind in this rapidly changing environment; it is critical that you–and your staff–have the best possible guidance. The NASPP Conference brings together top industry luminaries to provide the latest essential–and practical–implementation guidance that you need. This is the one Conference you can’t afford to miss. Don’t wait–the hotel is filling up fast; register today to make sure you’ll be able to attend.