I was recently asked to comment on a premium priced option granted to IBM’s CEO for an article in Bloomberg (“IBM Says CEO Pay Is $33 Million. Others Say It Is Far Higher“). There are a number of things that I find interesting about the grant.
The Option Grant
The option was granted to IBM’s CEO and is for a total of 1.5 million shares, granted in four tranches. Each tranche cliff vests in three years and has a different exercise price, ranging from $129.08 to $153.66 (premiums ranging from 5% to 25% of FMV).
The option was granted in January of last year, about a month before IBM’s stock price hit its five-year low. IBM’s stock price recovered to the point where all four tranches were in the money around mid-July and the option has mostly been in-the-money since then. IBM’s stock is now trading at around $160 (down from a three-month high of around $180). Either the options were very effective at motivating IBM’s CEO or IBM didn’t set the premiums high enough (or both).
The option doesn’t vest until January 2019 and we all know what can happen to any company’s stock price in that period of time, so there’s no guarantee that the option will still be in-the-money when it vests. The option has a term of ten-years, however, so if it isn’t in-the-money, there’s still plenty of time for the stock price to recover before it expires.
A History of Premium-Priced Options
This isn’t IBM’s first foray into premium priced options. From 2004 to 2006, IBM granted a series of stock options to its executives that were priced at a 10% premium to the grant date market value. In 2007 they dropped the practice and granted at-the-money options, then they ceased granting options altogether. This is the first option IBM has granted since 2007.
The Valuation Mystery
The reason I was asked to comment on the option is that the value IBM reported for the option (which is also the expense IBM will recognize for it) is significantly less than amount that ISS determined the option was worth. IBM reported that the option has a grant date fair value of $12 million but, according to the Bloomberg article, ISS puts the value at $29 million.
It’s not unusual for there to be variations in option value from one calculation to the next, even when all calculations are using the same model and the same assumptions. But a variation this large is surprising. Both IBM and ISS say they are using the Black-Scholes model, so the difference must be attributable to their assumptions. If I were to guess which assumption is causing the discrepancy, my guess would be expected term. The dividend yield and interest rate aren’t likely to have that much of an impact and it seems unlikely that there would be significant disagreement as to the volatility of IBM’s stock.
Why Price Options at a Premium?
The idea behind premium-priced options is to require execs to deliver some minimum amount of return to investors (e.g., 10%) before they can benefit from their stock options. It’s an idea that never really caught on: only 3% of respondents to the NASPP/Deloitte Consulting 2016 Domestic Stock Plan Design Survey grant them.
I’ve never been a fan of premium-priced options. I suspect that most employees, including execs, assign a very low perceived value to them (or assign no value to them at all), so I doubt they are the incentive they are supposed to be. And the reduction in fair value for the premium is less than the amount by which the options are out-of-the money at grant and far less than the reduction to perceived value, which makes them a costly and inefficient form of compensation.
– Barbara
Tags: ISS, premium-priced stock options
A recently published study, “CEO Compensation and Corporate Risk-Taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment” considers whether stock options encourage risk-taking behavior on the part of employees and executives. In today’s blog, I provide my thoughts on the study.
Risky Behavior and Stock Options
The study, which is summarized in the article “The Making of a Daredevil CEO: Why Stock Options Lead to More Risk Taking,” published by Knowledge@Wharton, looked at companies that had recently experienced an increased risk and evaluated which companies took steps to mitigate that risk based on the percentage of their managers’ compensation that is in stock options and the in-the-moneyness of the options.
The researchers found that firms where managers held more stock options took fewer mitigating actions. They felt that this is because once stock options are underwater, the value of the options can’t get any lower. When you think about it, with full value awards, there’s always upside potential but there’s also always downside potential–until the company is just about out of business, the value of the stock can always drop further. But once an option is underwater, it doesn’t matter how low the stock price drops, the option can’t be worth any less. As a result, managers in the study that held more options were less incented to take actions to keep the stock price steady.
Risk and In-the-Moneyness
Interestingly, and in line with this theory, the study also found that when managers’ had in-the-money options they took more mitigating action than when their options were underwater. If there was some spread in the options, the managers were motivated to preserve that spread and thus took action to keep the stock price from dropping. But where there was no spread, the managers were more incented to take risks (presumably in the hopes that the risks would pay off and the stock price would increase).
This is all very interesting; I’ve often wondered (probably here in this blog even) why the media and investors have a bias for full value awards over stock options–I think this is the first plausible explanation I’ve heard for that bias. But here in the NASPP Blog, we view studies like this with a healthy level of skepticism–it’s odd but I’ve never seen a study that didn’t prove the researchers’ initial hypothesis–so I wouldn’t scrap your option plan in favor of full value awards just yet (if you haven’t already done so).
A Nail in the Coffin for Premium-Price Options
I’ve never been a fan of premium-priced options because the reduction in expense is less than the premium, which, to my mind, makes them an inefficient form of compensation. I prefer discounted options, which provide a benefit that exceeds the additional expense to the company.
If this study can be believed, premium options would also discourage executives from taking steps to mitigate risk (whereas discounted options would presumably have the opposite impact). Maybe regulators and investors need to reconsider their bias against discounted options (although, in the case of the IRS, this bias may have less to do with concerns about risk taking and more to do with tax revenue–see my March 16, 2010 blog, “Discounted Stock Options: Inherently Evil or Smart Strategy“).
NASPP “To Do” List
We have so much going on here at the NASPP that it can be hard to keep track of it all, so I keep an ongoing “to do” list for you here in my blog.
- Renew your NASPP membership for 2012 (if you aren’t an NASPP member, join today).
- Purchase the audio for the 19th Annual NASPP Conference.
- Tune in for our webcast on Thursday, “6039: The Sequel – Putting Lessons Learned from 2010 to Use in 2011.”
- Check out the NASPP’s Facebook and Twitter pages.
- Complete the Compliance-O-Meter quiz on Insider Trading Compliance Policies.
- Take the “Question of the Week” challenge.
- Wow, it’s a big week for NASPP chapter meetings! Attend your local NASPP chapter meetings in Connecticut, Kansas/Missouri, Los Angeles, Orange County, Philadelphia, Sacramento, San Diego, San Fernando Valley, San Francisco, Silicon Valley, and the Twin Cities.
– Barbara
Tags: academic studies, discounted stock options, executive, executive compensation, executives, premium-priced stock options, research, risk, risk management, Study