For today’s blog, I feature five trends in tax withholding practices for restricted stock and units, from the 2016 Domestic Stock Plan Design Survey (co-sponsored by the NASPP and Deloitte Consulting):
Share Withholding Dominates; Sell-to-Cover Is a Distant Second. The majority (79% of respondents for executive transactions, 77% for non-executive transactions) report that share withholding is used to fund the tax payments the majority (greater than 75%) of award transactions. Most of the remaining respondents (17% of respondents for executive transactions, 18% for non-executive transactions) report that sell-to-cover is used to pay the taxes due on the majority of award transactions.
Rounding Up Is the Way to Go. Where shares are withheld to cover taxes, 75% of respondents report that the shares withheld are rounded up to the nearest whole share. Most respondents (62% overall) include the excess with employees’ tax payments; only 13% refund the excess to employees.
FMV Is Usually the Close or Average. The overwhelming majority (87%) of respondents use the close or average stock price on the vesting date to determine taxable income. Only 12% look to the prior day’s value to determine taxable income, despite the fact that this approach provides an additional 24 hours to determine, collect, and deposit the tax withholding due as a result of the vesting event (see “Need More Time? Consider Using Prior Day Close“).
Form 1099-B Is Rare for Share Withholding. Although share withholding can be considered the equivalent of a sale of stock to the company, only 21% of respondents issue a Form 1099-B to employees for the shares withheld.
Companies Are Split on Collecting FICA from Retirement Eligible Employees. Where awards provide for accelerated or continued vesting upon retirement, practices with respect to the collection of FICA taxes are largely split between share withholding and collecting the tax from employees’ other compensation (41% of respondents in each case).
The full results from the 2016 Domestic Stock Plan Design Survey, which the NASPP co-sponsors with Deloitte Consulting LLP, are now available. Companies that participated in the survey (and service providers who weren’t eligible to participate) have access to the full results. And all NASPP members can hear highlights from the survey results by listening to the archive of the webcast “Top Trends in Equity Plan Design,” which we presented in early November.
For today’s blog entry, I highlight ten data points from the survey results that I think are worth noting:
Full Value Awards Still Rising. This survey saw yet another increase in the usage of full value awards at all employee levels. Overall, companies granting time-based restricted stock or units increased to 89% of respondents in 2016 (up from 81% in 2013). Most full value awards are now in the form of units; use of restricted stock has been declining over the past several survey cycles.
Performance Awards Are for Execs. We are continuing to see a lot of growth in the usage of performance awards for high-ranking employees. Companies granting performance awards to CEOs and NEOs increased to 80% in 2016 (up from 70% in 2013) and companies granting to other senior management increased to 69% (from 58% in 2013). But for middle management and below, use of performance award largely stagnated.
Stock Options Are Still in Decline. Usage of stock options dropped slightly at all employee levels and overall to 51% of respondents (down from 54% in 2013).
TSR Is Hot. As a performance metric, TSR has been on an upwards trajectory for the last several survey cycles. In 2016, 52% of respondents report using this metric (up from 43% in 2013). This is first time in the history of the NASPP’s survey that a single performance metric has been used by more than half of the respondents.
The Typical TSR Award. Most companies that grant TSR awards, use relative performance (92% of respondents that grant TSR awards), pay out the awards even when TSR is negative if the company outperformed its peers (81%), and cap the payout (69%).
Clawbacks on the Rise. Not surprisingly, implementation of clawback provisions is also increasing, with 68% of respondents indicating that their grants are subject to one (up from 60% in 2013). Enforcement of clawbacks remains spotty, however: 5% of respondents haven’t enforced their clawback for any violations, 8% have enforced it for only some violations, and only 3% of respondents have enforced their clawback for all violations (84% of respondents haven’t had a violation occur).
Dividend Trends. Payment of dividend equivalents in RSUs is increasing: 78% of respondents in 2016, up from 71% in 2013, 64% in 2010, and 61% in 2007. Payment of dividends on restricted stock increased slightly (75% of respondents, up from 73% in 2013) but the overall trend over the past four surveys (going back to 2007) appears to be a slight decline. For both restricted stock and RSUs, companies are moving away from paying dividends/equivalents on a current basis and are instead paying them out with the underlying award.
Payouts to Retirees Are Common. Around two-thirds of companies provide some type of automated accelerated or continued vesting upon retirement (60% of respondents for stock grants/awards; 68% for performance awards, and 60% for stock options). This is up slightly in all cases from 2013.
Post-Vesting Holding Periods are Still Catching On. This was the first year that we asked about post-vesting holding periods: usage is relatively low, with only 18% of companies implementing them for stock grants/awards and only 13% for performance awards.
ISOs, Your Days May be Numbered. Of the respondents that grant stock options, only 18% grant ISOs. This works out to about 10% of the total survey respondents, down from 62% back in 2000. In fact, to further demonstrate the amount by which option usage has declined, let me point out that the percentage of respondents granting stock options in 2016 (51%) is less than the percentage of respondents granting ISOs in 2000 (and 100% of respondents granted options in 2000—an achievement no other award has accomplished).
Next year, we will conduct the Domestic Stock Plan Administration Survey, which covers administration and communication of stock plans, ESPPs, insider trading compliance, stock ownership guidelines, and outside director plans. Look for the survey announcement in March and make sure you participate to have access to the full results!
This week I provide additional coverage of the decisions the FASB made on the ASC 718 simplification project (see my blog from last week for Part 1).
Cash Flow Statement
The Board affirmed both of the proposals related to the cash flow statement: cash flows related to excess tax benefits will be reported as an operating activity and cash outflow as a result of share withholding will be reported as a financing activity. Nothing particularly exciting about either of these decisions but, hey, now you know.
Repurchase Features
The board decided not to go forward with the proposal on repurchases that are contingent on an event within the employee’s control. The proposal would have allowed equity treatment until the event becomes probable of occurring (which would align with the treatment of repurchases where the event is outside the employee’s control). The Board decided to reconsider this as part of a future project. The Board noted that this would have required the company to assess whether or not employees are likely to take whatever action would trigger the repurchase obligation, which might not be so simple to figure out (we all know how hard it is to predict/explain employee behavior).
Practical Expedient for Private Companies
The Board affirmed the decision to provide a simplified approach to determining expected term for private companies, but modified it to allow the approach to be used for performance awards with an explicitly stated performance period. I’m not sure that many private companies are granting performance-based stock options, but the few who are will be relieved about this, I’m sure.
Options Exercisable for an Extended Period After Termination
Companies that provide an extended period to exercise stock options after retirement, disability, death, etc., will be relieved to know that the FASB affirmed its decision to eliminate the requirement that these options should be subject to other applicable GAAP. This requirement was indefinitely deferred, but now we don’t have to worry about it at all.
For today’s blog entry, I cover yet another challenge in the ongoing saga of awards that provide for accelerated or continued vesting upon retirement.
A recent Chief Counsel Advice memorandum casts doubt on the treatment of dividend equivalents paid on vested but unpaid RSUs. This comes up when dividend equivalents are paid on RSUs that allow for deferred payout on either a mandatory basis or at the election of the award holder. This arrangement is relatively rare, however, and probably only impacts a few of my readers. More commonly, however, this is also an issue where dividend equivalents are paid on awards that provide for accelerated or continued vesting upon retirement and the award holder is eligible to retire.
Background
In either of the above situations, the RSU is subject to FICA when no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. For traditional deferral arrangements, risk of forfeiture lapses when the award vests. In the case of awards that provide for accelerated or continued vesting upon retirement, the risk of forfeiture substantively lapses when the award holder is eligible to retire.
Any dividend equivalents accrued on the award prior to when the award is subject to FICA will be subject to FICA at the time paid (if they are paid out to award holders at the same time they are paid to shareholders) or when the award is subject to FICA (if they will be paid out with the underlying award). But what about the dividend equivalents paid after the award has been subject to FICA? Does the company need to collect FICA on those equivalents when they are accrued/paid?
The Non-Duplication Rule
Under, Treas. Reg. §31.3121(v)(2)-1(a)(2)(iii), referred to as the “non-duplication rule,” once an RSU has been taken into income for FICA purposes, any future earnings on the underlying stock are not subject to FICA. So the answer to FICA treatment of the dividends depends on whether the dividends paid after this point are considered a form of earnings, akin to appreciation in value in the underlying stock (in which case, they would not be subject to FICA), or additional compensation (in which case, they would still be subject to FICA).
I’ve spoken with a number of practitioners about this. Most believe that an argument can be made that the dividend equivalent payments are a form of earnings and, thus, are not subject to FICA.
The CCA
In Chief Counsel Advice 201414018, issued earlier this year, the IRS argued that dividends paid after the award is subject to FICA are still subject to FICA. The situation the memorandum addresses, however, involved a number of facts not typically characteristic of RSUs that receive dividend equivalents:
The RSUs were granted by a private company
The awards were paid out only in cash
The dividend equivalents were paid out to award holders at the same time dividends were paid to shareholders, rather than with the underlying award
While concerning, the memorandum doesn’t necessary dictate a change in practice with respect to the FICA treatment of dividend equivalents, especially if your company is public, your RSUs are paid out in stock, and your dividend equivalents are paid out with the underlying award. It may, however, be worth reviewing the ruling with your tax advisors to ensure they are comfortable with your procedures (especially if any of the conditions in the memorandum also apply to your RSUs and dividend equivalents).
Retirement provisions constituted the most anticipated area of results in the 2013 Domestic Stock Plan Design Survey. I received several requests for a peek at the preliminary results in advance of our release of the final results. Now that the final results are available, I thought a summary of the data might be of interest to my readers.
The 2013 Domestic Stock Plan Design Survey Results
Automatic Payouts to Retirees: Just over 50% of respondents provide some sort of automatic payout to retirees–either full or pro-rata accelerated or continued vesting. Depending on the type of grant, another 5% to 17% provide a discretionary payout or some other type of payout.
Accelerated vs. Continued Vesting: For time-based restricted stock/units, acceleration of vesting (28%) edges out continuing to vest awards after retirement (23%). But, for stock options, the opposite is true–continued vesting upon retirement (27%) just edges out accelerated vesting (24%). And, for performance awards, continuing to vest (in other words, paying the awards out to retirees only at the end of the performance period rather than at retirement) wins by a landslide (44% vs. 8% or respondents). This makes sense–performance awards that pay out at retirement are problematic for a host of reasons: for starters, they provide the wrong incentive to potential retirees and don’t qualify as performance-based compensation under Section 162(m).
Full vs. Pro-Rata Vesting: For time-based awards, full vesting (vs. pro-rata vesting) is most common: 30% vs. 21% of respondents for RS/RSUs and 41% vs. 10% of respondents for stock options. But for performance awards, pro-rata vesting is more common (34% of respondents vs. only 18% that provide full vesting).
To be continued…tune in next week for the exciting conclusion to our foray into the world of retirement.
For today’s blog entry, I have a couple of follow-up tidbits related to the recent EITF decision on accounting for awards with performance periods that are longer than the time-based service period. I know you are thinking: “Yeesh, it was bad enough the first time, how much more could there be to say on this topic!” but you don’t write a blog.
Background
To refresh your memory, this applies to performance awards that provide a payout to retirees at the end of the performance period contingent on achieving a non-market condition target (in other words, just about any goal other than stock price or TSR targets). Where awards like this are held by retirement-eligible employees, the awards will not be forfeited in the event of the employees’ terminations but could still be forfeited due to failure to achieve the performance targets. The service component of the vesting requirements has been fulfilled but not the performance component.
This also applies to awards granted by private companies that vest based on both a time-based schedule and upon an IPO/CIC.
The EITF came to the same conclusion you probably would have come to on your own. Expense is adjusted for the likelihood that the performance conditions will be achieved; as this estimate changes throughout the performance period, the expense is adjusted commensurately until the end of the period, when the final amount of expense is trued up for the actual vesting outcome. (See “Performance Award Accounting,” April 15, for more information.)
The IASB Does It’s Own Thing
I thought it was just a few maverick practitioners that had taken an opposing position. The alternative approach (which the EITF rejected), is to bake the likelihood of the performance condition/IPO/CIC being achieved into the initial fair value, with no adjustments to expense for changes in estimates or outcome (akin to how market conditions are accounted for).
It turns out, however, that the IASB is one of the maverick practitioners that takes this position. Apparently, the IASB thinks that option pricing models can predict the likelihood of an IPO occurring or earnings targets or similar internal metrics being achieved. Which makes this another area were US GAAP diverges from IFRS. Just something to keep in your back pocket in case conversation lags at the next dinner party you attend.
Mid-Cycle Performance Grants
As I was reading Mercer’s “Grist Report” on the IASB’s decision, I noticed that they also had made a determination with respect to grants made in the middle of a performance cycle. These are typically grants made to new-hire employees. For example, the performance cycle starts in January and an executive is hired in February. All the other execs were granted awards in January at the start of cycle, but the newly hired exec’s award can’t be granted until February.
Under ASC 718, the grant to the newly hired exec is accounted for just like any other performance award. True, his award will have a different fair value than the awards granted in January and the expense of the award will be recorded over a shorter time period (by one month) than the other execs’ awards. But where the award is contingent on non-market conditions, the expense is adjusted based on the likelihood that the goals will be met and is trued up for the actual payout, just like any other performance-conditioned award.
The same treatment applies under IFRS 2, but only if the performance-conditioned award is granted shortly after the performance cycle has begun. Awards granted farther into the performance cycle (in my example, if the exec were hired in, say, June, rather than February) are accounted for in the manner applicable to market conditions (i.e., the vesting contingencies are baked into the initial grant date fair value, with no adjustment to expense for changes in estimates or outcome), even if the targets are internal metrics.
Hmmmm. I’m starting to wonder if discussions like this explain the dearth of dinner parties in my life.
Thanks to Susan Eichen at Mercer for bringing the IASB’s decision to my attention and for explaining the IASB’s positions with respect to mid-cycle performance grants.
At the same time that the IRS released regulations designed to clarify which restrictions constitute a substantial risk of forfeiture under Section 83 (see my blog entry “IRS Issues Final Regs Under Section 83,” March 4), a recent tax court decision casts doubt on the definition in the context of employees that are eligible to retire.
Background
As my readers know, where an employee is eligible to retire and holds restricted stock that provides for accelerated or continued vesting upon retirement, the awards are considered to no longer be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, and, consequently, are subject to tax under Section 83. This also applies to RSUs, because for FICA purposes, RSUs are subject to tax when no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture and the regs in this area look to Section 83 to determine what constitutes a substantial risk of forfeiture.
Although there’s usually some limited risk of forfeiture in the event that the retirement-eligible employee is terminated for cause, that risk isn’t considered to be substantial. As a practical matter, at many companies just about any termination after achieving retirement age is treated as a retirement.
Austin v. Commissioner
In Austin v. Commissioner however, the court held that an employee’s awards were still subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture even though the only circumstance in which the awards could be forfeited was termination due to cause. In this case, in addition to the typical definition of commission of a crime, “cause” included failure on the part of the employee to perform his job or to comply with company policies, standards, etc.
Implications
Up until now, most practitioners have assumed that providing for forfeiture solely in the event of termination due to cause is not sufficient to establish a substantial risk of forfeiture, regardless of how broad the definition of “cause” is. Austin seems to suggest, however, that, in some circumstances, defining “cause” more broadly (e.g., as more than just the commission of a crime) could implicate a substantial risk of forfeiture, thereby delaying taxation (for both income and FICA purposes in the case of restricted stock, for FICA purposes in the case of RSUs) until the award vests.
On the other hand, there are several aspects to this case that I think make the application of the court’s decision to other situations somewhat unclear. First, and most important, the termination provisions of the award in question were remarkably convoluted. So much so that resignation on the part of the employee would have constituted “cause” under the award agreement. There were not any special provisions relating to retirement; all voluntary terminations by the employee were treated the same under the agreement. In addition, the employee was subject to an employment agreement and the forfeiture provisions of the award were intended to ensure that the employee fulfilled the terms of this agreement.
Finally, the decision notes that, for a substantial risk of forfeiture to exist, it must be likely that the forfeiture provision would be enforced. I think that, for retirees, this often isn’t the case–the only time a forfeiture provision would be enforced would be in the event of some sort of crime or other egregious behavior. Termination for cause is likely to be met with resistance from the otherwise retirement-eligible employee; many companies feel that, with the exception of circumstances involving clearly egregious acts, it is preferable to simply pay out retirement benefits than to incur the cost of a lawsuit.
Never-the-less, it is worth noting that 26% of respondents to the NASPP’s recent quick survey on retirement provisions believe that awards held by retirees are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
The Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee has released a discussion draft of proposed legislation that could dramatically change the tax treatment of stock compensation as we know it. Here is a summary of the proposals.
No More Deferrals of Compensation
The good news is that Section 409A would be eliminated; I still don’t fully understand that section of the tax code and maybe if I just wait things out a bit, I won’t have to. But the bad news is that it would no longer be permissible to defer taxation of stock compensation beyond vesting. Instead, all awards would be taxed when transferable or no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
This would eliminate all elective deferral programs for RSUs and PSUs. The NASPP has data showing that those programs aren’t very common, so you probably don’t care so much about that. On the other hand, according to our data, about 50% of you are going to be very concerned about what this will do to your awards that provide for accelerated or continued vesting upon retirement. In addition to FICA, these awards would be subject to federal income tax when the award holder is eligible to retire. Say goodbye to your good friends the rule of administrative convenience and the lag method (and the FICA short-term deferral rule)–those rules are only available when the award hasn’t yet been subject to income tax. This could make acceleration/continuation of vesting for retirees something we all just fondly remember.
As drafted, this proposal would also apply to stock options, so that they too would be subject to tax upon vest (the draft doesn’t say anything about repealing Section 422, so I assume that ISOs would escape unscathed). But one practitioner who knows about these things expressed confidence that there would be some sort of exception carved out for stock options. I have to agree–I don’t have data to support this, but I strongly suspect that the US government gets a lot more tax revenue by taxing options when they are exercised, rather than at vest (and that someone is going to figure this out before the whole thing becomes law).
Section 162(m) Also Targeted
The proposal also calls for the elimination of the exception for performance-based compensation under Section 162(m). This means that both stock options and performance awards would no longer be exempt from the deduction limitation. At first you might think this is a relief because now you won’t have to understand Section 162(m) either. I hate to rain on your parade, but this is going to make the tax accounting and diluted EPS calculations significantly more complex for options and performance awards granted to the execs subject to this limitation.
And that’s a bummer, because the proposal says that once someone becomes subject to the 162(m) limitation, they will remain subject to it for the duration of their employment. Eventually, you could have significantly more than five execs that are subject to 162(m). That’s right–five execs. The proposal would make the CFO once again subject to 162(m), a change that’s probably long overdue.
And There’s More
The proposal would also change ordinary income tax rates, change how capital gains and dividends are taxed, and eliminate the dreaded AMT (making the CEP exam just a little bit easier). And those are just the changes that would impact stock compensation directly. There is a long list of other changes that will impact how you, your employees, and your employer are taxed. This memo by PwC has a great summary of the entire discussion draft. In addition, we are in the process of recording a podcast with Bill Dunn of PwC on the draft–look for it soon in the NASPP podcasts available on iTunes.
When Does This All Happen?
That’s a very good question. This proposal has a long ways to go on a road that is likely to be riddled with compromise. As far as I can tell, it hasn’t even been introduced yet as a bill in the House. It has to be passed by both the House and the Senate and then signed into law by the President. So I wouldn’t throw out those articles you’ve saved on Sections 409A and 162(m) and the AMT just yet. It’s hard to say what, if anything, will come of this.
As is often the case at this time of the year, a lot of tax related questions have been popping up in the NASPP Q&A Discussion Forum lately. For today’s blog entry, I try to quickly answer some of the questions I’ve seen the most frequently.
Former Employees You have to withhold taxes on option exercises by and award payouts to former employees and report the income for these stock plan transactions on a Form W-2, no matter how long it has been since they were employed by the company. The only exceptions are:
ISOs exercised within three months of termination (12 months for termination due to disability).
RSAs paid out on or after retirement (because these awards will have already been taxed for both income tax and FICA purposes when the award holders became eligible to retire). Likewise, RSUs paid out on or after retirement that have already been subject to FICA are subject to income tax only.
If the former employees did not receive regular wages from the company in the current year or the prior calendar year, US tax regs require you to withhold at their W-4 rate, not the supplemental rate. In my experience, however, few companies are aware of this and most withhold at the supplemental rate because the W-4 rate is too hard to figure out.
Changes in Employment Status Where an individual changes status from employee to non-employee (or vice versa) and holds options or awards that continue to vest after the change in status, when the option/award is exercised/paid out, you can apportion the income for the transaction based on years of service under each status. Withhold taxes on the income attributable to service as an employee (and report this income on Form W-2). No withholding is necessary for the income attributable to service as a non-employee (and this income is reported on Form 1099-MISC).
Any reasonable method of allocating the income is acceptable, so long as you are consistent about it.
Excess Withholding I know it’s hard to believe, but if you are withholding at the flat supplemental rate, the IRS doesn’t want you to withhold at a higher rate at the request of the employee. They care about this so much, they issued an information letter on it (see my blog entry “Supplemental Withholding,” January 8, 2013). If employees want you to withhold at a higher rate, you have to withhold at their W-4 rate and they have to submit a new W-4 that specifies the amount of additional withholding they want.
Also, withholding shares to cover excess tax withholding triggers liability treatment for accounting purposes (on the grant in question, at a minimum, and possibly for the entire plan). Selling shares on the open market to cover excess tax withholding does not have any accounting consequence, however.
ISOs and Form 3921 Same-day sales of ISOs have to be reported on Form 3921 even though this is a disqualifying disposition. It’s still an exercise of an ISO and the tax code says that all ISO exercises have to be reported.
On the other hand, if an ISO is exercised more than three months after termination of employment (12 months for termination due to disability), it’s no longer an ISO, it’s an NQSO. The good news is that because it’s an NQSO, you don’t have to report the exercise on Form 3921. The bad news is that you have to withhold taxes on it and report it on a Form W-2 (and, depending on how much time has elapsed, it might have been easier to report the exercise on Form 3921).
FICA, RSUs, and Retirement Eligible Employees This topic could easily be a blog entry in and of itself, but it doesn’t have to be because we published an in-depth article on it in the Jan-Feb 2014 issue of The NASPP Advisor (“Administrators’ Corner: FICA, RSUs, and Retirement“). All your questions about what rules you can rely on to delay collecting FICA for retirement eligible employees, what FMV to use to calculate the FICA income, and strategies for collecting the taxes are covered in this article.
Today I discuss recent litigation over mishandled FICA taxes on a nonqualified deferred compensation plan that could also have implications for RSUs.
The Lawsuit
The case involved a company that failed to collect FICA taxes on benefits paid under a nonqualified deferred compensation when the taxes were due. Because of this, and because the applicable statute of limitations during which the company could go back and amend the return for the year in which FICA should have been paid had elapsed, the company was obligated under IRS regulations to collect FICA when the benefits under the plan were paid out. The payouts occurred after the employees had retired.
The plan provided for payouts to occur in increments over a period of years, and, because the retirees were no longer actively employed, they had no other wages subject to FICA. As a result, the payouts were subject to Social Security. If the company had collected FICA when it should have, the payouts might not have been subject to Social Security because 1) the retirees would have still been employed and would have possibly met the wage cap for Social Security in those years; 2) the wage cap would have been lower; and 3) the entire amount would have been subject to Social Security in the same year, rather than in small increments over many years. A retiree brought suit against the company essentially claiming that because this was the company’s error and the error increased the amount of FICA tax that he has to pay, the company should have to pay his FICA tax for him.
This situation could also come up in the context of RSUs. Certainly it could apply where RSUs are subject to deferred payout, but more commonly it is likely to be a concern where RSUs provide for accelerated/continued vesting upon retirement and are granted to or held by employees that are eligible to retire. In that circumstance, the RSUs are substantially vested and are subject to FICA before they are paid out.
I learned a couple of important things from this that are applicable to RSUs.
There Is a Statute of Limitations
Who knew? If you screw up on FICA withholding for RSUs, you have a limited period of time in which to go back and fix this. That time is approximately three years (although the actual calculation of the statute of limitations is a little more complicated so if this applies to you, talk to your tax advisors).
FICA Taxes Revert Back to Payout
Even more interesting, if you don’t find the error and correct it before the statute of limitations runs out, your only choice is to collect FICA when the awards are paid out. Again, I say, who knew?
No Need to Panic, Yet
All this is interesting, but, of course, our primary interest is whether companies could be liable to participants for mishandled FICA taxes on RSUs. At this point, it’s hard to tell. Although there has been one decision in favor of the retiree, this case is far from over (that decision just allows the case to proceed), so who knows if the retire will prevail. And even if he does, the situation in this case isn’t fully analogous to RSUs. For one thing, the retiree is claiming a violation of ERISA, which typically doesn’t apply to RSUs.
Moreover, RSUs typically pay out at the time of retirement, not over a period of years after retirement. Thus, in the case of RSUs, there wouldn’t be a question of the payments being subject to Social Security when they otherwise wouldn’t have if FICA had been collected on time. The error would only increase FICA taxes through an increase in the stock price (which would mostly apply only to Medicare since Social Security is capped), an increase in the Social Security wage cap, and maybe differences in compensation levels (but only for employees that don’t otherwise normally earn enough to max out on Social Security). Even where employees are subject to tax at the higher 2.35% Medicare rate, it seems unlikely that any of those things would be worth suing over.