There’s a lot being said about the new CEO pay ratio disclosure rules, most of it far better than anything I could write myself, so today, as a fill in for Jenn Namazi who is on vacation, I continue my new tradition of “borrowing” other blog entries on this topic.
Today’s entry is a nifty “to do” list for preparing for the CEO pay ratio disclosure that Mike Melbinger of Winston & Strawn posted in his August 6 blog on CompensationStandards.com. Given that the disclosure isn’t required until 2018 proxy statements, you might have been lulled into thinking that this isn’t something you have to worry about yet. While it’s true that there’s no need to panic, there is a lot to do between now and 2018 and it is a good idea to start putting together a project plan now to get it all done. Don’t let this turn into another fire that you to put out. Here are Mike’s thoughts on how to get started:
1. Brief the Board and/or the Compensation Committee as to the final rules and the action steps. Press coverage of the rules has been extensive. They are likely to ask.
2. Each company may select a methodology to identify its median employee based on the company’s facts and circumstances, including total employee population, a statistical sampling of that population, or other reasonable methods. We expect that the executive compensation professionals in the accounting and consulting firms very soon will be rolling out available methodologies (they began this process when the rules were proposed, two years ago). The company will be required to describe the methodology it used to identify the median employee, and any material assumptions, adjustments (including cost-of-living adjustments), or estimates used to identify the median employee or to determine annual total compensation.
3. As I noted yesterday, the rules confirm that companies may use reasonable estimates when calculating any elements of the annual total compensation for employees other than the CEO (with disclosure). Assess your ability to calculate precisely all items of compensation or whether reasonable estimates may be appropriate for some elements. The company will be required to identify clearly any estimates it uses.
4. Begin to evaluate possible testing dates. The final rules allow a company to select a date within the last three months of its last completed fiscal year on which to determine the employee population for purposes of identifying the median employee. The company would not need to count individuals not employed on that date.
5. Consider tweaking the structure of your work-force (in connection with the selection of a testing date). The rules allow a company to omit from its calculation any employees (i) individuals employed by unaffiliated third parties, (ii) independent contractors, (iii) employees obtained in a business combination or acquisition for the fiscal year in which the transaction becomes effective. Finally, the rule allows companies to annualize the total compensation for a permanent employee who did not work for the entire year, such as a new hire. The rules prohibit companies from full-time equivalent adjustments for part-time workers or annualizing adjustments for temporary and seasonal workers when calculating the required pay ratio.
As I noted yesterday, the rules permit the company to identify its median employee once every three years, unless there has been a change in its employee population or employee compensation arrangements that would result in a significant change in the pay ratio disclosure.
6. Determine whether any of your non-U.S. employees are employed in a jurisdiction with data privacy laws that make the company unable to comply with the rule without violating those laws. The rules only allow a company to exclude employees in these countries. (The rules require a company to obtain a legal opinion on this issue.)
7. The rules only allow a company to exclude up to 5% of the company’s non-U.S. employees (including any non-U.S. employees excluded using the data privacy exemption). Consider which non-U.S. employees to exclude.
8. The rules allow companies to supplement the required disclosure with a narrative discussion or additional ratios. Any additional discussion and/or ratios would need to be clearly identified, not misleading, and not presented with greater prominence than the required pay ratio.
The rules explicitly allow companies to apply a cost-of-living adjustment to the compensation measure used to identify the median employee. The SEC acknowledged that differences in the underlying economic conditions of the countries in which companies operate will have an effect on the compensation paid to employees in those jurisdictions, and requiring companies to determine their median employee and calculate the pay ratio without permitting them to adjust for these different underlying economic conditions could result in a statistic that does not appropriately reflect the value of the compensation paid to individuals in those countries. The rules, therefore, allow companies the option to make cost-of-living adjustments to the compensation of their employees in jurisdictions other than the jurisdiction in which the CEO resides when identifying the median employee (whether using annual total compensation or any other consistently applied compensation measure), provided that the adjustment is applied to all such employees included in the calculation.
If the company chooses this option, it must describe the cost-of-living adjustments as part of its description of the methodology the company used to identify the median employee, and any material assumptions, adjustments, or estimates used to identify the median employee or to determine annual total compensation.
Companies with a substantial number of non-US employees should seriously consider the ability of apply a cost-of-living adjustment to the compensation measure used to identify the median employee.
Last week, the SEC adopted the final CEO pay ratio disclosure rules. I’ve been on vacation, so I don’t have a lot to say about them, but Broc Romanek’s blog on ten things to know about the rules is better than anything I could have written anyway, so I’m just going to repeat that here:
1. Effective Date is Not Imminent (But You Still Need to Gear Up Now): We can look forward to new “Top 10″ Lists in a couple years. Highest and lowest pay ratios. Although the rules aren’t effective until the 2018 proxy statements for calendar end companies, you still need to start gearing up, considering the optics of your ultimate disclosures. The rules do not require companies to report pay ratio disclosures until fiscal years beginning after January 1, 2017.
2. You Don’t Need to Identify a New Median Employee Every Year! This is the BIG Kahuna in the rules! A big cost-saver as the rules permit companies to identify its median employee only once every three years (unless there’s a change in employee population or employee compensation arrangements). Your still need to disclose a pay ratio every year—but you don’t have to go through the hassle of conducting a median employee cost analysis every year. During those two years when you rely on a prior-calculated median employee, your CEO pay is the variable.
3. Pick Your Employee Base Within Three Months of FYE: The rules allow companies to select a date within the last three months of its last completed fiscal year to determine their employee population for purposes of identifying the median employee (so you don’t count folks not yet employed by that date—but you can annualize the total compensation for a permanent employee who did not work for the entire year, such as a new hire).
4. Independent Contractors Aren’t Employees: Duh.
5. Part-Time Employees Can’t Be Equivalized: The rules prohibit companies from full-time equivalent adjustments for part-time workers—or annualizing adjustments for temporary and seasonal workers—when calculating pay ratios.
6. Non-US Employees & the Whole 5% Thing: For some reason, the mass media is in love with this part of the rules. The rules allow companies to exclude non-U.S. employees from the determination of its median employee in two circumstances:
– Non-U.S. employees that are employed in a jurisdiction with data privacy laws that make the company unable to comply with the rule without violating those laws. The rules require a company to obtain a legal opinion on this issue—can you say “cottage industry”!
– Up to 5% of the company’s non-U.S. employees, including any non-U.S. employees excluded using the data privacy exemption, provided that, if a company excludes any non-U.S. employee in a particular jurisdiction, it must exclude all non-U.S. employees in that jurisdiction.
7. Don’t Count New Employees From Deals (This Year): The rules allow companies to omit employees obtained in a business combination or acquisition for the fiscal year in which the transaction took place (so long as the deal is disclosed with approximate number of employees omitted.)
8. Total Comp Calculation for Employees Same as Summary Comp Table for CEO Pay: The rules state that companies must calculate the annual total compensation for its median employee using the same rules that apply to CEO compensation in the Summary Compensation Table (you may use reasonable estimates when calculating any elements of the annual total compensation for employees other than the CEO (with disclosure)).
9. Alternative Ratios & Supplemental Disclosure Permitted: Companies are permitted to supplement required disclosure with a narrative discussion or additional ratios (so long as they’re clearly identified, not misleading nor presented with greater prominence than the required ratio).
10. Register NOW for the Proxy Disclosure Preconference and August 25 Pay Ratio Workshop:Register now before the discount ends next Friday, August 21. The Proxy Disclosure Preconference will be held on October 27, in advance of the NASPP Conference in San Diego. Registration for the Proxy Disclosure Preconference also includes access to a special online Pay Ratio Workshop that will be offered on August 25. The Course Materials will include model disclosures and more. Act by Friday, August 21 to save!
As expected (and as I blogged last week), the SEC has issued a proposal for the pay-for-performance disclosure required under Dodd-Frank. Proxy disclosures aren’t really my gig, so I don’t have a lot more to say about this topic. Luckily, Mike Melbinger of Winston & Strawn provided a great bullet-point summary of the proposed disclosure in his blog on CompensationStandards.com. I’m sure he won’t mind if I “borrow” it.
The proposed rules rely on Total Shareholder Return (TSR) as the basis for reporting the relationship between executive compensation and the company’s financial performance.
Based on the explicit reference to “actually paid” in Section 14(i), the proposed rules exclude unvested stock grants and options, thus continuing the trend to reporting realized pay. Executive compensation professionals will need to sharpen their pencils to explain the relationship between these figures and those shown in the Summary Compensation Table.
For equity-based compensation, companies would use the fair market value on date of vesting, rather than estimated grant date fair market value, as used in the SCT.
The proposed rules also would require the reporting and comparison of cumulative TSR for last 5 fiscal years (with a description of the calculations).
The proposed rules would require a comparison of the company’s TSR against that of a selected peer group.
The proposed rules would require separate reporting for the CEO and the others NEOs—allowing use of an average figure for the other NEOs.
The proposed rules would require disclosure in an interactive data format—XBRL.
Compensation actually paid would not include the actuarial value of pension benefits not earned during the applicable year.
The proposed rules would phase in of the disclosure requirements. For example, in the first year for which the requirements are applicable [2018?], disclosure would be required for the last 3 years only.
The proposed rules exclude foreign private issuers and emerging growth companies, but not smaller reporting companies. However, the proposed rules would phase in the reporting requirements for smaller companies, require only three years of cumulative reporting, and not require reporting amounts attributable to pensions or a comparison to peer group TSR.
A Few More Thoughts
In the NASPP’s last Domestic Stock Plan Design Survey (co-sponsored by Deloitte Consulting), usage of TSR targets for performance awards increased to 43% of respondents. With this new disclosure requirement, will even more companies jump on the TSR-bandwagon?
At least there’s one bit of good news: the disclosure covers only the NEOs, not a broader group of officers as was originally feared.
More Information
To learn more about the proposed regs, check out our NASPP alert, which includes a number of practitioner memos. The memo from Pay Governance includes a nifty table comparing the SEC’s definition of “actual” pay to the SCT definition of pay, traditional definitions of realized and realizable pay, and the ISS definition of pay.
It’s beginning to look this is going to be the year of Dodd-Frank rulemaking at the SEC. We may have the CEO pay-ratio disclosure rules by the end of the year, the SEC recently proposed rules for hedging policy disclosures, and now the SEC appears poised to propose the pay-for-performance disclosure rules this week.
Readers will recall that Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to promulgate rules requiring public companies to disclose how executive compensation related to company financial performance (see my blog entry, “Beyond Say-on-Pay,” August 5, 2010). In his April 24 blog on TheCorporateCounsel.net, Broc Romanek noted that the SEC has calendared an open Commission meeting for this Wednesday, April 29, to propose the new rules.
Broc’s Eight Cents
Broc offered eight points of analysis on this disclosure:
1. Companies can get the data and crunch the numbers. I don’t think that the actual implementation itself will be difficult.
2. But I think what could be particularly worrisome is having yet another metric to figure out what the CEO got paid and trying to explain all of it.
3. You know how companies have different schemes for granting equity, including type and timing. If the rules tend to try to fit everyone into a narrow bucket in order to try to line everyone up for comparability, and a company’s program doesn’t quite fit neatly into it, then the disclosure can get even more complicated.
4. There are two elements: compensation and financial performance. What is meant by “financial performance” for example? Maybe the SEC will just ask for stock price, maybe they’ll go broader.
5. A tricky part likely will be the explanation of what it all means—and how it works with the Summary Compensation Table.
6. I don’t think it will be difficult to produce the “math” showing the relationship of realized/realizable pay relative to TSR and other financial metrics, so long as:
– There’s a tight definition of realized pay
– We know what period to measure TSR (and if multiple periods can be used)
– We know what other performance measures can be included (if any) and if they can be as prominent in the disclosure as TSR
7. Another area of potential difficulty is explaining why there is not a tight or tighter correlation with TSR (“we use metrics other than TSR to drive our compensation; thus, the correlation is not very strong; on the other hand, our compensation is based on Revenue Growth and EBITDA Margin, and as Exhibit II demonstrates, the correlation is very significant”).
In addition, Dodd-Frank has no requirement for a relative ranking, and companies will need to decide if TSR and Pay should be put in some type of relative context (“relative to our peers, our realizable pay was well below the peers; so even though compensation is not tightly aligned with stock price performance the last 3 years, we did not pay our bums very much).
8. I think what may be the most difficult to address is a requirement to discuss what the Compensation Committee plans to change—and why is it now that it has performed the analysis?
Let’s Make It a Dime; Here’s My Two Cents
I’m not sure that the problem with executive compensation is that companies aren’t disclosing enough information about it. Isn’t this what the CD&A is for? Isn’t this why the stock performance graph is included with the executive compensation disclosures?
Moreover, does anyone think that any company will just come out and say that their executive compensation is not based on or tied to company performance in any way? I’m just not sure that public companies need one more disclosure to try to convince their shareholders that the amount of compensation they are paying to their executives is justified by the company’s performance.
As I noted on October 21 (“ISS Changes Stock Plan Methodology“), ISS is changing how they evaluate stock plan proposals. Just before Christmas, ISS released additional information about their new Equity Plan Scorecard, including an FAQ. For today’s blog entry, I take a look at how the scorecard works.
What the Heck?
Historically, ISS has used a series of tests (Shareholder Value Transfer, burn rates, various plan features) to evaluate stock plan proposals. Many of these tests were deal-breakers. For example, fail the SVT test and ISS would recommend against the plan, regardless of how low your burn rate had been in the past or that fact that all the awards granted to your CEO vest based on performance.
Under the new Equity Plan Scorecard (known as “EPSC,” because what you need in your life right now is another acronym to remember), stock plans earn points in three areas (which ISS refers to as “pillars”): plan cost, grant practices, and plan features. Each pillar is worth a different amount of points, which vary based on how ISS categorizes your company. For example, S&P 500 and Russell 3000 companies can earn 45 points for the plan cost, 35 points for grant practices and 20 points for plan features. Plans need to score 53 points to receive a favorable recommendation. [I’m not sure how ISS came up with 53. Why not 42—the answer to life, the universe, and everything?] So an S&P 500 company could completely fail in the plan cost area and still squeak by with a passing score if the plan got close to 100% in both the grant practices and plan features area.
Plan Cost
Plan cost is our old friend, the SVT analysis but with a new twist. The SVT analysis is performed once with the shares requested, shares currently available under all plans, and awards outstanding, then performed a second time excluding the awards outstanding. Previously, ISS would carve out options that had been outstanding for longer than six years in certain circumstances. With the new SVT calculation that excludes outstanding options, this carve out is no longer necessary (at least, in ISS’s opinion–you might feel differently). The points awarded for the SVT analysis are scaled based on how the company scores against ISS’s benchmarks. Points are awarded for both analyses (with and without options outstanding), but the FAQ doesn’t say how many points you can get for each.
Grant Practices
The grant practices pillar includes our old friend, the burn rate analysis. But gone are the halcyon days when burn rates didn’t really matter because companies that failed the test could just make a burn rate commitment for the future. Now if companies fail the burn rate test, they have to hope they make the points up somewhere else. Burn rate scores are scaled, so partial credit is possible depending on how companies compare to the ISS’s benchmarks. This pillar also gives points for plan duration, which is how long the new share reserve is expected to last (full points for five years or less, no points for more than six years). S&P 500 and Russell 3000 companies can earn further points in this pillar for certain practices, such as clawback provisions, requiring shares to be held after exercise/vest, and making at least one-third of grants to the CEO subject to performance-based vesting).
Plan Features
This seems like the easiest pillar to accrue points in. Either a company/plan has the features specified, in which case the plan receives the full points, or it doesn’t, in which case, no points for you. There are also only four tests:
Not having single-trigger vesting upon a CIC
Not having liberal share counting
Not granting the administrator broad discretionary authority to accelerate vesting
Specifying a minimum vesting period of at least one year
That’s pretty simple. If willing to do all four of those things, S&P 500/Russell 3000 companies have an easy 20 points, non-Russell 3000 companies have an easy 30 points (more than halfway to the requisite 53 points), and IPO/bankruptcy companies have an easy 40 points (75% of the 53 points needed).
Alas, this does mean that companies no longer get a free pass on returning shares withheld for taxes on awards back to the plan. Previously, this practice simply caused the arrangement to be treated as a full value award in the SVT analysis. Since awards were already treated as full value awards in the SVT analysis, it didn’t matter what you did with the shares withheld for taxes. Now you need to be willing to forego full points in the plan features pillar if you want to return those shares to the plan.
Dealbreakers
Lastly, there are a few practices that result in a negative recommendation regardless of how many points the plan accrues under the various pillars. These include a liberal CIC definition, allowing repricing without shareholder approval, and a couple of catch-alls that boil down to essentially anything else that ISS doesn’t like.
This week I attended the annual CEP Symposium hosted by the Certified Equity Professional Institute at Santa Clara University. This was no ordinary CEP Symposium – it was the Institute’s 10th annual event, and also celebrated the Institute’s 25th anniversary. With so many great sessions at this event, it was hard to choose some tidbits to share in today’s blog. Finally, I decided to share with you 5 things I learned from Mark Borges, who delivered this year’s keynote address (and, by no coincidence, delivered the keynote at the first CEP Symposium years ago).
1. Performance-based pay is the new “norm.” That’s probably not surprising to many of us who are in the trenches of administering these programs, but the part that caught my attention is that shareholders are also catching on to the mainstream prevalence of these awards. The bottom line: if you are not using performance-based pay (which includes awards), your shareholders are likely to say something – now or in the near term future.
2. The proxy statement has become a “communication” tool, rather than a “compliance” tool. Some of the bigger brands have caught on to this concept and are investing in magazine-like layouts, looks and feels in designing and delivering their proxies. For examples, check out this year’s proxies from General Electric and Coca-Cola.
3. Executive pay litigation isn’t over. We’ve been through a couple phases of litigation initiated by shareholder plaintiff attorneys. The first round mostly focused on failed say-on-pay votes. The second round turns to inadequate proxy disclosures – mostly around stock plan proposals. Where is the litigation moving next? The eye seems to be turning to the technical non-compliance with the qualified performance based exception under Section 162(m).
4. Say-on-pay disclosures may be headed towards inclusion of more supplemental or responsive insights. It’s not far fetched to envision a table in the proxy that reports detailed results of shareholder say-on-pay votes and a matrix to address concerns raised by shareholders. 5. Don’t forget about the impending CEO pay ratio disclosure requirements coming from the SEC. The Commission is still scheduled to adopt rules this year, with a likely effective date somewhere in 2014 and implementation in 2016. These disclosures are expected to be both informative and inflammatory.
All in all, this year’s Symposium was a great event. I remember the first one – attended by somewhere around 75 people. This year’s attendance appeared to be just over 400. Congratulations to the Santa Clara University and the CEPI on their 25th anniversary in supporting the equity compensation profession, and for another successful event!
We’re into late March and I’m reminded of the centuries old English proverb: “March comes in like a lion and goes out like a lamb.” Somehow I think it’s the reverse for the stock plan world; as many of us get to this point in the year, we’ve found that we moved on from year-end reporting to a busier proxy season.
Say-on-What?
Perhaps I speak for many of us when I suggest that the term “say-on-pay” has almost become like white noise in the background. For so long it was talked about everywhere – with so much attention spent on dissecting how companies were implementing say-on-pay driven practices and proxy voting outcomes. Well, say-on-pay is still here, and while many of us are used to it, there are still a fair number of companies that still fail to gain an affirmative say-on-pay vote when proxy season comes. A few days ago, Broc Romanek of CompensationStandards.com blogged that the 2nd say-on-pay failure for this proxy season just happened. This particular company was one that received an affirmative say-on-pay vote the year before. All in all, 74 companies failed the say-on-pay vote last year. Let’s hope those numbers start a downward trend this season. I’m not sure if I’d put my money on a downward spiral just yet, though. According to an informal poll on CompensationStandards.com, 82% of respondents felt that somewhere between 41-90 companies would fail to obtain affirmative say-on-pay votes this season. Yikes!
Keep Your Eyes Wide Open
The message of today’s blog is that while say-on-pay is not so much a “hot topic” in stock compensation at the moment, it is proxy season, and shareholders are still very much engaged in expressing themselves via their say-on-pay votes. Additionally, last year we had much discussion on the wave of litigation aimed at better proxy disclosures. These are the things to keep in mind as you sit at the proxy table this year. While it’s obviously good to care about any proposal in your proxy statement, if you’ve got stock plan related proposals on the table, you’ll want to have your radar up to understand how shareholders (and their lawyers?) are reactive to your proxy statement as a whole. A negative vote against a stock plan matter may simply be a by-product of shareholder unhappiness related to other aspects of the company’s disclosures.
Although we many be feeling complacent with the concept of say-on-pay, now is not the time to relax our efforts to ensure that all disclosures will stand up to the continued scrutiny of shareholders and their advisors.
In separate proxy related news, the Wall Street Journal reports that it looks like proxy advisory firm ISS is set to change hands (for the third time in seven years).
Here are a few items that recently showed up in my Google Alert/email that I found interesting.
Return on Executives Exequity is promoting a new way to measure alignment of pay with performance: return on executives (ROX). This measure compares the change in compensation paid to executives with the aggregate change in shareholder wealth. According to Exequity’s alert, ROX results in greater correlation between pay and performance and fewer disconnects in pay for performance alignment than other models (e.g., relative degree of alignment) typically used by ISS, Glass Lewis, and institutional investors.
The alert doesn’t go into a lot of detail on the calculation, but if you are having trouble with your Say-on-Pay story, maybe you should give Exequity a call.
Canada’s Loophole Activists in Canada are jumping on the stock options loophole bandwagon. Their objection isn’t related to corporate tax deductions, however (companies already don’t typically get a deduction for stock compensation in Canada). Stock options that meet certain requirements are taxed as capital gains in Canada, which generally results in a 50% income deduction. The requirements seem to be somewhat straightforward (you can read about them on pg 28 the NASPP’s Canada Guide) and there isn’t a limit on the number of shares that can qualify for this benefit, like there is with ISOs in the US. Canadian tax activists think option gains should be taxed as compensation. But I wonder, if the options are taxed as compensation, shouldn’t companies then be entitled to a corporate tax deduction for them?
Less Disclosure It’s not often that you hear about the SEC reducing the disclosures companies are required to make. Recently, however, the Corporation Finance staff updated the SEC’s Financial Reporting Manual to reduce the amount of disclosure companies have to make about their pre-IPO stock price valuations. The SEC doesn’t note what is new in the Manual, but a blog by Polk Davis describes what has changed with respect to the disclosures. This seems to be an outcome of the SEC’s Reg S-K study that I blogged about last week.
Just when you thought you were finally getting a handle on the executive compensation disclosures, the SEC is considering changing them. According to an alert by McGuireWoods, the SEC staff has reviewed the disclosure requirements of Reg S-K (all of them, not just the disclosures relating to executive compensation) and issued a report that includes recommendations for further review. The JOBS Act of 2012 (not to be confused with the Jobs Creation Act of 2004) required the study with respect to disclosures by emerging growth companies, but the SEC expanded it to cover all companies.
The staff’s recommendations with respect to the executive compensation disclosures are fairly vague; they point out that these disclosures can be quite lengthy and technical and further review might be warranted on this basis, as well as to confirm that the information disclosed is useful to investors. The staff also suggests that the disclosures be reviewed to determine if they need to be made simpler for smaller companies.
So maybe the disclosures will change and maybe they won’t. According to the report, there weren’t any comments submitted to the SEC’s JOBS Act website on the executive compensation disclosures. Interestingly, there were two comments suggesting that the table disclosing the number of shares outstanding and available for grant under stock plans approved by shareholders and not approved by shareholders could be eliminated (and one comment that this table shouldn’t be eliminated, proving once again that you can’t please all the people, all the time).
According to McGuireWoods, at this time, the SEC is still formulating an action plan with respect to the study; a time frame hasn’t been specified for completing any further reviews called for under the study, much less promulgating and transitioning to any new rules.
Did You Know?
I did learn a couple of interesting tidbits when reading the section of the SEC’s report that covered the executive compensation disclosures. I thought you might be interested to know that:
The executive compensation disclosure rules have been amended more often than any other rules for disclosures required under Reg S-K.
The executive compensation disclosures, albeit in a very different format, have been around since the very first registration statement (Form A-1) implemented in 1933.
Back in 1933, the disclosure was required for any directors, officers, or other persons earning in excess of $25,000. This seems like a pretty low threshold, but then I ran the amount through the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s inflation calculator. In today’s dollars, that’s around $450,000.
In 1972, the threshold for disclosure was increased to compensation in excess of $40,000. According to the inflation calculator, that’s around $223,000 in today’s dollars.
It wasn’t until 1992 that the threshold was increased to $100,000. In today’s dollars, that’s about $166,000. $40,000 in 1972 was the equivalent of about $134,000 in 1992, so my guess is that we have a ways to go until the SEC decides to increase the threshold again.
ISS has published its burn rate tables for the 2014 proxy season and the news isn’t good. For most industries, the ISS burn rate caps have decreased for 2014. For today’s entry, I have a few fun facts about the new burn rate tables.
For Russell 3000 companies:
Burn rate caps decreased for 14 of the 22 industries in the Russell 3000 that ISS publishes caps for.
Caps increased for seven of the 22 industries (automobiles & components, banks, consumer services, insurance, retailing, semiconductor equipment, and transportation) and the cap stayed the same for the utilities industry.
The largest decrease was for the media industry, which dropped from 5.6% last year to 4.43% for this year (1.17 points). ISS did not decrease the caps for any other industries by more than 1 point.
The largest increase was for the automobiles & components industry, which increased from 3.28% last year to 3.81% this year (.53 points).
For non-Russell 3000 companies:
Burn rate caps decreased for 15 of the 22 non-Russell 3000 industries.
Just as for the Russell 3000 companies, ISS increased the caps for seven industries, but not the same seven. For non-Russell 3000 companies, the industries where the caps were increased are banks, capital goods, commercial & professional services, consumer durables & apparel, insurance, retailing, and technology hardware & equipment.
ISS did not leave the cap the same for any non-Russell 3000 companies.
The largest decrease was 2 points, which is the maximum change (either increase or decrease) ISS allows from one year to the next (yes, ISS puts a cap on the change in the cap).
There were two industries for which burn rates dropped by 2 pts: energy and diversified financials. For energy, the maximum burn rate dropped from 9.46% to 7.46%, but would have dropped to 6.26% without ISS’s cap on changes in maximum burn rates. For diversified financials, the maximum burn rate dropped from 9.56% to 7.56%, but would have dropped to 7.17% without the cap.
For just under half of the industries where the maximum burn rate decreased, the decrease was greater than 1 point. In addition to energy and diversified financials, these industries included automobiles & components, pharmaceuticals & biotechnology, telecommunication services, transportation, and utilities.
The largest increase was in capital goods, which went from 6.69 in 2013 to 8.16 in 2014 (1.47 points).
It’s Like We’ve Got a Good Set of Tarot Cards
For anyone that listened to the NASPP’s November webcast highlighting the results of our 2013 Domestic Stock Plan Design Survey (co-sponsored by Deloitte Consulting), this isn’t a surprise. The survey results foreshadowed this trend. Only 24% of respondents to the survey reported a three-year average burn rate of 2.5% or more (down from 31% in 2010) and, in the past year, almost one-fifth (19%) of respondents took action to reduce their burn rate. The ISS caps are extrapolated directly from actual burn rates (for each industry, the cap is generally the industry’s three-year average burn rate plus one standard deviation); ISS policy in this area simply reflects what is happening in practice.