Arguments in a recent divorce proceeding potentially cast doubt on the idea of pay-for-performance, i.e., that outsized executive compensation is justified by performance.
The Jed Clampett Defense
If this sounds familiar, it’s because we highlighted an article (“Are C.E.O.s That Talented, or Just Lucky?,” Robert Frank, Feb. 7, 2015) in the New York Times that discussed case in the Across Our Desk column in the March-April 2015 NASPP Advisor. Lawyers for the founder and CEO of Continental Resources argued that he should only have to pay a small portion of his overall wealth to his ex-wife because most of the growth in his wealth was attributable to factors outside his control. Apparently under the applicable state laws (and in the laws of a number of states), the increase in value of an asset that you owned prior to marrying is not divisible in your divorce if the increased value is not due to your own efforts.
According to the article, the CEO’s lawyers argued that “under 10 percent of his wealth was a result of skill and effort, and that mostly he rode the crest of oil prices and the slide.” The CEO’s holdings included a 68% stake in Continental Resources, which has market capitalization of over $30 billion. Essentially the argument was that, although the CEO’s wealth increased during his marriage and much of that wealth was attributable to his holdings in the company he founded and runs, the holdings increased in value through little effort of his own. He was just lucky enough to be CEO of a successful company (sort of like Jed Clampett of The Beverly Hillbillies striking it rich by finding oil in his backyard).
Pay-for-Performance?
This was interesting to me because there is so much emphasis these days on paying for performance. This emphasis has lead to a surge in the use of performance awards, which often include multipliers when the company performs well, increasing payouts to execs.
I looked up what the Continental Resources proxy said about the CEO’s compensation. The 2014 proxy included statements like: “We rely upon our judgment in making compensation decisions, after…reviewing the performance of the Company, and evaluating an NEO’s contribution to that performance…and long-term potential to enhance shareholder value,” and other statements that seemed to indicate that compensation is based, at least in part, on individual performance. So while the CEO might not have thought he contributed to the company’s success, management and the compensation committee didn’t seem to share this view.
On the other hand, the Times article notes that academic research seems to indicate that individual executives don’t necessarily have a lot of control over the success of a company:
“As we know from the research, the performance of a large firm is due primarily to things outside the control of the top executive,” said J. Scott Armstrong, a professor at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. “We call that luck. Executives freely admit this — when they encounter bad luck.”
The Ends Justify the Payouts, Even If They Aren’t the Means?
Ultimately, do shareholders care about the reason for a company’s success? I suspect that if the company is doing well and increasing shareholder wealth, they are fine with large payouts to executives even if the company’s success is not due to the efforts of executives.
As expected (and as I blogged last week), the SEC has issued a proposal for the pay-for-performance disclosure required under Dodd-Frank. Proxy disclosures aren’t really my gig, so I don’t have a lot more to say about this topic. Luckily, Mike Melbinger of Winston & Strawn provided a great bullet-point summary of the proposed disclosure in his blog on CompensationStandards.com. I’m sure he won’t mind if I “borrow” it.
The proposed rules rely on Total Shareholder Return (TSR) as the basis for reporting the relationship between executive compensation and the company’s financial performance.
Based on the explicit reference to “actually paid” in Section 14(i), the proposed rules exclude unvested stock grants and options, thus continuing the trend to reporting realized pay. Executive compensation professionals will need to sharpen their pencils to explain the relationship between these figures and those shown in the Summary Compensation Table.
For equity-based compensation, companies would use the fair market value on date of vesting, rather than estimated grant date fair market value, as used in the SCT.
The proposed rules also would require the reporting and comparison of cumulative TSR for last 5 fiscal years (with a description of the calculations).
The proposed rules would require a comparison of the company’s TSR against that of a selected peer group.
The proposed rules would require separate reporting for the CEO and the others NEOs—allowing use of an average figure for the other NEOs.
The proposed rules would require disclosure in an interactive data format—XBRL.
Compensation actually paid would not include the actuarial value of pension benefits not earned during the applicable year.
The proposed rules would phase in of the disclosure requirements. For example, in the first year for which the requirements are applicable [2018?], disclosure would be required for the last 3 years only.
The proposed rules exclude foreign private issuers and emerging growth companies, but not smaller reporting companies. However, the proposed rules would phase in the reporting requirements for smaller companies, require only three years of cumulative reporting, and not require reporting amounts attributable to pensions or a comparison to peer group TSR.
A Few More Thoughts
In the NASPP’s last Domestic Stock Plan Design Survey (co-sponsored by Deloitte Consulting), usage of TSR targets for performance awards increased to 43% of respondents. With this new disclosure requirement, will even more companies jump on the TSR-bandwagon?
At least there’s one bit of good news: the disclosure covers only the NEOs, not a broader group of officers as was originally feared.
More Information
To learn more about the proposed regs, check out our NASPP alert, which includes a number of practitioner memos. The memo from Pay Governance includes a nifty table comparing the SEC’s definition of “actual” pay to the SCT definition of pay, traditional definitions of realized and realizable pay, and the ISS definition of pay.
It’s beginning to look this is going to be the year of Dodd-Frank rulemaking at the SEC. We may have the CEO pay-ratio disclosure rules by the end of the year, the SEC recently proposed rules for hedging policy disclosures, and now the SEC appears poised to propose the pay-for-performance disclosure rules this week.
Readers will recall that Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to promulgate rules requiring public companies to disclose how executive compensation related to company financial performance (see my blog entry, “Beyond Say-on-Pay,” August 5, 2010). In his April 24 blog on TheCorporateCounsel.net, Broc Romanek noted that the SEC has calendared an open Commission meeting for this Wednesday, April 29, to propose the new rules.
Broc’s Eight Cents
Broc offered eight points of analysis on this disclosure:
1. Companies can get the data and crunch the numbers. I don’t think that the actual implementation itself will be difficult.
2. But I think what could be particularly worrisome is having yet another metric to figure out what the CEO got paid and trying to explain all of it.
3. You know how companies have different schemes for granting equity, including type and timing. If the rules tend to try to fit everyone into a narrow bucket in order to try to line everyone up for comparability, and a company’s program doesn’t quite fit neatly into it, then the disclosure can get even more complicated.
4. There are two elements: compensation and financial performance. What is meant by “financial performance” for example? Maybe the SEC will just ask for stock price, maybe they’ll go broader.
5. A tricky part likely will be the explanation of what it all means—and how it works with the Summary Compensation Table.
6. I don’t think it will be difficult to produce the “math” showing the relationship of realized/realizable pay relative to TSR and other financial metrics, so long as:
– There’s a tight definition of realized pay
– We know what period to measure TSR (and if multiple periods can be used)
– We know what other performance measures can be included (if any) and if they can be as prominent in the disclosure as TSR
7. Another area of potential difficulty is explaining why there is not a tight or tighter correlation with TSR (“we use metrics other than TSR to drive our compensation; thus, the correlation is not very strong; on the other hand, our compensation is based on Revenue Growth and EBITDA Margin, and as Exhibit II demonstrates, the correlation is very significant”).
In addition, Dodd-Frank has no requirement for a relative ranking, and companies will need to decide if TSR and Pay should be put in some type of relative context (“relative to our peers, our realizable pay was well below the peers; so even though compensation is not tightly aligned with stock price performance the last 3 years, we did not pay our bums very much).
8. I think what may be the most difficult to address is a requirement to discuss what the Compensation Committee plans to change—and why is it now that it has performed the analysis?
Let’s Make It a Dime; Here’s My Two Cents
I’m not sure that the problem with executive compensation is that companies aren’t disclosing enough information about it. Isn’t this what the CD&A is for? Isn’t this why the stock performance graph is included with the executive compensation disclosures?
Moreover, does anyone think that any company will just come out and say that their executive compensation is not based on or tied to company performance in any way? I’m just not sure that public companies need one more disclosure to try to convince their shareholders that the amount of compensation they are paying to their executives is justified by the company’s performance.
It’s been a while since I posted a stock compensation grab bag. Here are a few recent developments that don’t warrant their own entry but are still worth knowing about.
HSR Filing Thresholds
Good news: now executives can acquire even more stock! Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, executives that acquire company stock in excess of specified thresholds are required to file reports with the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. The thresholds at which these reports are required have increased for 2015. See the memo we posted from Morrison & Foerster for the new thresholds, which are effective as of February 20, 2015.
If you have no idea what I’m talking about, check out our handy HSR Act Portal.
Final FATCA Regs
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) requires employees to report any overseas accounts that hold specified foreign financial assets, which could be interpreted to include stock awards issued by non-US corporations. The assets (stock awards, for our purposes) are reported on IRS Form 8938 (“Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets”), which is filed with the annual tax return. Final FATCA regulations, released in December 2014, clarify that unvested awards, do not need to be reported on Form 8938 until they have “substantially vested” (except in the case of a Section 83(b) election).
Dodd-Frank Rulemaking Update
The SEC has pushed back its agenda of rulemaking projects under the Dodd-Frank Act. The proposed rules for clawback requirements, disclosure of hedging policies, and pay-for-performance disclosures and the final rules for the CEO pay ratio disclosure have been pushed back to October 2015 (just in the time for the 23rd Annual NASPP Conference). This is despite comments from SEC Chair Mary Joe White last fall that the SEC was pushing to issue the final CEO pay ratio rules by the end of year. That’s a big delay—from the end of 2014 to October 2015—especially given the pressure on the SEC to issue these rules.
Section 83(b) Election Update
When making a Section 83(b) election, employees are required to include a copy of the election with their tax return for the year in which the election is made. In PLR 201438006, the IRS ruled that a Section 83(b) election was valid even though the taxpayer failed to attach a copy of the election to his Form 1040. If the failure had invalidated the election, employees could effectively revoke the election by “forgetting” to include it with their tax return—and, as we all know, Section 83(b) elections are irrevocable once the deadline to file them has elapsed.
Realizable pay has quickly emerged as a hot topic for this proxy season. In today’s blog, I offer a few thoughts on realizable pay as it relates to stock compensation.
Why Realizable Pay?
Realizable pay has emerged as a method for evaluating whether executive pay aligns with company performance. It’s an alternative to comparing company performance to total pay as disclosed in the Summary Compensation Table. For equity awards, pay is disclosed in the SCT at grant and is based on the grant date fair value. Arguably, the pay disclosed in this table is for future performance, not current performance. Also, the grant date fair value is not necessarily a predictor of how much compensation execs will actually receive under the arrangement.
Realizable pay, however, is based not on grant date fair value but on the current value of the company’s stock. Thus, where equity awards are a significant component of executive pay, realizable pay can make for a more compelling story for shareholders: high levels of realizable pay are likely the result of an elevated stock price, which in turn probably means that the company is performing well. On the other hand, poorly performing companies have lower stock prices, resulting in underwater stock options and low levels of realizable pay.
What Is Realizable Pay?
Realizable pay is not a mandated disclosure, so there is no standard definition for it. Generally, it can be expected to include cash compensation paid during the year, plus the intrinsic value of options and awards held by the executive. But, of course, it’s more complicated than that.
Which awards/options? Awards typically vest and pay out in three to four years, but options can be outstanding for up to ten years. The standard that is emerging seems to be to include only options and awards granted within a specified period (e.g., three years). The idea is that the grants that are generating the company’s current performance are the ones made in recent years; grants made earlier generated performance in an earlier time frame.
Vested and Unvested? Technically, executives can really only realize the value of options and awards that are vested. Most companies, however, seem to include both vested and unvested options and awards in realizable pay.
Performance Awards? Where execs hold performance awards, a decision also need to be made as to whether to include these awards at threshold, target, or maximum. These awards could also be included at the level at which they are currently expected to pay out, but companies may be uncomfortable with this approach as it potentially signals management’s expectations as to future company performance.
When Is Realizable Pay Not Realizable?
When ISS calculates it, of course. ISS includes the current Black-Scholes value of options in realizable pay, rather than just their intrinsic value (see “Proxy Advisor Policies for 2013,” November 27, 2012). The Black-Scholes value is generally always going to be higher than the intrinsic value (think fast: ten points if you can name two situations where the Black-Scholes value would not be significantly higher than intrinsic value), so this has the effect of increasing the pressure to outperform peers.
This week I have a couple of additional treats from the smorgasbord of topics related to stock compensation. Enjoy!
FAQs on ISS Peer Groups I guess I wasn’t the only one confused by ISS’s new peer group methodology; ISS has issued an FAQ to explain the new process.
There’s still a bunch of stuff about 8-digit, 6-digit, 4-digit, and 2-digit GICS codes that I don’t understand, but the gist that I came away with is that peers are selected first from within the company’s 8-digit code. ISS constrains which companies can be considered peers based on size (by revenue and market capitalization), so if there aren’t any 8-digit peers that fit within those constraints, then ISS moves to the 6-digit peers, and then to the four-digit peers. ISS will not select peers that match only based on the 2-digit code.
I finally googled “GICS Codes” to figure out what all these digits mean. Standard & Poor’s assigns companies to ten 2-digit industry groups (your 2-digit GICS code). Then within that 2-digit code, you are assigned to a more specific 4-digit code, and within that 4-digit code…all the way down to the 8-digit code. So the companies that share your 8-digit code should be those that most closely resemble you in terms of industry classification.
When selecting among those peers that meet your size constraints, ISS will give priority to companies that are in your self-selected peer group or that have been selected you as a peer, as well as companies that have been selected as peers by your peers or that have selected by your peers as their peers. This sort of feels like that game “Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon.” Note that if you’ve changed the companies in your self-selected peer group since last year, ISS has provided a special form that you can use to notify them of the change; you have until Dec 21 to do so.
What does all of this have to do with stock compensation you ask? Well, not much, because these peers have nothing to do with the burn rate tables published by ISS (those are based solely on 4-digit GICS codes). ISS uses these peer groups only for purposes of determining whether compensation paid to your CEO aligns with company performance. But it’s good to be aware of your ISS peer group because it probably differs from the peers you’ve identified for purposes of your performance awards and other LTI programs. Thus, even though your CEO has awards that vest based on performance, ISS could still find that his/her pay doesn’t align with company performance.
Top Ten Myths on Say-on-Pay A group of academics from Stanford and the University of Navarra have written a paper to debunk myths related to Say-on-Pay. Beside being an interesting topic, the paper has the advantages of being short (only 14 pages, including exhibits) and is written in fairly straightforward English (the word “sunspot” doesn’t appear in it anywhere).
My favorite myth is #6: “Plain-vanilla equity awards are not performance-based.”
Our 20th Annual Conference is over, and, I’ll admit, I’m still recovering from the buzz. When I say buzz, I mean the literal energy and enthusiasm that seems to vibrate throughout every conference. It was great to engage with so many members, as well as listen in on sessions that are so timely and relevant to the challenges we face today. Having been to a dozen conferences over the years, I’d rank this year’s conference as our best ever. I won’t recap the full conference in today’s blog (you’ll have to wait for our next Advisor edition for that), but I wanted to share my observation on some of the top topics trending in our world of stock compensation based on things seen and overheard.
The Unofficial Top 5
1.Performance Plans and associated Valuation Strategies: Performance plans are migrating from plainer vanilla (I can’t use the term plain vanilla, because I don’t know of a performance plan that was that simple to administer) to more creative approaches (things like the use of relative TSR). In conjunction with new pay for performance models, the relative accounting impact and considerations are worth understanding.
2.Say-on-Pay: As we’ve passed through the peak of the second annual proxy season since the implementation of Say-on-Pay, it’s still a very much a hot topic. With more companies receiving negative Say-on-Pay votes from shareholders in 2012 than 2011, companies are more invested in ensuring their disclosures will withstand shareholder scrutiny.
3.Global Administration and Mobility: Learning to navigate the intricate nuances of managing global and mobile employee populations continues to be top priority for stock plan professionals. Sessions on global administration always rank highly on our conference attendance lists, and this year was no different.
4. Executives, Executives, and Executives: Handling tricky issues and situations relatives to executives and their compensation ranks high on the interest scale. Things like terminations and pay for performance top the list.
5. Stock Ownership Guidelines: I’ve heard many people talking about the rapid trend towards adopting stock ownership guidelines. If you work for an issuer (or a vendor who provides direct support to issuer stock plan administrators) and are asking “what are stock ownership guidelines?”, you’d better find out quick (in short, they are guidelines implemented by a company regarding minimum amounts of share ownership certain employees must attain and retain.) The vast majority of public companies report having such guidelines in place, and, in my opinion it’s a matter of “if” and not “when” for the stragglers who haven’t implemented guidelines yet.
Many of you likely have some or all of these topics on your radar list. These are definitely trends to observe in the coming months; areas where we’ll likely see lots of activity, new ideas, and administration challenges.
It’s been months since I last discussed anything related to the Dodd-Frank Act so in today’s blog, I provide an update on SEC rulemaking related to the Act.
More Delays
The SEC recently updated its calendar for rulemaking activities pertaining to Dodd-Frank to delay a number of projects, including:
Requirements for companies to adopt clawback policies for compensation paid to executives.
Disclosure of the ratio of CEO pay to the median pay of all employees.
Disclosure of the relationship of executive compensation to corporate financial performance.
Disclosure of hedging policies for employees and directors.
Final rules on these projects are now scheduled to be issued no earlier than July and possibly as late as December 2012. This means we won’t have final rules in time for this year’s proxy season (but you had probably already figured that out for yourself). The SEC expects to issue proposed rules during the first half of 2012.
Accredited Investors
The SEC has amended the definition of an “accredited investor” to exclude the value of primary residences from net worth. This is an important definition under Regulation D, which provides a number of exemptions from registration for offerings of stock, some of which limit the number of nonaccredited investors that can participate in the offering.
Next up, the SEC is set to finalize rules prohibiting “bad actors” from participating in Rule 506 offerings. At first I thought this meant that Pauly Shore and David Caruso wouldn’t be able to participate in unregistered offerings, but it actually relates to felons and others that have been convicted of or sanctioned for securities fraud and similar activities.
These changes probably don’t impact the operation of most companies’ stock plans. Public companies generally register all the shares issued under their stock plans and private companies are generally relying on Rule 701 for an exemption from registration. Either way, neither has to worry about accredited investors or complying any with of the Regulation D exemptions (including Rule 506). But where a private company has exceeded the limitations in Rule 701 (10 points if you know what they are off the top of your head–no Googling) or where either public or private companies are making private sales of stock to investors outside of their stock plans, the Regulation D exemptions can come into play.
NASPP “To Do” List We have so much going on here at the NASPP that it can be hard to keep track of it all, so I keep an ongoing “to do” list for you here in my blog.
On October 18, ISS issued a preview of some of the policy changes it is considering for the 2012 proxy season. In today’s blog, I take a look at proposed policy changes relating to how ISS evaluates CEO pay and stock plans submitted for shareholder approval for Section 162(m) purposes.
ISS, CEO Pay, and Company Performance
ISS currently evaluates CEO pay and company performance by comparing the company’s TSR to that of its GICS industry group to identify underperformance, then applying a qualitative analysis of various other factors that relate the CEO’s pay to TSR.
Under the newly proposed policy, ISS will apply a relative measure that compares the company’s TSR to that of its peers, which will be determined based on market capitalization, revenue, and GICS industry group. ISS will compare the company’s TSR ranking within the group to that of its CEO pay ranking. ISS will also consider the multiple of the CEO’s pay to the peer-group median.
In addition to the relative measure, ISS will apply an absolute measure that tracks changes in the company’s TSR against changes in its CEO’s pay.
The results of ISS’s pay-for-performance evaluation can impact recommendations ISS issues for the company’s Say-on-Pay proposal and stock plan proposals (if a significant portion of the CEO’s misaligned pay is in the form of equity), as well as individual director nominations.
ISS and Section 162(m)
In the past, when stock plans have been submitted for shareholder approval solely for the purpose of qualifying for exemption under Section 162(m), ISS has generally recommended that shareholders approve the plans. Under the newly proposed policy, however, ISS states that they will complete a full analysis of future plans submitted to shareholder vote for this purposes.This will include consideration of the total shareholder value transfer, burn rate analysis (if applicable), and specific plan features (such as repricing and change-in-control provisions).
This may particularly be a concern for newly public companies that wish to qualify performance unit awards for exemption under Section 162(m). Under recently proposed rules, the IRS clarified that the Section 162(m) exemption for post-IPO grants of stock options, SARs, and restricted stock made during a transition period does not apply to RSUs. Thus, newly public companies that wish to grant exempt performance unit awards will need to submit their plans for shareholder approval, triggering a full analysis of the plan by ISS.
Comments and More Information
ISS accepted comments on the policy through the end of October. (We posted an NASPP alert on the policy changes shortly after ISS issued the proposal. If you follow the NASPP on Twitter or Facebook, then you knew about our alert in time to submit comments to ISS.)
NASPP “To Do” List We have so much going on here at the NASPP that it can be hard to keep track of it all, so I keep an ongoing “to do” list for you here in my blog.
Wondering what the hottest topics in stock compensation are today? You can find out at the 19th Annual NASPP Conference, with the session “Today’s Hottest Topics in Stock Compensation.” I happen to have caught a glimpse of the panel’s slide presentation, so, in today’s blog entry, I “leak” a few of the topics that will covered.
Today’s Hottest Topics in Stock Compensation I’ve been saying all year that performance-based awards are red-hot and I’m pleased to see that our expert panel agrees (it’s always nice to be right). The panel plans to discuss a number of tricky issues relating to performance-based pay that have emerged over the past year, including:
Setting long-term performance goals in today’s volatile economy without jeopardizing 162(m) deductibility.
Best approaches for disclosing in the CD&A the use of non-GAAP financials for performance awards.
Trends and emerging practices with respect to double-trigger CIC vesting of performance-based awards.
The panel also plans to discuss whether stock options will become more performance-based in light of ISS concerns.
Next year’s proxy season is also clearly on everyone’s minds these days. Here are the proxy-related topics that the panel plans on discussing:
Under what circumstances might a company defy ISS guidance and how should they prepare for the consequences?
Drafting the CD&A disclosure of the Compensation Committee’s response to Say-on-Pay votes.
How will ISS’s new policy (currently in draft form–see the NASPP alert “ISS Issues Draft of 2012 Policy for Comment“) regarding the evaluation of executive pay affect plan design, benchmarking, and support for management’s Say-on-Pay proposals?
What best practices have evolved for developing a strategy for shareholder Say-on-Pay?
The panel will also discuss clawback provisions (particularly what to do about them if the SEC doesn’t finalize rules before the 2012 proxy season).
Don’t miss “Today’s Hottest Topics in Stock Compensation” at this year’s NASPP Conference. The panel wil be moderated by Art Meyers of Choate Hall & Stewart (and of the NASPP Executive Advisory Committee). Art’s co-panelists will be Mike Melbinger of Winston & Strawn (and author of Melbinger’s Compensation Blog on CompensationStandards.com), Mark Borges of Compensia (and author of Borges’ Proxy Disclosure Blog on CompensationStandards.com), and Paula Todd of Towers Watson (and of the NASPP Advisory Board).
See You Next Week in San Francisco! It’s hard to believe, but the 19th Annual NASPP Conference is next week! I hope to see all of my readers at the Conference, which starts next Tuesday, November 1, in San Francisco. We expect to have around 2,000 attendees–it’s going to be a very exciting event; register today to ensure you don’t miss out (and make your hotel reservations, because the hotel is close to selling out).
NASPP “To Do” List We have so much going on here at the NASPP that it can be hard to keep track of it all, so I keep an ongoing “to do” list for you here in my blog.