A recent IRS Chief Counsel Memorandum indicates that smaller reporting companies must treat their CFO as a covered employee under Section 162(m) if he/she is one of the top two highest paid executives other than the CEO.
Wait a Minute! The CFO Isn’t Subject to 162(m)?
Yep, that’s right. For larger reporting companies, it may seem crazy, but the CFO isn’t ever a covered employee under Section 162(m). This is because the definition of a named executive officer under Item 402 of Reg S-K for purposes of the executive compensation disclosures in the proxy has evolved and the definition of a covered employee under Section 162(m) hasn’t kept pace.
Section 162(m) applies to the following executives:
The CEO
The top four highest paid executives other than the CEO, as determined for proxy disclosure purposes.
Back when 162(m) was adopted, this was the same group of people that were considered NEOs for purposes of the proxy disclosures. But in 2006, the SEC changed Item 402 to carve out a separate requirement for CFOs. So now, the NEOs in the proxy are:
Anyone serving as CEO during the year
Anyone serving as CFO during the year
The top three highest paid executives other than the CEO and the CFO.
Up to two additional executives that would have been in the top three except that they terminated before the end of the year.
Unfortunately, only Congress can change the statutory language under Section 162(m), so the IRS can’t modify the definition of a covered employee to match the SEC’s new definition of an NEO. (When Congress drafted Section 162(m), they probably should have just said that it applies to all NEOs as determined under Item 402 of Reg S-K.)
All the IRS can do is interpret the requirement under 162(m) in light of the SEC’s definition. Their interpretation is that the SEC’s change exempts CFOs from Section 162(m) (see the NASPP alert “IRS Issues Guidance on ‘Covered Employees’ Under Section 162(m),” June 9, 2007). (If you are wondering, former employees are also not subject to Section 162(m); this is another evolution in the SEC definition that hasn’t been implemented in the tax code.)
What Gives With Smaller Reporting Companies?
Smaller reporting companies are subject to abbreviated reporting requirements, including fewer NEOs for proxy reporting purposes. Thus, the SEC’s new definition in 2006 never applied to smaller reporting companies. Instead, NEOs in smaller reporting companies are defined as:
The CEO
The top two highest paid executives other than the CEO.
Per Chief Counsel Memorandum 201543003, because the CFO isn’t separately required to be included in the proxy disclosures for smaller reporting companies, he/she is still a covered employee for Section 162(m) if he/she is one of the top two highest paid executives other than the CEO.
It’s no April Fool’s joke—on March 31, the IRS and Treasury issued final regulations under Section 162(m). The final regs are largely the same as the proposed regs that were issued back in 2011 (don’t believe me—check out the redline I created); so much so that I considered just copying my blog entry on the proposed regs and changing the word “proposed” to “final” throughout. But I’m not the sort of person that takes short-cuts like that, so I’ve written a whole new blog for you.
For more information on the final regs, check on the NASPP alert, which includes several law-firm memos.
The IRS Says “We Told You So”
The final regulations implement the clarification in the proposed regs that, for options and SARs to be exempt from the deduction limit under Section 162(m), the plan must specify a limit on the maximum number of shares that can be granted to an individual employee over a specified time period. It is not sufficient for the plan to merely limit the aggregate number of shares that can be granted, even though this creates a de facto per-person limit; the plan must separately state a per person limit (although the separately stated per-person limit could be equal to the aggregate number of shares that can be issued under the plan). One small change in the final regs was to clarify that the limit doesn’t have to be specific to options/SARs; a limit on all types of awards to individual employees is sufficient.
When the proposed regs came out, I was surprised that the IRS felt the need to issue regs clarifying this. This had always been my understanding of Section 162(m) and, as far as I know, the understanding of most, if not all, tax practitioners. In his sessions over the years at the NASPP Conference, IRS representative Stephen Tackney has said that everyone always agrees on the rules until some company gets dinged on audit for not complying with them—then all of a sudden the rules aren’t so clear. I expect that a situation like this drove the need for the clarification.
In the preamble to the final regs, the IRS is very clear that this is merely a “clarification” and that companies should have been doing this all along, even going so far as to quote from the preamble to the 1993 regs. Given that the IRS feels like this was clear all the way back in 1993, the effective date for this portion of the final regs is retroactive to June 24, 2011, when the proposed regs were issued (and I guess maybe we are lucky they didn’t make it effective as of 1993). Hopefully, you took the proposed regs to heart and made sure all your option/SAR plans include a per-person limit. If you didn’t, it looks like any options/SARs you’ve granted since then may not be fully deductible under Section 162(m).
Why Doesn’t the IRS Like RSUs?
Newly public companies enjoy the benefit of a transitional period before they have to fully comply with Section 162(m). The definition of this period is one of the most ridiculously complex things I’ve ever read and it’s not the point of the new regs, so I’m not going to try to explain it here. Suffice it to say that it works out to be more or less three years for most companies.
During the transitional period, awards granted under plans that were implemented prior to the IPO are not subject to the deduction limit. Even better, the deduction limit doesn’t apply to options, SARs, and restricted stock granted under those plans during this period, even if the awards are settled after the period has elapsed. It’s essentially a free pass for options, SARs, and restricted stock granted during the transition period. The proposed regs and the final regs clarify that this free pass doesn’t apply to RSUs. For RSUs to be exempt from the deduction limit, they must be settled during the transition period. This provides a fairly strong incentive for newly public companies to grant restricted stock, rather than RSUs, to executives that are likely to be covered by Section 162(m).
I am surprised by this. I thought that some very reasonable arguments had been made for treating RSUs the same as options, SARs, and restricted stock and that the IRS might be willing to reverse the position taken in the proposed regs. (In fact, private letter rulings had sometimes taken the reverse position). I think the IRS felt that because RSUs are essentially a form of non-qualified deferred comp, providing a broad exemption for them might lead to abuse and practices that are beyond the intent of the exemption.
This portion of the regs is effective for RSUs granted after April 1, 2015.
Today’s blog entry is about CHIPs. Not the Erik Estrada and John Wilcox variety, but Certain Health Insurance Providers. The IRS has proposed regulations implementing the $500,000 deduction limit that applies to CHIPs under the President Obama’s health care package.
Why Do You Care?
If you aren’t a health insurance provider, you probably are wondering why you should care about this. And, right now, you probably don’t. But the placing further restrictions on the limit on corporate tax deductions under Section 162(m) for all companies is something that is currently on the table in DC. I think it’s likely that any additional restrictions would mimic, at least in part, the restrictions that apply to health insurance providers. Thus, even if you aren’t CHIP, I think it’s worth five minutes of your time to read today’s blog entry so you have an idea of what might be coming down the pike.
What’s Different?
The following table provides a quick illustration of how the limit for CHIPs differs from the standard limitation we are all familiar with under Section 162(m). As you can see, it’s about more than just $500,000.
Limit for CHIPs
Standard 162(m) Limit
Applies to:
Public and private companies
Public companies only
Max Deduction:
$500,000
$1,000,000
Covered Employees:
All employees + directors + most consultants
NEOs only
Performance Compensation:
Not exempted
Exempted
Timing:
When earned
When paid
Why You Should be Worried
The new limit that applies to CHIPs has some significant implications for stock compensation. First, because performance compensation isn’t exempted, stock options and performance awards are subject to the limit (which does have a silver lining in that CHIPs don’t have to worry about meeting 162(m) requirements when implementing these plans–say hello to our long-lost friend, discretionary payouts).
Second, because the limit applies when compensation is earned, not when it is paid, to figure out whether the company can claim its deduction for stock awards, the deduction has to be allocated on a daily pro rata basis over the period the awards was earned. You would expect this to be the vesting period, but it isn’t. For options, the period is measured from grant to exercise; for restricted stock, it’s grant to vest; and for RSUs, it’s grant to payout. So let’s say an option is exercised just prior to the end of its ten-year contractual term–that’s 11 tax years that the deduction would be allocated over.
That’s complicated enough, but things get really complicated when you think about the impact on your DTA accruals for tax accounting purposes and the tax benefit assumed for diluted EPS purposes. Makes you glad your company isn’t a CHIP (unless you are a CHIP, in which case, good luck with all that).
For today’s blog, I have another exciting smorgasbord of random stock plan related tidbits.
IRS Issues GLAM on Stock Compensation Deductions and CICs In January, the IRS issued general legal advice memorandum AM2012-010 clarifying that when NQSOs and SARs are cashed out due to a change in control, the tax deduction is attributable to the acquired company. This is because the obligation to make the payments became fixed and determinable at the closing and the payments were for services performed prior to the acquistion.
Two things to note here:
This is unfortunate because chances are the target company isn’t all that profitable, making the deduction less than useful.
The acronym for this type of IRS pronouncement is GLAM. That makes the whole thing sound way cooler than it actually is.
For more information see the WSGR alert we posted on this development.
ISS Theme Song: Coming Around Again? I’m sure you’ve heard about this by now, but just in case, ISS has announced that it will replace the GRId analysis system with a new system called “QuickScore,” which does have the advantage of sounding niftier and friendlier. If you are thinking “what the heck, didn’t they just switch to the GRId system,” time must be flying by for you just as fast as it does for me. ISS switched to GRId back in 2010 (I blogged about it, see “Will ISS Red Light Your Stock Compensation?” March 23, 2010). Still, it does feel like ISS is changing systems almost as often as they change their name.
Under QuickScore, companies will receive a relative ranking from 1 to 10 (1 is good, 10 is bad) by region and industry, instead of the color coded (red, yellow, green) score companies received under GRId. Which is similar to ISS’s Corporate Governance Quotient system that was replaced by GRId. Sort like how ISS changed to RiskMetrics and then changed back to ISS.
Backdating Bad for Your Career A recent academic study found that CFOs that lost their job as a result of option backdating have had a tough time re-entering the workforce. Only 18.7% found a comparable position (compared to 35.1% of CFOs that had lost their job for other reasons) and only 48.4% found any full-time corporate position (compared to 83.8% of other CFOs).
Which was a little surprising to me because how would a potential employer even know that’s how you lost your job? You wouldn’t exactly put “falsifying corporate records to reduce expense” under the skills listed on your resume and, in my experience, companies don’t give out that kind of information about former employees. But I guess a quick Google search these days can be very revealing about job candidates.
Back in July, I blogged about Barnes & Noble’s grant to their CEO that was in excess of the per-person limit in their plan (“What’s Your Limit?,” July 31, 2012). I thought that was an isolated incident, but now another company has done the same thing, three years in a row! If one more company does it, I think we’ll have to call it a “trend.”
Devry Makes Repeated Grants in Excess of Plan Limit A recent lawsuit against Devry alleges that the company granted options to its CEO in excess of the per-person limit included in its stock plan for Section 162(m) purposes for three years in a row. The total number of excess shares granted to the CEO is almost 160,000 (34,100 shares in excess of the limit in 2010; 20,200 in 2011; and 105,425 in 2012).
Devry has several stock plans and it’s a little hard to tell which plan the options were granted out of. Ultimately, though, it doesn’t matter because, with the exception of their 1994 plan, which, according to their June 30 2012 Form 10-K, is no longer in use, all of the plans limit the number of option shares that can be granted to an individual to 150,000 per year.
Unlike Barnes & Noble’s limit, which was over a three-year period, this is a nice, clean annual limit, so it seems a little surprising that no one at Devry noticed the error. Even more surprising that they managed to make the same error three years in a row.
According to their 10-K, Devry currently has two plans that they grant options out of (a 2003 plan and a 2005 plan). As far as I can tell, based on the Form 4 reporting the grants, the options granted to the CEO were granted out of just one plan (although I can’t ascertain this for certain). I believe that the limit applies only to options granted under the plan in which it is stated. Thus, if a portion (no more than 150,000 shares worth) of each year’s options were granted under one plan with the remaining portion granted under the other plan, it seems to be that neither plan limit would have been exceeded and there’d be no problem under Section 162(m).
Don’t Be My Next Blog Entry!
This is such an easy mistake for shareholders and the IRS to find. The per-person limit is clearly stated in your plan, which is filed with the SEC–there’s list of exhibits in your 10-K telling readers which filing it is included in. And all of your executives’ grants are reported on Form 4 filings. At “The IRS Speaks” panel at this year’s NASPP Conference, Deb Walker of Deloitte pointed out that Section 162(m) is one of the first areas IRS auditors target, because it is an area where there are a lot of compliance failures that are relatively easy to uncover. Make sure your company doesn’t make this mistake; compare all grants to your executives against the per-person limit in your plan. Do this every time an executive is granted an option.
On June 21, 2012, the IRS issued Rev. Rul. 2012-19 to clarify the treatment of dividends paid on awards that satisfy the requirements to be considered performance-based compensation under Section 162(m). For today’s blog entry, I summarize this ruling.
Background on Section 162(m) (That You Probably Already Know But I Feel Compelled to Include Anyway, Just in Case)
Section 162(m) limits the tax deduction companies can claim for compensation paid to specified executive officers to $1 million per year. Performance-based compensation, as defined under the code and associated regulations, is exempt from this limitation. There are numerous conditions that must be met for awards to be considered performance-based, including that the awards must be payable only upon achievement of performance targets and cannot be paid out prior to certification (by the compensation committee) that the targets have been satisfied.
Treatment of Dividends Under Section 162(m)
Under the ruling, the dividends (and dividend equivalents) are viewed as separate awards–thus, they don’t taint the status of the underlying awards even if they will be paid to award holders before the performance conditions have been met (or will be paid even if the conditions aren’t met). But the dividends or equivalents themselves are considered performance-based compensation only if they also meet the requirements for this treatment under Section 162(m)–i.e., if they will be paid only upon attainment of performance targets and meet the other requirements specified under Section 162(m).
The easiest way to ensure that the dividends/equivalents will be considered performance-based under Section 162(m) is to pay them out only when the underlying award is paid out. If the award is forfeited, the dividends/equivalents accrued on it are forfeited as well. This is also a best practice for accounting purposes and from a shareholder-optics standpoint (ISS specifically identifies paying dividends on unvested performance awards as a “problematic pay practice”–see my December 15, 2010 blog entry, “ISS Policy Updates“).
Interestingly–in a grotesque-but-can’t-look-away sense–the ruling says that the dividends/equivalents don’t have to be subject to the same performance criteria as the underlying award–you could have one set of goals for the award and different goals for the dividends. That seems like a disaster just waiting to happen–a mess from both an administrative and participant education standpoint (as if your executives really need another set of goals to focus on, in addition to the award goals and the cash bonus plan goals). But now that the IRS has suggested it, I fear there is a compensation consultant already trying to design a plan that incorporates this feature. Just say “No!”
No Deduction for Dividends Paid on a Current Basis
Where the dividends will be paid out prior to satisfaction of the performance conditions–i.e., where they are paid to award holders at the same time they are paid to shareholders–the dividends are not considered performance-based compensation and are subject to the limit on the company’s tax deduction under Section 162(m).
This is just one more nail in the coffin for paying out dividends on a current basis. Even if the dividend payments aren’t that significant, I imagine trying to separate them from the original award for purposes of computing the company’s tax deduction will be a challenge. I have a headache just thinking about it.
No Surprises
My sense, from reading Mike Melbinger’s blog on CompensationStandards.com (“Code Sec. 162(m), RSUs, Dividends and Dividend Equivalents,” July 2, 2012) and the Skadden memo we posted on this, is that this is pretty much what everyone was doing anyway. It certainly seemed like common sense to me–if there is such a thing when it comes to the tax code. So, just like last month’s “Section 83 Update” (June 12, 2012), I’m a little surprised that the IRS doesn’t have anything more important to worry about. I’m sure this will be discussed at the IRS and Treasury Speak panel at the NASPP Conference–it will be interesting to hear why the IRS felt the need to issue this ruling.
NASPP “To Do” List We have so much going on here at the NASPP that it can be hard to keep track of it all, so we keep an ongoing “to do” list for you here in our blog.
Don’t miss the Silicon Valley chapter all-day conference this Wednesday, July 11. Robyn Shutak and I will be presenting on life events and equity compensation, with Liz Stoudt of Radford–we hope to see you there!
Chapter meetings are also being held in Chicago, Los Angeles, NY/NJ, and Philadelphia. I’ll be speaking at the NY/NJ and Philadelphia meetings–be sure to stop by and say hello!
This week, we feature another installment in our series of guest blog entries by NASPP Conference speakers. Today’s entry is written by Ellie Kehmeier of Steele Consulting, who will lead a session on Section 162(m) at the NASPP Conference.
If any code section warrants the old adage “the devil is in the details,” it’s got to be Section 162(m), which disallows corporate tax deductions for compensation paid to top executives in excess of $1 million. Complying with the requirements of this section can be devilishly tricky, especially when it comes to trying to preserve tax deductions for equity awards by meeting the exception for performance-based compensation.
My fellow panelists, Danielle Benderly of Perkins Coie and Art Meyers of Choate Hall & Stewart, and I have presented on 162(m) before. We realize that, while it’s an incredibly important topic, it can also be an incredibly dry topic. For our session in New Orleans, we plan to bring 162(m) to life with lively back-and-forth discussion of issues raised in a detailed case study we’re putting together for this session that hits on many of the stumbling blocks that we’ve seen trip up HR, legal, and tax professionals alike.
For example, while most people understand that stock options and SARs generally qualify as performance-based compensation as long as the awards aren’t granted with a discounted exercise price, it’s easy to overlook the additional requirement that the compensation committee that grants equity awards to 162(m) covered employees must be comprised solely of two or more “outside directors”. Easy enough, you might think: if we’re already following the NASDAQ and NYSE listing requirements for independent directors, we should be okay, right? Not so fast! The tax rules are different, and in some respects more stringent, than the exchange listing requirements. For example, if your company pays any amount, no matter how immaterial, to an entity that is more than 50% owned by a director (directly or beneficially)–such as a caterer or florist that happens to be owned by a family member of that director–then you have a problem! If your compensation committee fails to meet these requirements, then all the equity awards granted by the committee similarly fail. That’s a harsh result, and can cause a pretty big hit to your company’s bottom line!
We will also use our case study to explore other outside director challenges, as well as tricks and traps related to when performance goals need to be established, if and how they can be changed, and when and how to get shareholder approval. For example, do your plans explicitly address how your compensation committee can adjust performance goals to reflect the effect on an acquisition? Can your company pay bonuses outside of your performance plan if the established goals are not met? Can you structure compensation for executives hired mid-year to comply with 162(m)? Our case study will also address the transition rules for newly public companies. Finally, we’ll discuss planning opportunities and best practices, and cover recent developments, including proposed 162(m) regulations that may be finalized by the time we meet in New Orleans. We’ll see you there!
Just before the turning of the New Year, the New York Times printed an article about the potential for large cash windfalls to CEOs who received mega-sized stock option grants during the lowest points of the stock market downturn in 2008 and 2009. Judging from the number of Google Alerts that subsequently came to my inbox on this topic, it seems the article stirred some strong opinions, particularly about the corresponding potential corporate tax deductions.
High Value Non Qualified Stock Option Exercise = Hefty Corporate Tax Deduction
In summary, during the lowest points of stock market performance, many companies issued larger-than-usual stock option grants to their executives. Now, with the market on the rebound, and barring a relapse, many of these grants are well in-the-money and primed to generate huge windfalls of cash for the executives upon exercise. Hand in hand with large cash gains for the executive would be a hefty tax deduction for the company. Estimates run in the billions in terms of shares granted and potential dollars in gains resulting from the grants in question. According to the article, “of the billions of shares worth of options issued after the crisis, only about 11 million have thus far been exercised, according to data compiled by InsiderScore, a consulting firm that compiles regulatory filings on insider stock sales.” This seems to indicate that most of the potential windfall is still on paper, and there may be many significant stock option exercises to come.
What’s the Buzz?
Critics of the stock option tax deduction provisions within the Internal Revenue Code are already vocalizing dissent over the possibility that many companies may drastically reduce, or altogether eliminate, their tax liability due to the large sized deductions that would accompany such significant executive gains. Barbara blogged about a similar concept back in September. As I thought about this possibility, it occurred to me that this is not the only time in history that large windfalls equaled large deductions. In fact, anytime there is an uptick in a company’s stock and a stock option appreciates, there is value. This could be in parallel with market conditions, or simply because a company is performing well, or both. When that value is recognized in the form of an exercise of a non-qualified stock option, the company receives a corresponding tax deduction. Since executives are usually the employees with the largest stock grants, it’s likely that the largest corporate tax deductions typically originate from executive transactions. This isn’t a new trend.
Déjà Vu
I’m thinking back to the 1990s up through 2000 when the stock market was bullish, and feeling like I’ve been here before. Which prompts me to say “so what?” Now, before I get dozens of emails correcting me on statement, the “what” that is different in this situation is that it seems many of the stock options granted in 2008 and 2009 were particularly oversized, seemingly because of the state of the economy and miserable market conditions. In addition, many of those grants were free of performance conditions, which means that the potential windfall in many cases may be a pure reflection of a market rebound, and has nothing to do with the executive or company’s performance. That thought has stirred some buzz, and it seems likely to continue as more paper gains translate into real cash through exercises. It seems that time is upon us, or not too far into the future. This will be a topic that is bound to generate some buzz in the coming months. I wonder if Senator Levin will use this as yet another opportunity to try and get his bill (limiting stock option tax deductions to the expense recognized for them) through Congress. It seems like 2012 may be a year of epic stock option gains; we’ll just have to wait and see.
It was great to see everyone at the NASPP Conference last week. One session I look forward to every year at the Conference is “The IRS Speaks“–which I consider to be my chance to get the inside scoop on various IRS projects that impact stock compensation. For today’s blog, I have a few updates from this year’s panel, as well as some other recent tax news.
For highlights of the NASPP Conference, check out my blog entries on November 2 and November 4.
COLAs for 2012 The maximum amount of earnings subject to Social Security tax will increase to $110,100 in 2012 (up from $106,800 this year) (those of you that follow the NASPP on Facebook and Twitter already know this). The tax rate is also scheduled to return to 6.2% (up from 4.2% this year), making the maximum withholding $6,826.20 for 2012 (see the NASPP alert). But stay tuned on this one; President Obama has proposed reducing Social Security tax for 2012.
Also, if any of you exclude highly compensated employees from your ESPP, note that the threshold for who is considered highly compensated increases to $115,000 in 2012.
BTW–COLAs stands for “cost of living adjustments.”
Updates from “The IRS Speaks“ Here are areas where the IRS hopes to issue guidance in the next year or so:
409A income inclusion rules. Note however, that this doesn’t include Code Y reporting. That isn’t likely to happen until some time after the 409A income inclusion rules are finalized.
Finalizing the proposed regs that were issued earlier this year under Section 162(m).
The treatment of dividends and dividend equivalents under Section 162(m).
A model election under Section 83(b) that includes examples illustrating the tax consequences of making (or not making) the election. (Fascinating–I had no idea the IRS even thought there was a need for this.)
Guidance on Section 162(m)(6), which relates to the deduction limit that applies to health insurance providers.
Something about foreign pension plans under Section 402(b) (I have no idea what this is–sorry, when I hear the words “foreign pension plans,” I tune out).
The panel also covered a number of issues relating to Section 6039 returns for ISOs and ESPPs. I don’t have time to cover them all today, but maybe in a future blog.
In terms of cost-basis reporting, the panel did say that the IRS is considering adding a checkbox to Form 1099-B that would indicate whether the reported cost basis includes W-2 income recognized in connection with the shares. We think this brilliant suggestion from Andrew Schwartz of BNY Mellon Shareowner Services would be a big help in explaining the form to employees, but if the IRS makes this change, it won’t be until the 2012 form comes out.
NASPP “To Do” List We have so much going on here at the NASPP that it can be hard to keep track of it all, so I keep an ongoing “to do” list for you here in my blog.
A new study reporting that some CEOs make more than their companies pay in taxes has been making a splash in the media lately. Today I offer some comments on the study.
Executive Excess 2011: The Massive CEO Rewards for Tax Dodging The study looked at the 100 highest paid CEOs in the US and found that 25 of them earned more than their companies paid in taxes. The study also found that the average pay of the 25 CEOs exceeded the average pay of CEOs at all Fortune 500 companies, but, as one criticism of the study points out: “any subset of the 100 highest-paid CEOs in the country is going to have higher average pay than S&P 500 CEOs in general,” so this isn’t exactly groundbreaking.
The study also emphasizes that most of the 25 companies received tax refunds. Maybe I’m missing something here, but I thought getting a tax refund means you paid too much in tax, the IRS earned interest on your money all year, and then gave your excess payment back without interest at the end of the year. The companies that didn’t get a tax refund were the clever ones because they earned interest on their money all year, rather than the IRS–they aren’t necessarily paying their CEOs any less.
Compensation Apples to Tax Oranges
One problem I have with this study is that CEO pay isn’t directly related to the company’s tax bill. The two amounts really have nothing to do with each other. In fact, amounts paid to the CEO are an expense to the company; expenses reduce the company’s profitability which in turn reduces the amount the company pays in taxes.
Companies that aren’t profitable don’t pay any taxes. If CEO pay shouldn’t exceed the company’s tax bill, does this mean that CEOs at companies that aren’t realizing a profit shouldn’t be paid anything? That’s really going to put a damper on the start-up market.
Don’t get me wrong, I agree with the principle that many CEOs of public companies are paid excessively–I’m just not sure that the company’s tax bill is the appropriate yardstick by which we should determine what is excessive.
Is Senator Levin Behind This?
The study includes a special side bar (on pg 7) that explains how stock options contribute to this problem by producing a tax deduction for the corporation that differs from the expense recognized for the option–something Senator Carl Levin has been trying to change for years (see my August 9 blog, “Senator Levin, Still Trying“).
The study says that “The amount of compensation the executive receives on the exercise date is often substantially more than the book expense of the options…” I take issue with this statement. I’ve never seen any data to back it up, I don’t see any data backing it up in this study, and I know that many options end up underwater or result in a spread at exercise that is less than the grant date fair value. In fact, I’d love to see an analysis comparing grant date fair value to spread at exercise for a wide range of stock options at a wide range of companies, if anyone out there wants to take the project on.
CEOs Pay Taxes Too
One reason why compensation results in a tax deduction for the company is that the individual receiving the compensation pays taxes on it. So, while the company might be getting a tax break, the CEOs are still paying tax, probably a lot of tax.
NQSO exercises are certainly subject to tax. The US corporate tax rate for large public companies is around 34% to 35% (at least according to Wikipedia–I know nothing about corporate tax rates). The highest federal marginal income tax rate in the US is 35% and I have to believe that the CEOs in the study are paying tax at this rate (plus they are paying FICA taxes and the company is paying matching FICA taxes on the income). So whether the company pays tax on the income or the CEO does, it seems like the tax revenue is about the same (maybe slightly higher when the CEO is paying the tax because of FICA).
For example, let’s say that a company earns a profit $100 million and the CEO of the company holds an NQSO with a spread of $1 million. If the CEO doesn’t exercise the option, the company pays tax on $1 billion. If the CEO does exercise the option, the company pays tax on $99 million, but the CEO pays tax on the $1 million spread–at possibly a slightly higher rate than company would have paid. Tax revenue for the US federal government is about the same either way.
NASPP “To Do” List We have so much going on here at the NASPP that it can be hard to keep track of it all, so I keep an ongoing “to do” list for you here in my blog.